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Summary
Party membership seems to lose importance for political careers. In the wake of political
dealignment and dwindling numbers in party membership, an increasing number of parties
have started to recruit candidates without prior party membership. What are the impli-
cations of this trend in elite recruitment for candidate loyalty, party unity and legislators'
activity in parliament? This thesis empirically addresses these questions by making use
of several novel and self-collected quantitative data-sets. First, the thesis explores the for-
mal eligibility criteria within parties that aspirants for candidacies have to fulﬁll. By using
data based on roughly 500 self-collected (historical) party constitutions, data on parties'
parliamentary voting records and candidate survey data, this thesis ﬁnds that candidacy
eligibility criteria that presume a minium length of prior party membership are associ-
ated with greater party unity and candidate loyalty. Secondly, I explore how prior party
membership aﬀects to behavior of legislators. Expectations generated from social identity
theory are put to empirical tests using data on all Member of Parliament of the German
Bundestag from 1953 to 2013, and their voting behavior on unwhipped votes. Longer
spells of prior and active party membership are associated with greater coherence, theo-
rized to be the product of socialization processes into parties' norms and values. Finally,
the consequences of long-term party membership respective the lack thereof are investi-
gated by taking advantage of the Japanese case. I explore the behavioral diﬀerences of
candidates nominated through open recruitment and those nominated through traditional
channels, as has been practiced by major Japanese parties. I ﬁnd that those candidates
nominated under open recruitment, oftentimes lacking prior party membership and po-
litical experience, are ill-prepared for legislative oﬃce at the national level. Compared to
their more traditional colleagues, these candidates are less active in parliament. In conclu-
sion, this thesis ﬁnds that party membership matters on such dimensions as party unity
and legislative activity, and that it is (enforced) intra-party socialization processes that
help prepare the individual candidate for the responsibilities of legislative oﬃce. Thus,
this thesis contributes to the literature of candidate selection  by looking at eligibility
criteria  and legislative studies  by assessing the former's consequentiality.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
I supplied land, houses and the use of much capital... but experience proved
that the attempt was premature to unite a number of strangers not previously
educated for the purpose, who should carry on extensive operations for their
common interest, and live together as a common family.
- Robert Owen (1771-1858) in April 18281,
Two years after his short-lived attempt at building a socialist-utopian society New Har-
mony in Indiana faltered, Robert Owen acknowledged that the demise was in part due
to the members that constituted his society. Its admission policy, open to any and all
(Wilson 1967, p.105), and the failure to thoroughly screen applicants and select the right
type of supporters committed to the cause, corrupted Owen's vision of an ideal commu-
nal life by admitting crackpots, free-loaders, and adventurers (ibid., p.116). Unlike New
Harmony, the Twin Oaks Community in Virginia, set up in the 1960s is still thriving and
one of the longest-surviving non-religious communes in the United States. Following the
principles of egalitarianism, leadership roles rotate between all members. But to become a
permanent member Twin Oaks' admission policy stipulates a six-month trial period with
a ﬁnal decision made by a six-person selection committee (Reece 2016). This way, they
can weed out obvious mismatches.2
While these two approaches to community-building share the common goal of building
an infrastructure for an ideal societal life, they diﬀer in notable ways, the most important
ones being their admission and screening policies. By setting higher bars for joining and
gaining admission by  for instance  demanding a trial period, the group can screen and
actively control who will become a member and who will not. This holds true for any social
group and can aﬀect how cohesive the group's membership stands to be. Moreover, the
1Cited in Gordon (1999, p.288).
2A political party's version of this parable is presented by De Lange and Art (2011), tracing back the
diﬀerence in party survival of the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) to
the admission policies of their respective leaders, Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders.
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higher the bars for joining a social group the higher the social and psychological costs to
quit and leave that group. Consequently, group leaders can expect higher commitment of
those entrants that have been admitted under more demanding admission rules than those
admitted under more lenient ones (see Hirschman 1970). Especially for political parties, a
highly distinctive type of social group which heavily relies on its unity to function, these
aspects of screening and the commitment of its members  those on the ground and
those in parliament  can become decisive for electoral success (e.g., Greene and Haber
2015) or party survival (e.g., de Lange and Art 2011).
On the face of it, political parties share many elements with utopian societies: they follow
an ideology and are set out to implement policies that are thought to bring the whole polity
in the here and now closer to its members' dreams and ideals. They also have in common
that neither utopian societies nor political parties are immune from admitting potential
crackpots, free-loaders, and adventurers (Wilson 1967, p.116). And parties, too, may be
plagued from time to time by defections from the party (e.g., Heller and Mershon 2009),
policy disagreement (e.g., Hix 2004; Sieberer 2006; Willumsen and Öhberg 2017) or idle
and ill-prepared duds (see de Lange and Art 2011; Heﬀer 2017; Samuel 2017)  all of
which constitute phenomena that are clearly not valued by those ruling the party and
trying to keep the party united and productive.
When selecting candidates parties often face the challenge of selecting the type of candi-
date that toes the party line and is active in parliament, while avoiding the selection of the
type that deﬁes the party's position and is unable or unwilling to contribute in parliament.
In fact, the nomination of candidates poses a principal-agent problem (e.g., Kiewiet and
McCubbins 1991; Lupia 2003). Parties are unable to observe whether aspirants for nomi-
nations are truly committed to the party or merely signal to be loyal in order gain access
to the party's electoral machine. To what extent are parties able to steer clear of these
types of behavior? Can parties avoid the adverse selection of non-committed applicants
by employing tougher screening mechanisms? What kind of behavioral consequences arise
from selecting committed and non-committed candidates? These questions form the topic
of this thesis.
This dissertation revolves around the question how political parties, and in particular
parties in parliament, can regulate the admission to the exclusive pool of its candidates
and how party membership before candidacy is related to greater loyalty and activity of
2
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Members of Parliament (MPs).3 The focus of this thesis lies in the behavioral consequences
of variation in parties' screening mechanisms for candidates and consequences of variation
in candidates' and MPs' party membership background. In other words, how do parties'
screening mechanisms  i.e., formal Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC)  help them to
avoid selecting rather undesirable types of candidates, i.e. those that sit idle and disagree
with the party, and instead ensure the selection of the types of candidates more desired,
i.e. those active and falling in line with the party?
My inquiries examine how CEC aﬀect the unity of parties in parliament, candidates' loy-
alty toward the party, and how important (enforced) socialization processes within the
party are for loyal voting behavior and legislative activity. As I will argue throughout
this thesis, it is socialization processes that evolve with (long-term) party membership
that ensure the preference homogeneity and internalization of common norms and val-
ues that help to explain variation in legislative activity and individual level respect for
party unity. Moreover, the exposure to the workings of politics and the embeddedness
into networks that comes with party membership, as well as the motivation for partisan
politics in the ﬁrst place, are crucial factors in explaining legislative activity, such as the
introduction of Private Member Bills or the tabling of parliamentary questions. While
some parties ensure the selection of committed candidates by setting formal requirements
such as party membership for a certain period of time before a candidature, other parties
relinquish candidates with a strong party background in favor of politically inexperienced
non-members.
I will show that especially those eligibility criteria that entail a long-term involvement
with the party and those that nudge candidates to maintain good relations with other
party members correlate with higher party unity. Although a deeper and more thorough
inquiry into the reasons for these diﬀerences in candidacy eligibility criteria is certainly
warranted  one could think about electoral considerations, a need for technocratic ex-
pertise or a zeal for democratic principles  it is not the focus of this thesis. Instead, I
will examine how variation in CEC aﬀect party unity, candidate loyalty and legislative
activity. This, moreover, is complemented by exploring how MPs' party membership back-
3Technically one has to diﬀerentiate between admission to the party as a regular member and the
screening mechanisms used to vet potential candidates. While it is deﬁnitively interesting to explore
the consequences and their relationship to candidacy requirements, membership admission policies of
parties are not the focus of this thesis, which instead revolves around formal criteria and requirements
to be met by candidacy-seekers. Moreover, I do not look at factions within parliamentary party groups
and their admission policies, as for example the National-Liberale Aktion (NLA) within the ruling Free
Democratic Party of Germany (FDP) during their stint in oﬃce with the Social Democrats (SPD) in
1970. The NLA, a newly founded conservative faction, demanded two letters of references for admission
in order to rule out less conservative youngsters undermining the faction's policy stance. See http:
//www.zeit.de/1970/29/rechte-formation, accessed: 14.01.2019.
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grounds are associated with higher preference homogeneity as observed in parliamentary
voting behavior and MPs' legislative activity. By linking parties' candidate selection rules
to party unity and behavior of candidates and MPs, this thesis speaks and adds most
importantly to the literatures on candidate selection and legislative politics. Speciﬁcally,
it will show how certain internal party rules, hitherto neglected, aﬀect the working of
legislatures.
Why Study Parties' Eligibility Criteria and Party Membership?
Membership in political parties, it appears, is losing in importance for political careers. In
the wake of political dealignment we see an erosion of partisan identiﬁcation and voting
based on party-labels (e.g., Dalton and Wattenberg 2002; Kayser and Wlezien 2011), a
decline in membership-based politics (e.g., van Biezen and Poguntke 2014) and, in an
increasing number of countries  including but not limited to the United States, France or
the Czech Republic  the entry of political outsiders to the highest oﬃce of the executive.
Although there seems to be a systemic component to this development in some of these
countries (see Samuels and Shugart 2010), parties increasingly seek to recruit outsiders
and newcomers as parliamentary candidates, too. Many parties have in fact responded
to these trends of political dealignment, by for example changing the way they nominate
their candidates.
The French La Républic en Marche (REM)  for instance newly created in 2016 and
to some degree a beneﬁciary of political dealignment, was put in a tough spot to attract
and nominate a large number of promising candidates in a very short time. While around
half of their pool of candidates was ﬁlled with former members of the traditional French
parties  mainly from the Socialists (Parti Socialiste, PS)  the remaining spots were
ﬁlled with ﬁrst-time candidates selected in the wake of public calls for applications (The
Economist 2017). Somewhat similar, multiple parties in Japan  including the two major
parties the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
started to experiment with public calls for applications for candidatures  so-called k	obo
 as early as the 1990s. This trend toward open recruitment has since reached dramatic
levels. Formed in 1996, the ambition of the DPJ to become a viable challenger to the
ever-dominant LDP was initially cut short by a shortage of (quality) candidates (Smith
2013; Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014). Reverting to open recruitment, the DPJ started ﬁlling
vacant electoral districts and could eventually topple the LDP in 2009  a result probably
not possible without ﬁlling vacant districts through open recruitment.
Other examples include the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), which posted an ad
on Facebook looking for a candidate to run in the conservative stronghold of Bitburg-Prüm
4
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 party membership not required, but overall agreement with the party's ideals desired.
Own members were apparently not willing or able to stand (see Ripperger 2016). In neigh-
bouring Austria, Sebastian Kurz of the People's Party (ÖVP) drafted a party-list with
many hand-picked technocratic experts without prior party membership (APA, 2017).
Despite the various local factors that have played their role in each of these examples to
adopt open recruitment or that led to the selection of candidates lacking party member-
ship, they all point to the apparent trend that (long-term) party membership seems to
lose in importance for political and legislative careers.
But why is this interesting or deserving of academic attention? Given its increasing rel-
evance for political parties and political practioneers, new trends in candidate selection
mechanisms have major implications for legislative politics and for the societal legitimacy
of political parties. The head of the executive, for instance, i.e. chancellors and prime
ministers, are usually chosen from among the party in parliament in most parliamentar-
ian systems. To become a member of parliament for this party, however, one needs to be
nominated by the party  preferably in a safe district or high up on the party list. Only
after going through the vetting process of parties' eligibility criteria for candidates (or,
where applicable, eligibility criteria for party leadership positions for that matter) can
aspiring candidates be nominated. Moreover, parties' formal eligibility criteria profoundly
determine the type of personnel and candidates parties value and place before the voter
 who often only has a take it or leave it option. These eligibility criteria therefore have
crucial implications for the composition of the party in parliament. Related to this, are
parties with more open CEC considered more democratic by voters? How does this aﬀect
parties' legitimacy among voters and party members?4 Most importantly, though, now,
that some parties have started experimenting with alternative ways of recruitment, are we
to see changes in attitudes and behavior of candidates and MPs? If parties change the re-
quirements for candidacy eligibility could this aﬀect the selection, background and quality
of those taking seat in parliament or in executive positions? What are the behavioral con-
sequences of this variation in eligibility criteria and party membership background?
The Study of Candidate Selection
Previous studies have identiﬁed the importance of candidate selection early on. Dubbed
the secret garden of politics (Gallagher and Marsh 1988, p. IX), the relevance of can-
didate selection for understanding intra-party politics has been recognized almost 120
years ago by Ostrogorski (1902). Forty years later, Schattschneider (1942) stated that
the nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can
4Tackling these questions unfortunately have to be deferred to future projects.
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make the nominations is the owner of the party (cited in Gallagher and Marsh 1988,
p. 3). Despite the regular iterations of its relevance in subsequent decades (e.g., Black
1972; Ranney 1981), systematic research on candidate selection remained rather scarce
and (case) studies about it rather descriptive (e.g., Kaack 1969; Roberts 1988; Shira-
tori 1988). Most early studies understood candidate selection in a behavioralist tradition
through the conceptual lens of elite recruitment, where any outcome was the product
of the preferences of selectors and decisions taken in the back room. This approach has
often neglected the independent eﬀects of candidate selection institutions on nomination
outcomes (e.g., Obler 1974).
However, theoretical and conceptual advances in the last two decades (e.g., Rahat and
Hazan 2001; Hazan and Rahat 2010) have emphasized the necessity of studying the eﬀects
of candidate selection methods on such a diverse set of political outcomes as competitive-
ness (e.g., Kenig 2009b; Ramiro 2016), representation (e.g., Lawless and Pearson 2008),
incumbency turnover (e.g., Put, Gouglas, and Maddens 2015), and legislative behavior
(e.g., Shomer 2009, 2016, 2017). These studies suggests that variation in the institutional
design of candidate selection is associated with variation in the outcome of various political
phenomena.
Rahat and Hazan (2001) and Hazan and Rahat (2010) conceptualized candidate selection
along four separate dimensions: besides the candidacy dimension, which is the focus of
this thesis and which asks who can be nominated as candidate, they further identiﬁed
the selectorate, i.e. the body of the party that selects candidates; the centralization, i.e.
the administrative level within the party at which nominations are made; and, ﬁnally,
the voting system, i.e. whether parties appoint or vote for a candidate and, if the latter,
what type of voting rules apply. For them, the candidacy dimension is the most brutal
(p. 19) of these four dimensions as it has the potential to reduce the pool of eligibles
dramatically.
The candidacy dimension adjudicates who is formally eligible to seek a party's nomination.
Are there any requirements to be fulﬁlled and, if so, how strict are these? These formal
restrictions are the basis on which the continuum displayed in Figure 1.1 rests. At the
inclusive and open end of this dimension every voter can seek a party's nomination.
The bid for the Republican presidential nomination by Donald J. Trump, real estate
billionaire and reality-show TV star, epitomizes the left-most extreme of an inclusive
candidacy. Trump, seeking the Republican nomination, could impose himself onto the
party which reluctantly had to nominate him as presidential candidate eventually, as a
6
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number of contenders trailing him in support failed to coordinate eﬀectively during the
campaign.5
Figure 1.1: The Candidacy Dimension, following Hazan and Rahat (2010)
ExclusiveInclusive
All
citizens
Party
members
Party members and
additional requirements
Moving toward the center and the right-most end of the continuum, candidates for general
elections have to comply with more restrictive requirements. The most common and most
apparent one is membership in the party. Yet quite a number of parties allow non-members
to compete on their ticket, as the German Left (Die Linke) does on their oﬀene Liste
(open list), or the German Green party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, B90/Gr) and the
Social Democratic Party of Austria (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs). Beginning
with their 1993 and 1998 party constitutions, respectively, both parties explicitly allow
for non-members to compete on their party lists (B90/Gr, 1993; SPÖ, 1998). However,
more restrictive parties demand a minimum length of membership for candidate eligibility.
The Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano, PSI), for instance, stipulated ﬁve
years of prior consecutive membership in the 1970s and 1980s (PSI, 1970; 1978; 1984).
The Australian Labor Party's (ALP) 1987 party constitution of its Northern Territory
branch was less intensive, but demanded a number of additional requirements. To be
eligible, candidates had to meet the following requirements and conditions: two years of
consecutive party membership before the calling of nominations, attendance of at least
three meetings in the twelve months prior to the calling of nominations, ﬁve written
recommendations by other party members who themselves have had to be party members
for at least 12 months before the calling for nominations, union membership, and ﬁnally
the candidate had to sign the Public Oﬃce Candidate's pledge (ALP, 1987).6 However,
strict eligiblity criteria are not always enforceable. As de Winter (1988) notes, the highly
demanding criteria for candidates of the Belgian Socialist Party in the 1970s could at
5This example serves only as an illustration of a highly open and inclusive nomination process, as
the focus of this thesis is the selection of candidates for general elections and not for presidents or party
leaders, for that matter.
6This pledge reads: I hereby pledge myself not to oppose the candidate selected by the Australian
Labor Party and, if elected, to do my utmost to carry out the principles embodied in the Platform and
on all questions aﬀecting the Platform to vote as a majority of the Parliamentary Labor Party decided
at a duly constituted Caucus meeting. I further pledge not to withdraw from the election contest after
being duly nominated, without the consent of the Administrative Committee, nor to resign my seat in
Parliament without the consent of the Administrative Committee. I hereby agree and acknowledge that
any sum speciﬁed in the Constitution and Rules to be paid by me and which remains unpaid is a debt
owing to the members of the NT [J.R.: Northern Territory] Branch and may be sued for and recovered
in any court of competent jurisdiction (ALP, 1987).
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times not be fully enforced, as the social milieu these criteria presume have declined or
disappeared completely. Yet, one can still expect that the mere presence of eligibility
criteria in party constitutions inﬂuences the pool of aspiring candidates, the unfolding of
their expressed ambitions (see also Fox and Lawless 2005) and, hence, the mode of their
selection.
Candidacy eligibility criteria also extend to many positions and oﬃces within parties,
including that of the party leader. In classifying party leader selection methods, Kenig
(2009a) compiled a set of requirements to be fulﬁlled by those party members that wish
to become party leader. While some parties allow any type of party member to seek
the leadership position, others  such as the Irish Labour Party  restrict this position
to sitting MPs. Other stipulations include a deﬁned period of prior party membership,
monetary deposits, or the collection of a number of signatures from co-partisan or fellow
MPs. The purpose of these requirements is to avoid fringe candidates from taking up a
campaign that could potentially harm the party's image (a case in point is Donald J.
Trump's bid for the Republican's presidential nomination).
What are CEC and where can we ﬁnd them?
But what exactly are CEC and how do they distribute across parties, electoral systems,
but also across diﬀerent types of parties' selectorates? This section gives a brief overview
over the diﬀerent types of CEC found in parties and the empirical distribution of CEC.
The following paragraphs serve the purpose of providing a ﬁrst impression of the diﬀerent
types of CEC and datasets used in this thesis. These two datasets are: the Political Party
Database (PPDB) and my own data based on collections of (historical) party constitu-
tions.
The ﬁrst dataset, the PPDB, is a cross-sectional dataset covering 18 countries for the time
span of 2010 to 2014. The country list includes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Based on oﬃcial party constitutions
and statutes formal eligibility criteria are coded for 115 parties in these countries. These
criteria are comprised of demanding party membership from aspirants for candidacy, a
minimum length of party membership, the collection of signatures, the signature of pledges
of loyalty, monetary deposits, membership in trade unions or adherence to a speciﬁc reli-
gion (Poguntke et al. 2016).
Systematic data on CEC is sparse. The PPDB, the only comparative dataset that pro-
vides information on parties' formal eligibility criteria, is unfortunately limited to a cross-
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Table 1.1: Distribution of Candidacy Eligibility Criteria
Candidacy Eligibility Criteria
Party Minimum Length Union Religious Pledge of Collection of Monetary
N
Membership of Membership Membership Aﬃliation Loyalty Signatures Deposit
% ∅ Months % % % % %
Electoral System
Plurality/Majority 94.1 7.8 11.1 0 22.2 55.6 16.7 17
Mixed 31.3 1 0 0 12.5 12.5 0 16
PR 48.8 5.2 0 7.4 26.8 13.6 6.2 82
Closed-list PR 35 11.7 0 5 14.3 10 25 20
Open-list PR 53.2 3.8 0 8.2 29.8 14.8 0 62
Party Selectorate
National Party Leaders 71.4 3.8 0 0 0 57.1 14.3 7
Regional/State-level 57.1 5.3 5.7 2.9 30 31.4 8.6 35
Bargaining of multiple Levels 57.5 5.8 0 7.3 30.8 14.6 7.3 40
Local/Municipal Actors 33.3 7 0 11.8 13.3 0 5.9 18
Note: Data on CEC from PPDB; data on selectorate from DALP; STV system is grouped into Open-list PR category given the de facto
option for preference voting. Minimum Length of Membership set to 0 where Party Membership is required but no further information on
length requirements are made; values of selectorate rounded to integers.
sectional comparison. To examine changes over time within parties, I have therefore col-
lected historical party constitutions for the major parties in Germany and the Nether-
lands. Moreover, I have collected party constitutions for mainly social democratic parties
in the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. For some parties in these countries
information go back as far as the 1970s.
Table 1.1 shows the percentage of parties that have adopted each of the seven types of
eligibility criteria in the PPDB dataset, separated by the electoral system these parties
are competing in. It appears that parties are using CEC to counter-balance incentives
emanating from the electoral system. Electoral systems that incentivize the cultivation
of the personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995), such as First-Past-the-Post (FPTP)
with plurality/majority voting and open-list PR systems, see a higher share of parties
demanding party membership, pledges of loyalty and the collection of signatures. In both
systems candidates may see a beneﬁt in diﬀerentiating themselves from the party, either
by appealing to particularistic interests or, in case of sitting MPs, by voting against the
party line. To counter these tendencies parties, it could be argued, revert to setting stricter
CEC to nominate candidates that have a higher tolerance to these electoral incentives.
Although merely associational, these relationships present an intriguing intuition about
the usage and prevalence of CEC.
Moreover, the rather low number of parties that cluster in even fewer countries call for
caution when reading the table. Parties of the same country could set similar CEC for
other reasons than the electoral system that are unique to the country. For example,
the high percentage of monetary deposits required by parties in closed-list PR systems
is due to four parties in Israel (the ﬁfth being the Basque Nationalist Party, PNV, in
Spain). Similarly, the relatively long time of prior party membership in closed-list parties
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is equally due to some highly demanding Israeli parties, thus obscuring the otherwise
clear pattern of more demanding CEC in electoral systems with greater incentives for the
personal vote.
A further caveat of this comparison concerns the presumed homogeneous eﬀect of electoral
institutions and their incentives on all parties and their candidates alike. As Smith (2018,
p. 125) argues, it eﬀectively depends on the actual number of candidates that parties ﬁeld
in multimember districts in systems employing for instance the Single Non-Transferable
(SNTV) or Single Transferable Vote (STV) as previously used in Japan or currently in
Ireland, respectively. If candidates in these systems do not face other candidates from
their own party they are not as much incentivized to diﬀerentiate themselves from their
copartisans, as when the party ﬁelds multiple candidates. In fact, the Irish Labour Party
and Sinn Féin usually nominate only one candidate in most electoral districts. Similarly,
the Japanese K	omeit	o and the Japanese Communist Party tended to run only single
candidates in the multimember districts of Japan's pre-reform electoral system. Hence,
candidates of these parties are less incentivized to appeal to their personality despite
such electoral rules. At the same time, parties can rely on a more centralized selection
of candidates which could eﬀectively serve as a supplement to more demanding CEC in
terms of instilling candidate loyalty.
The environment for electoral competition appears to be a strong correlate and moderator
for parties' demand of instituting less or more demanding candidacy eligibility criteria.
Parties may use eligibility criteria in order to counter-balance the centrifugal incentives
of an electoral system to diﬀerentiate oneself from the party. Essentially, by selecting can-
didates highly committed to the party and its platform, parties rely on their candidates'
commitment to the party to innoculate them from these electoral pressures to disrupt
party unity.
Perhaps similarly contingent on the incentives emanating from electoral systems are par-
ties' candidate nominating selectorates (e.g., Shomer 2014; Lundell 2004). But how do
they correlate with parties' CEC? Are they chosen to complement, supplement or reinforce
each other? Table 1.1 displays how CEC distribute across diﬀerent types of selectorates.
Data on these stem from the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP)7
and provide information on the centralization of the selectorate. A striking observation is
the large share of parties with national level selections that demand party membership
(71.5%) and a collection of signatures (57.1%). It seems these selectorates, perhaps some-
7See https://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/. This data relies on several country experts that
assess whether a party's National party leaders, regional/state level actors, actors at the local/municipal
level are in charge or whether nominations are the outcome of bargaining of multiple levels. Answers from
all experts were rounded to the closest integer.
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what detached from the base, have to reassure themselves of selecting the right candidate
by demanding membership from candidates and aﬃdavits from other party members.
Moving toward more decentralized selections, candidates tend to have to prove longer
spells of prior memberships  in those parties that actually demand membership from its
candidates. When local or municipal actors are in charge (presumably selecting candi-
dates for decentralized electoral districts), parties need to make sure to select candidates
that remain true to the party and that exhibit a higher tolerance toward the incentive to
appeal to and follow particularistic local interests too much. Regional level selectorates
are somewhat in the middle when it comes to CEC, too. Almost the half of these parties
demand membership, roughly half a year of it, the collection of signatures and in one
third of the cases pledges of loyalty.
Overall, it appears that when discipline can be enforced through central selection, parties'
national headquarters only seem to make sure to select party members that are in good
standing with their peers. But as we move to more decentralized selection, party discipline
cannot as easily be instilled through sanctions from the party leadership. Hence, longer
spells of prior membership and pledges of loyalty appear to become more prominent
and important in ensuring party unity. This cross-sectional comparison, superﬁcial as it
may be, suggests interesting patterns of complementarity between the selectorate and the
candidacy dimension.
All of this, the electoral system and parties' selectorate bodies, pose of course a challenge
to disentangling the eﬀects of CEC from that emanating from the type of the electoral
system or the degree of centralization in the selectorate. Below, in the section on Research
Questions & Contribution, I will elaborate how I ensure the identiﬁcation of CEC's net
eﬀect on candidate, MP and party behavior. The confounding through electoral systems
or parties' selectorates are mainly controlled for by choices of the design or the statistical
analysis. To increase my analytical leverage in this respect, I have collected hundreds of
(historical) party constitutions to code parties' CEC in previous decades.
This neglect of the time dimension is therefore a big caveat when using the cross-sectional
PPDB dataset, as changes in CEC over time within parties and party systems remain
obscure. As mentioned above, the modes of parties' organizational structure, especially
in relation to its members, evolved dramatically over the last hundred or so years and
with it, we can expect, the need for CEC too. Moreover, incumbent MPs observed at
time t could have been selected under much diﬀerent CEC in time t-1. To explore the
development of CEC over time, I have collected several hundred historical party constitu-
tions and statutes. For example, the Catholic Centre Party (Deutsche Zentrums Partei,
DZP), a centrist party standing for the political Catholicism and inﬂuential during the
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Weimar Republic in Germany (1919-1933), required merely membership and, in some
party branches, Catholic denomination of its candidates (Lepper 1998). However, as the
party fell into political irrelevance at the end of the 1950s, a comparison over a longer
time period is not possible.
A prime candidate of studying changes over a longer time span is Germany's oldest politi-
cal party, the SPD. The party split in 1917 in a row over the party's position on Germany's
war eﬀort in World War I, forming the Mehrheitssozialdemokratie (MSPD), i.e. the more
pragmatic wing, and the Unabhängige Sozialdemokratie (USPD), the more radical wing.
In their 1922 party constitution, the USPD demanded from its candidates seeking oﬃce
at the local level a prior membership of one year, for candidates seeking national oﬃce
three years of prior party membership (USPD, 1922). In 1925, two and a half years after
reuniting with the USPD, the SPD had similar candidacy eligibility criteria of three year
of prior party membership for its candidates irrespective of what public oﬃce is sought
(SPD, 1925). After World War II and the heyday of the German mass party, the SPD's
CEC were reduced drastically and its federal party constitutions did not mention any
candidacy eligibility criteria until the 1971 party constitution, when it required party
membership (with exception for municipal elections) (SPD, 1971)  in a decade in which
the party's membership ﬁgures at times exceeded one million. While the party discussed
the regular recruitment of non-member experts around the millenium without actually
adopting any rule in this respect (e.g., Hainz 2006), its regional branch in the state of
Rhineland-Palatine adopted an open recruitment for the 2017 election in the conservative
stronghold of Bitburg-Prüm.
Hence, the SPD neatly epitomizes the development of CEC over time, in a fashion that on
the face of it seems intuitive and universal. Corresponding to the contemporaneous trends
of political dealignment in the electorate (e.g., Dalton and Wattenberg 2002), the decline
of traditional politically-relevant societal groups (e.g., van Biezen and Poguntke 2014),
and organizational changes within parties (e.g., Katz and Mair 1995), parties appear to
reduce their CEC accordingly. The case of the SPD further indicates that the relationship
between the electoral system and parties' CEC is not a deterministic one, as the SPD's
most stringent CEC have been in place during the highly proportional electoral system
of the Weimar Republic.
To complement this picture of just one party, Figure 1.2 shows the development of CEC
over several decades for seven parties from the Netherlands. These parties are the Christian
Democratic Appeal (Christen Democratisch Appèl, CDA), the Democrats 66 (Democraten
66, D66), GreenLeft (GroenLinks, GL), the Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA),
the Political Reformed Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, SGP), the Socialist
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Party (Socialistische Partij, SP), and the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
(Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, VVD). Each panel represents one party with
its CEC at the time of revisions to its party constitution (indicated by the year numbers
in each panel). Dark bars indicate the presence of a given type of eligibility criteria.
It is striking that all parties demand membership from their candidates over the whole
time period. In some parties, candidates are requested to have been a member for a certain
time, ranging from two months in the PvdA to two years in the SGP. An overall pattern
of decreasing membership requirements over time, however, is not apparent. While the
CDA demanded two months of membership after its oﬃcial inauguration in the 1980s, it
increased the minimum length of prior membership to one full year in 1994. The D66, in
contrast, has been alternating between six months and a full year in prior membership
between 1969 and 2014. The most extreme change is observed in the SGP instituting a
two-year prior membership requirement only in 1996. The VVD, in comparison, went from
no formal minimum length of membership to six month in 1975, to a reduced length of
roughly 3 months in 2005. With the 2005 party constitution, eligibility is bestowed after
the ﬁrst of four quarterly focal dates after joining the party.
Another set of CEC are pledges of loyalty and the collection of signatures from other
party members. Four out of the seven Dutch parties presented here demand from their
candidates pledges of loyalty. The SP, however, only has asked for a pledge from its
candidates for a brief period of time from 2003 to 2009. GreenLeft appears to be the only
party that demands the collection of signatures from co-partisans, ﬁfeteen to be precise,
from its candidates. This rule has been instituted with the 2005 party constitution and
thus far has been the unique characteristic of GreenLeft in terms of CEC.
What we do not see from these ﬁgures is a similar development of CEC as has been
documented for the German SPD. Dutch parties appear to rather go into the opposite
direction with the installment of more demanding formal length requirements mainly in
the 1990s. Data on other Social Democratic parties, however, mainly do support the
trajectory that the CEC of the SPD has taken. The Labour Parties of Australia, New
Zealand and the UK, have reduced their prior membership length requirements from 24
months to 12 months between the 1980s respective 1960s and the 2000s. Norway's Labour
Party (Det Norske Arbeiderparti, DNA), too, reduced its length requirements from three
months in 1973 (the date of its ﬁrst installment) to one month in 2002. What we do see,
however, is that parties appear to either experiment with their CEC (e.g., the Socialist
Party adopting pledges of loyalty for only four years) or that changes in parties' CEC
could reﬂect internal struggles for more inclusive (exclusive) CEC (the D66's alternation
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Figure 1.2: Candidacy Eligibility Criteria in the Dutch Parties, 1950s to 2010s
CDA, founded in 1980
1980 1985 1994 1997 2003 2008 2012
2 months 12 months Membership
Pledge
(a) CDA
D66, founded in 1966
1969 1973 1978 1981 1985 1986 1992 1996 2001 2006 2008 2012 2014
6 months Membership 12 months 6 months 12 months
Pledge
(b) D66
GL, founded in 1989
1992 1997 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2012
Membership
Signatures
(c) GL
PvdA, founded in 1946
1972 1973 1977 1982 1985 1987 1992 2005 2008 2009 2012
Membership 2 months
Pledge
(d) PvdA
SGP, founded in 1918
1973 1978 1983 1989 1996 1997 2007 2008
Membership 24 months
(e) SGP
SP, founded in 1971
1976 1991 1994 2003 2009 2012
Membership
Pledge
(f) SP
VVD, founded in 1948
1956 1960 1962 1963 1965 1969 1974 1975 1977 1981 1984 1995 2005 2007
Membership 6 months 3 months*
(g) VVD
between six and 12 months of prior membership could be the result of diﬀerent factions
within the party manipulating the supply of candidates in their favor).
Yet, we do not know enough about the distribution of CEC across parties and over time.
We do not know enough about their consequences for candidate behavior, how they aﬀect
representation of minority groups within parties or parties' behavior in parliament. CEC
are not only expressions of parties' preferences for certain types of candidates, they are
also consequential for whom voters face in the voting booth and how parliament looks
and how it works. Hence, studying CEC is highly relevant for several ﬁelds within the
political science and touches various topics including representation, legislative behavior
of parties and legislators alike, and the electoral appeal of parties.
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Previous Research on CEC
Research comparing or exploring the consequences of the candidacy dimension is com-
parably rare. The selectorate dimension, in contrast, has attracted substantially more
scholarly attention  not least due to prominent changes on this dimension in many polit-
ical parties in established democracies (e.g., Pilet and Cross 2014; Detterbeck 2016). This
attention has spawned a number of studies in the last two decades exploring the reasons
of democratization of the selectorate (e.g., Gauja 2012; Cross and Blais 2012; Yu, Yu,
and Shoji 2014), examining its impact on the competitiveness of leadership races (e.g.,
Kenig 2009b), on party unity (e.g., Faas 2003; Indridason and Kristinsson 2015; Shomer
2016; Cordero and Coller 2015), incumbent turnover (e.g., Put, Gouglas, and Maddens
2015), legislative behavior (e.g., Shomer 2009), or representation (e.g., Spies and Kaiser
2014).
However, changes in candidate selection in the last decades have not been restricted to
changes on the selectorate dimension  oftentimes the initial installment of party primaries
 but extended also to the candidacy dimension. Granted, besides some singular events
mentioned above, such as calls for applications for candidates by the German SPD in
2016, most changes on this dimension stayed below the radar of the mass media.
Candidacy requirements, formal or informal, however, have received some academic at-
tention in the past  though sparsely so. Seligman (1961) was one of the ﬁrst exploring
the role of eligibility in candidate selection in political parties. His later work broadened
the scope and extended the investigation of eligibility in political recruitment to entire
political systems. For him eligibility criteria, whether formal or informal, are indicative of
the values a selecting system holds dear. Seligman groups these criteria into an ascriptive
category  including sex, religion, or age  and an objective one  such as achievements
in the party (Seligman 1964, 1971). As diﬀerent types of eligibility criteria set distinc-
tive incentives for candidacy-seekers, they are also likely to encourage a diﬀerent set of
candidates coming forward and seeking candidacy, as Black (1972) suggests.
But why do parties diﬀer in their eligibility criteria? Combining the arguments of Selig-
man (1964, 1971) and Black (1972), parties could be considered as purposely seeking a
certain type of candidate when setting eligibility criteria. Depending on what qualities
and attributes in candidates parties are looking for they may set corresponding CEC.
On the one hand, parties may seek loyal and committed candidates. On the other, they
may prioritize candidates' electoral attractiveness or technocratic expertise. Moreover,
the organizational structure of the party and its ideological self-image  following princi-
ples of openness, transparency and intra-party democracy  potentially help in explaining
variation in parties' Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC), too.
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One of the primary reasons for parties to set stricter CEC and have demanding vetting
processes is the party's demand for committed and loyal candidates that, once elected,
do not undermine party cohesion (e.g., de Lange and Art 2011). So, in order to weed
out political opportunists who may try to exploit the party's label (Obler 1974, p. 180),
parties set very strict CEC that discourage opportunists to come forward. The Belgian
Socialist Party (Belgische Socialistische Partij, BSP) of the early 1970s neatly illustrates
the high barriers candidacy-seekers have had to overcome: ﬁve years of membership in
the party, the trade union, the co-operative and insurance association; annual minimum
purchases from the Socialist co-op; regular subscription to the party's newspaper; children
have had to be sent to state rather than Catholic schools; and spouses (i.e. wives) and
children had to be enrolled in the appropriate women's and youth organizations of the
party (Obler 1974; de Winter 1988).
In addition, setting very demanding CEC as the BSP in the 1970s, may entail two other
beneﬁts to the party. First, parties with stricter CEC may assure that the candidates
elected will assiduously follow the orders (Obler 1974, p. 180) of the party leadership
and arrive in parliament as a cohesive group. In fact, eligibiblity criteria can set selective
incentives and rewards for long-term party activists (Hazan 2003), thus not only ensuring
their obedience to the party leadership but also that of ambitious rank-and-ﬁle members
of the party for whom this clear intra-party trajectory for becoming a candidate can result
in greater compliance with the party's decisions and rules.
Secondly, with stricter eligibility requirements, parties may ensure the selection of candi-
dates that are in a better position to represent the party's voters descriptively (Seligman
1964; Pitkin 1967). Especially far-left and social democratic parties have a tradition of
nominating candidates aﬃliated with labor unions (see, for instance, the contributions
in Gallagher and Marsh 1988). Nominating union members in electoral districts with an
industrial tradition and a strong presence of a blue-collar milieu may result in better
descriptive representation. Similarly, parties with a particular religious outlook may pre-
fer to select candidates of the same belief, as is common in the K	omeit	o party in Japan
(Smith 2014). Naturally, parties may also follow electoral considerations when satisfying
demands for descriptive representation on part of their voters by nominating candidates
with certain socio-economic or socio-demographic attributes.
Another factor that could explain diﬀerences in CEC across parties is the importance
parties put on the electoral attractiveness or technocratic policy expertise of its candi-
dates vis-à-vis the candidates' utility to the party as a loyal and committed party servant
(Smith 2018, chapter 2). Given the trade-oﬀ between electorally promising but ideologi-
cally perhaps deviant candidates, parties are thought to strategically nominate them only
16
Chapter 1 Introduction
where needed. Galasso and Nannicini (2011) argue that parties purposely select candi-
dates barely aﬃliated with the party in those districts they deem electorally diﬃcult. In
so doing, they hope their candidate can garner support from party supporters and decisive
swing voters that base their vote decision not only on the party label but on evaluations
of candidates' personalities. Similar electoral concerns were driving changes in candidate
selection in Japan, where a shortage of quality candidates in oppositional parties led to
the introduction of open recruitment (e.g., Smith 2013; Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014).
Furthermore, assuming that parties are not merely vote and seat maximizers but also care
for good public policy (see Müller and Strøm 1999), they might see themselves in a position
where they have to dispense the enforcement of stricter CEC to nominate technocratic
policy experts that lack party membership. The SPD in Germany debated whether to
allow for nomination of policy experts on ten list ranks considered safe, though to no
avail, however (Hainz 2006). Solely devising his party list for the 2017 election in Austria,
Sebastian Kurz, freshly elected leader of the Austrian People's Party (Österreichische
Volkspartei, ÖVP), hand-picked numerous expert candidates that were not members of
the ÖVP (APA, 2017).
Some parties with a set of generally stricter CEC may formally allow for eligibility waiver
for non-members in their constitutions, as for instance practiced by the Italian Socialist
Party (PSI, 1978) or the Belgian Green party (Groen!) (Groen! 2008). In this way, these
parties may combine the best of both worlds. For once, their formal eligibility criteria
still exert their deterrence eﬀect on opportunists and ensures that the bulk of the party's
candidates are selected following tough formal criteria. At times, when deemed necessary
parties may suspend their formal requirements and selectively recruit candidates that may
lack the necessary track record or even membership, but that are considered valuable to
the party on electoral, policy or other grounds.
Finally, the party's organization and ideological self-image could explain variation in CEC
across parties. Katz and Mair (1995) recount how the models of parties' organizations and
in particular their relationships to their members and supporters have changed over the
last one and a half centuries. In particular milieu-based mass parties, the dominant party
type for most of the 20th century, embedded members in encompassing organizational
networks that extended to many spheres of social life. Membership was organized formally
and penetrated all aspects of life. Its members exhibited a social identity in line with the
social segment the party represents and not merely policy agreement. Correspondingly,
one could expect that parties that approximate this model more closely implement greater
eligibility requirements to ensure the nomination of loyal delegates of the party.
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Now, given the evolution of parties' modes of organizing membership away from that of
the mass party and toward a membership less infused with social identity, the legitimation
of strict CEC might be harder to sustain. Eventually, the distinction between members
and non-members becomes blurred in the cartel party model that invites both types
of supporters to participate in inner party decisions (Katz and Mair 1995, p. 21). An
extreme case are newly formed parties that lack a comprehensive organizational and
membership structure. Not surprisingly, the relatively young Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) and the even younger La Républic en Marche in France reached out to the public
to ﬁnd suitable candidates. Lacking in membership numbers, these parties had no pool
of potential candidates to revert to among its members and instead were forced to seek
candidates outside of the party to contest in elections (see Smith, Pekkanen, and Krauss
2013; The Economist 2017).
These empirical examples and the theoretical arguments for possible variation in parties'
CEC presented already hint at the fact that parties do in fact diﬀer in their CEC and
at times even change them. About the consequences of the changes, however, we do not
know much. One exception is the study by Smith and Tsutsumi (2014), which suggest
that the adoption of open recruitment led to the selection of candidates with less polit-
ical experience and more moderate policy position when compared to their co-partisans
recruited through more traditional channels. How this thesis will address this gap in the
literature on candidacy eligibility criteria and their consequences is presented in the next
section.
Research Questions & Contribution
The research questions advanced in this thesis ask how CEC aﬀect the unity of parties,
the loyalty of its candidates and the activity of its MPs. Yet, while we have seen several
accounts about why parties may choose diﬀerent eligibility criteria, we do not know much
about the behavioral consequences of variation in CEC and why they should aﬀect can-
didate and MP behavior in the ﬁrst place. As we have seen in the above discussion of
the empirical distribution of CEC and the numerous accounts on why they might vary,
research attempting to isolate the eﬀect of CEC from other eﬀects originating from, for
instance, the electoral system or from other party characteristics, is challenging. To over-
come some obstacles created by this conundrum, I have collected data on CEC over time
to increase my leverage in estimating more credibly the independent eﬀects of CEC. How
I address these concerns are brieﬂy hinted at when presenting my research questions in
turn.
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How can CEC aﬀect the behavior of candidates, MPs and parties? I argue that CEC
aﬀect these behaviors through mainly two channels; ﬁrst by deterring and avoiding bla-
tant candidate mismatches and secondly by (enforcing) socialization processes within the
party.
First, CEC can exert inﬂuence through their deterrence eﬀects on candidacy-seeker and
thus aﬀects the supply of potential candidates (e.g., Norris 1997). Blatant opportunists
that only care about oﬃce will be more attracted to political parties that are more open in
terms of candidacy requirements. Usually, such aspirants pay less attention to the party's
ideological outlook or otherwise they would have joined the party in the ﬁrst place. As they
lack ideological conviction, they dread spending time and eﬀorts schmoozing with local
or national party ﬁgures to either obtain a critical number of formal recommendations or
enduring long enough as an active member to become formally eligible. As Obler (1974)
puts it, demanding eligibility criteria are in place to weed out political opportunists who
may try to exploit the party's label (p. 180).
What could happen if candidacy-seekers are not properly screened for their commitment
to the party is neatly described in the comparative account by de Lange and Art (2011)
of the fate of the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPM) and the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV).
While LPM had to struggle to recruit enough candidates to exploit their favorable standing
in the electorate, they have neglected to screen and vet these recruits properly with the
result of internal conﬂicts and the premature termination of the coalition they were part
of. The PVV, in contrast, has been thoroughly vetting and training its candidates and has
even imposed a stop for new admissions to preclude the entrance of opportunistic recruits
that could cause trouble.
Secondly, certain types of CEC moreover exert an inﬂuence through the socialization
processes they entail. A minimum length of prior party membership before members can
seek candidacy or the collection of reference letters or signatures from co-partisans are
associated with greater involvement in the party's subculture, the development of a social
identity as a party member and an internalization of the party's norms and values. Purely
by being member to the party, the frequent contact to other (already socialized) members
and the party's communication channels, will nudge new entrants to re-evaluate their
attitudes and behaviors in light of what is expected of party members (e.g., Turner 1991;
Ashforth and Mael 1989). Thus, by objectively fulﬁlling lengthy membership requirements
candidacy-seeker undergo these socialization processes and, once eligible, will make loyal
and committed candidates and MPs. Similarly, the collection of a number of signatures
requires networking and schmoozing with co-partisans that vouch for the new entrant 
only, however, if the entrant is deemed committed enough to the party.
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Thus, in conclusion, the impact of CEC on campaign, legislative or voting behavior does
not primarily work trough the behavioral incentives they create to gain re-selection  as
does the selectorate or the degree of decentralization (e.g., Hazan and Rahat 2010)  , but
rather through the elimination of candidates seen unﬁt and the selection of a desired type
of personnel that arrives in parliament with the appropriate behavioral norms internalized
and that neither requires a carrot nor a stick to fall in line with the party's basic policy
program.
Exploring the eﬀects of parties' CEC on party unity, candidate loyalty and legislative ac-
tivity of MPs contribute primarily to the literatures on candidate selection and legislative
politics. As the ﬁrst study that looks into parties' formal candidacy eligibility criteria
across space and time, this thesis advances our understanding about how candidates are
selected. Examining the deterrence eﬀect of CEC adds to our understanding of the sort-
ing argument advanced in the literature on why we see such ideologically homogeneous
parties (e.g., Krehbiel 1993; Willumsen 2017). Since the selection of candidates are the
deﬁning function of parties and given its decisive implications for the composition of the
parliament and in many cases the executive, adding to our knowledge of who can be se-
lected as a candidate in the very ﬁrst place is of utmost relevance to the academic debate
and the understanding of politics in practice. It further opens a new channel through
which we can perceive the generation of party behavior, party unity and the workings of
legislatures: that is, candidacy eligibility criteria.
Given the scarcity of comparative data on CEC, this research is also the ﬁrst to system-
atically compare and investigate the consequences of CEC over space and time, which
has been made available by ﬁrst-hand data collection of several hundreds of (historical)
party constitutions. Given the challenge of isolating the eﬀect of CEC in the presence
of behavioral incentives created by electoral systems and parties' selectorates, this data
collection eﬀort has been crucial in allowing, for instance, for the estimation of party
ﬁxed-eﬀects models that control statistically for these confounders and allow for a more
credible estimate of the net impact of CEC on candidate behavior. In multiple regression
models I ﬁnd that those CEC that presume a (long-term) involvement with the party are
empirically associated with greater unity and loyalty among its candidates.
A second research question addresses the role of pre-parliamentary socialization within
the party for party cohesion and unity. By investigating how the length of party mem-
bership and involvement in the party before a member's ﬁrst candidacy and election to
parliament aﬀects their voting loyalty, I explore in a more ﬁne-grained way the impor-
tance of socialization processes within parties. Essentially, this research question aims to
test the same logic underlying the argument made above for the impact of CEC. This
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logic suggests that the more time candidates and later on MPs have spent in the party
as (active) party members before their election, the more will they have internalized the
party's positions, norms and values  and behave accordingly.
In a large data collection eﬀort, I coded the party membership background of nearly all
Bundestag member ever elected over the period of 1953 to 2013. By focusing on one
single country the challenges of separating the eﬀects of party membership diﬀerentials
from those of the electoral system and other eﬀects related to a party's organizational
structure becomes easier. In this speciﬁc case, I employ party-by-party regression models
to account for party-eﬀects and introduce ﬁxed-eﬀects for the formal type of the mandate
of Germany's mixed electoral system. In addition, while this accounts for the formal type
of the mandate, tier-speciﬁc re-election probabilities (Stoﬀel 2014) are estimated and
used as controls to model MPs de facto type of mandate given the huge number of MPs
competing in both tiers. I ﬁnd that longer membership spells and active party membership
is positively related to voting with the majority and negatively with voting against it on
unwhipped votes.
The main contribution of this research lies in the ﬁeld of elite socialization and legislative
politics. By putting the socialization within the party center stage, this research is ad-
dressing the gap in the literature which primarily has been either looking at socialization
processes of political elites within the family (e.g., Prewitt, Eulau, and Zisk 1966; Herzog
1975; Gruber 2009) or, once elected, within the legislature (e.g., Price and Bell 1970;
Garand 1988). Although a few studies exist that have addressed socialization within the
party (Kornberg 1966; Clarke and Price 1977; Saalfeld 1995), they often exhibit shortcom-
ings in their empirical analyses. Although some previous studies have examined the role
of prior party oﬃce on parliamentary voting behavior (Saalfeld 1995), this thesis extends
empirically on these early and bivariate studies by operationalizating party membership
in novel and more ﬁne-grained ways. It measures (1) the years of party membership prior
to ﬁrst candidacy and ﬁrst election to parliament, (2) it gauges how the age at which
MPs have joined their party, (3) how having held a party oﬃce before ﬁrst candidacy, and
ﬁnally (4) how previous membership in other parties aﬀect the preference homogeneity of
MPs. Thus, this study adds to our understanding how diﬀerent dimensions of (long-term)
party membership, hithertho operationalized in the literature merely in a dichotomous
fashion, aﬀect the loyal voting behavior of MPs. In times in which party membership
seems to lose relevance for political careers (e.g., Smith, Pekkanen, and Krauss 2013; Yu,
Yu, and Shoji 2014), parties lose in membership (e.g., Dalton and Wattenberg 2002) and
instead recruit ever more often non-member as candidates, this research provides insights
into possible consequences for parties' preference homogeneity in the near future.
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Finally, a third research question aims to explore the relationship of CEC and party
membership with legislative activity. Legislative behavior is not limited to voting in par-
liament, but instead comprises other relevant activities such as ﬂoor speeches, questions
and the writing of legislative texts, too. My third research question revolves around how
minimal CEC aﬀect the behavior of these activities in parliament. More speciﬁcally this
research investigates how open recruitment in the wake of public calls for applications
for candidacies resulted in the nomination of politically inexperienced candidates that in
most cases acquired party membership only in the process. In some sense, this research
presents an investigation of the ﬂipside of the two other research questions. What can we
expect to see in terms of parliamentary behavior when candidates and MPs lack a strong
party membership background and therefore, in most cases, prior political experience
and a healthy expectation about their future role in parliament? I argue that candidates
and MPs selected through open recruitment, lacking prior political experience, are less
well-equipped to master the intricate craftmanship of writing legislative texts and fail in
fulﬁlling their role as a checks-and-balance on the government.
Similar to the second research question, this one too, is being answered by examining
a mixed-electoral system, that of Japan. Here, however, to control for electoral system
eﬀects I restrict the universe of observations to candidates and MPs competing and elected
in the nominal tier. Party ﬁxed-eﬀects are employed to control for diﬀerences in behavioral
incentives originating from party's organizational structures and placebo-test are run to
ensure behavioral diﬀerences are not driven by characteristics of electoral districts.
In light of the current trend of an increasing number of (governing) parties to recruit their
candidates through open recruitment and in the wake of public calls for applications, the
insights from answers to this research question hold lessons for what to expect of future
legislatures in terms of preparedness and professionalism. Some pundits, for instance, have
already observed a fatigue in the newly elected MPs of the French REM whose discrep-
ancy in their expectations and their actual role as MPs seems responsible for their disil-
lusionment (Samuel 2017). Apart from actual politics, this research further speaks to the
literature of legislative studies, too. By examining how the selection background of MPs
correlate with legislative activities, we can draw insights into the workings of legislatures,
the likely professionalism of certain MPs and how and why opposition parties might fail
to hold government accountable. All these consequences feed into the expectations of an
increasing dominance of the executive over the legislative branch of government in terms
of policy-making. Seemingly democratic practices within parties might thus undermine
democratic principles at the core of the system.
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In sum, the relevance of this thesis originates from the consequentiality of CEC and party
membership of MPs for their ability to stand and vote united and to fulﬁll their roles in
parliament by drafting legislative texts or by holding government accountable. Against
the apparent trend of parties to select ever more unaﬃliated candidates, the relevance of
investigating this trend's implications becomes more important. How exactly this thesis
attempts to do this is outlined in the next section below.
The Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is structured alongside three chapters that examine, a) how parties' candidacy
eligibility criteria ensure voting unity and candidate loyalty (chapter 2 Candidacy Eligi-
bility Criteria and Party Unity), b) the importance of long-term party membership for
the formation of homogeneous preferences and the internalization of norms of party unity
(chapter 3 Party Membership, Pre-Parliamentary Socialization and Party Cohesion), and
c) the behavioral consequences when Member of Parliament lack a strong party member-
ship background (chapter 4 Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate Recruitment).
All three chapters have been designed as standalone articles that place themselves within
their respective literature and, thus, can be read as such.
The second chapter examines what kind of parties' formal admission rules are associated
with higher degrees of party unity. I argue that parties face two type of candidates,
opportunists and loyalists, at the time of nomination. While the former's ambition are
thought to be mainly motivated by seeking oﬃce, the latter's drive stems from their
ideological conviction. To tell these types apart from each other, parties institute formal
candidacy eligibility criteria, such as demanding a pledge of loyalty, a certain minimum
length of party membership, or the collection of signatures from other party members. The
more demanding, now, these criteria are and the more these involve the maintenance of
good relations with other party members, the more likely it is for parties to select loyalists
over opportunists. One reason for this is the deterrence of opportunists, which lack in
ideological commitment to spend years in the party schmoozing with other party members
and instead look for easier nominations in other parties. A second reason are socialization
processes that accompany the fulﬁllment of these candidacy eligibility criteria. Aspirants
are socialized into and internalize party's norms and values once they have achieved
eligibility. Using three diﬀerent analyses I show empirically how formal eligibility criteria
for candidacy are associated with greater party unity and candidate loyalty. The ﬁrst
analysis relies on data of roll-call votes in 16 industrial democracies and examines at the
party level how diﬀerent types of eligibility criteria aﬀect the voting unity of parties in
parliament. The second and third analysis uses candidate survey data and investigates
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what type of candidacy eligibility criteria in place at the time the candidate has joined
the party  the second analysis  and at the time of nomination  the third analysis 
aﬀect the expressed loyalty of candidates toward the party's platform. My results indicate
that those eligibility criteria that nudge aspirants to deeply immerse themselves with the
party and to maintain close relations with other party members are associated with higher
party unity and greater candidate loyalty.
The third chapter takes a closer look at long-term party membership and how socialization
processes within the party aﬀect the voting behavior of Members of Parliament. Based
on social identity theory, which stipulates that joining a social group entails identiﬁcation
with and internalization and adherence to the groups values and norms, I generate hy-
potheses on how the degree of attachment to the party inﬂuences uniform voting behavior
emanating from MPs' grown homogeneity in terms of policy preferences and their desire
for unity in and for itself. Empirically, I test these expectations by using data on voting
behavior of German MPs on all free votes of the post-war era, that is, votes on which
party disciplined has been lifted or no oﬃcial party position has been declared. For these
votes, uniﬁed voting behavior can more credibly be considered values- and norms-induced
than to be forced by the party whip  an observable implication of party socialization. The
inﬂuence of four diﬀerent measures for this socialization into the party's norms and values
are gauged in multiple models estimated for each party separately, thus accounting for
potential party-speciﬁc modes of socialization. In order to disentangle party-internal so-
cialization processes from legislative ones, I restrict the analysis to legislative newcomers.
As suggested by social identity theory, uniform voting behavior on free votes is associated
with a stronger socialization into and a deeper internalization of common norms of the
party, as measured by the four diﬀerent indicators.
In the fourth chapter I examine the behavioral consequences when Member of Parlia-
ment lack a strong background in party membership  the empirical ﬂipside of chapter
3. Departing from the focus on unity, this chapter explores other behavioral dimensions
that may be aﬀected by long-term party membership or the lack thereof. In the analysis, I
take advantage of the Japanese case where major parties have been nominating candidates
through open recruitment and more traditional ways at the same time over the last two or
so decades. I theorize that open recruitment, usually taking place in competitve districts,
attracts entrepreneurial candidates that are able to woo crucial independent voters on
account of their personality but that lack in long-term party membership. In safe district,
in contrast, parties nominate loyal candidates to have their core personnel elected into
parliament. By looking at diﬀerent indicators of legislative activity, including the num-
ber of questions tabled and Private Member Bills (PMB) introduced and cosponsored, I
ﬁnd that oppositional entrepreneurial candidates fail in holding government accountable
24
Chapter 1 Introduction
by not tableing questions and, when in government, are also less likely to introduce or
cosponsor PMBs. Placebo-tests are examined to rule out confounding eﬀects emanating
from district characteristics.
The concluding chapter summarizes the arguments and ﬁndings of the questions addressed
in this thesis. This ﬁnal chapter broaches the implications of my ﬁndings for research and
candidate selection and provides potential avenues for future research.
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Chapter 2
Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Party Unity
Candidate selection methods can be consequential for party unity in legisla-
tive voting. This paper argues that party rules determining who can become a
candidate, the Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC), can have direct implica-
tions for party unity. I theorize that with stricter formal requirements, parties
avoid adverse selection and ensure the nomination of committed candidates.
By using roll-call vote data from 16 industrial democracies, candidate surveys
and an original dataset consisting of nearly 500 historical party constitutions, I
show that parties demanding prior membership and nudging aspirants to main-
tain networks within the party tend to be more uniﬁed in parliamentary voting.
Moreover, their candidates, too, express greater loyalty when compared with
parties without formal CEC.
Introduction
Party unity is essential for parliamentary democracy and most parties in parliamentary
systems, indeed, exhibit highly uniﬁed voting records. Explanations for variation in par-
liamentary voting range from systemic factors, such as electoral incentives (e.g., Carey
2009; Kam 2009), to the sorting of like-minded citizens into parties at the individual level
(e.g. Willumsen 2017). In addition, previous research has identiﬁed that the way parties
select their candidates and who within the party wields power over candidates' (re-) nom-
ination can be consequential for party unity (e.g. Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999; Rahat
and Hazan 2001; Hazan and Rahat 2010).
However, despite its central theoretical signiﬁcance in explaining uniﬁed party behavior,
empirical research examining the role of candidate selection methods (CSM) is still lim-
ited. Only a small number of recent studies aiming to explain voting unity has produced
some empirical ﬁndings on the impact of CSM on party voting unity (Faas 2003; Hix
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2004; Depauw and Martin 2008; Shomer 2016, 2017). These studies assume that Mem-
bers of Parliament (MPs) respond rationally to the incentive structure of parties' selection
methods and understand observed party unity as the result of incentive-induced obedient
behavior by re-(s)election seeking MPs.
In order to gain some leverage on the eﬀect of CSM on party voting unity, these studies
have modelled in one fashion or another the extent to which party leaders control access to
the ballot. This usually has been measured by the exclusiveness of the selectorate (e.g. Faas
2003; Shomer 2016), the level at which selection takes place  i.e. decentralized selection
versus centralized selection (e.g. Hix 2004; Depauw and Martin 2008; Shomer 2016)  or
by collapsing both dimensions together (e.g. Shomer 2017). Empirically, centralization
of candidate selection and the exclusiveness of the selectorate have been found to exert
inﬂuence on party unity in line with expectations; more centralized selection is correlated
with higher unity (Hix 2004; Depauw and Martin 2008) and more exclusive selectorates
are associated with more uniﬁed parties as well (Shomer 2016), with a twisted result for
members of the European Parliament though (Faas 2003).
Yet, while previous studies have primarily looked at who selects, an equally important
question is to ask who can be selected? In other words, who can formally present themselves
as candidates at the time of nomination? Is candidacy open to all citizens or is it restricted
to party members who might even have to sign pledges of loyalty, collect signatures or
be aﬃliated with labor unions? The question is not merely about who can become the
party's candidate, but more profoundly what type of personnel and applicants are wanted
or barred from standing as candidates according to formal party rules? How lenient or
strict are parties in their nominations, what type of person is excluded from standing
as a candidate and what consequences does this have for the unity of the party? As
voters in most electoral systems face a take it or leave it option in the voting booth,
these candidacy criteria set by parties have crucial implications for the make-up of the
party-elect in parliament.
Despite the fundamental signiﬁcance of these party rules extant research has neglected
this candidacy dimension of candidate selection (see Rahat and Hazan 2001; Hazan and
Rahat 2010). The empirical studies mentioned above have so far examined only one or
two dimension of selection, namely the dimension of the selectorate and the degree of cen-
tralization of selection. Overall, research on candidacy eligibility is scarce. Early studies,
however, have already emphasized the importance and consequentiality of the incentive
structure set by institutional arrangements that govern elite recruitment and candida-
cies for the type of aspirant coming forward (e.g. Seligman 1964; Schlesinger 1966; Black
1972). In contrast to the dimension of the selectorate and the degree of centralization, the
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unifying eﬀect of the candidacy dimension does not work through the (in-) dependency
on party selectors for re-nomination felt by candidates but rather through its eﬀect on the
self-selection of committed personnel coming forward. Contributions in the edited volume
on candidate selection by Gallagher and Marsh (1988) present cross-sectional information
on candidacy criteria, but lack systematic research on the unifying consequences of varia-
tions on the candidacy dimension. Limited empirical research has shown that candidates
selected through open recruitment following nation-wide and formally undiscriminating
calls for applications exhibit policy attitudes diﬀerent from those of co-partisans that were
selected through tradtional channels (Smith and Tsutsumi 2014) and that these candi-
dates are less active in parliament than those MPs with a stronger party membership
background (see Chapter 4). As of now, the theoretical and empirical research on the
candidacy dimension is bleak and empirical evidence on its eﬀect on party unity is lacking
completely.
In this study, I draw on the principal-agent framework to ﬂesh out the reasoning of why
parties may choose to set stricter Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC), such as a minimum
length of party membership or the collection of signatures, and present the ﬁrst empirical
investigation of the unifying eﬀects of diﬀerent types of CEC. My theoretical argument
is that by imposing more demanding CEC parties avoid the problem of adverse selection
through screening aspirants for candidacy. By employing tougher screening mechanisms
parties can uncover candidates' commitment to the party, as opportunists are likely to
be deterred from demanding criteria while loyal aspirants can signal their commitment
to the party by fulﬁlling the very same. Empirically, I make use of roll-call voting data
from 16 countries, a unique and new dataset with information on parties' CEC over
time based on roughly 500 historical party constitutions as well as data from candidate
surveys. In several regression models I show that those CEC that require aspirants to be
a party member for a certain period of time before the candidacy and those CEC that
nudge aspirants to maintain good relations and networks with other party members are
correlated with higher voting unity in parliament at the party level and higher expressed
loyalty in candidate surveys.
These ﬁndings speak to two arguments made in the literature. First, it relates to the
argument of sorting of citizens with similar ideological proclivities into parties (e.g., Kre-
hbiel 1993; Willumsen 2017), as CEC may serve as an ampliﬁer for this behavior since
opportunists looking for a quick way to national oﬃce may be deterred from joining the
party when learning about demanding CEC. Secondly, this ﬁnding underscores the im-
portance of socialization into party milieus and internalization of party rules and norms
(e.g., Crowe 1983, 1986). As Dodson 1990 has argued, group membership, in this case
party membership, leads to the creation of group identity in the individual, entailing the
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development of psychological attachment and, in combination with regular contact with
co-partisans, nudges the new member to re-evaluate their own attitudes and behavior in
light of what they deem essential to belong.
Hence, this study contributes to the literature on party unity and candidate selection by
proposing insights into the empirical consequences of the candidacy dimension in CSM
and by adding to our understanding of how parties' internal organizations aﬀect party
unity and therefore the working of parliaments. The next section lays out the theoretical
framework and derives hypotheses to be tested following the elaboration of the research
design and data.
Theory
During campaigns and in parliament, parties have to delegate actions at the micro-level
to their candidates (e.g. campaign speeches) and MPs (e.g. voting behavior). This sort of
delegation is ubiquitous in democracies. Voters delegate to parties and candidates, and
parties in parliament delegate to the cabinet which in turn delegates to ministries and the
bureaucracy (Strøm 2003). A less frequently examined part of this chain is the one men-
tioned above between the parliamentary party leadership and its candidates respective
MPs during election campaigns. As any delegation relationship, this one is prone to po-
tential agency loss, too, when the candidate or MP (the agent) has preferences diverging
from that of the party leadership (the principal). By delegating these actions, parties rely
on their members not to undermine the uniﬁed image and the perception of the party it
wishes to display to the electorate. While a uniﬁed party image brings beneﬁts to all its
members  candidates, MPs and party leaders alike  by sending a clear and unblurred
policy signal to voters (e.g. Greene and Haber 2015), individual candidates and MPs may
be tempted electorally to defect from the oﬃcial party line to cater to particularistic
constituency or interest group interests (e.g. Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Tavits 2009;
Willumsen and Öhberg 2017).
Parties interested in containing agency loss and in maintaining an undiluted policy im-
age should thus be inclined to instill party unity by employing ex ante mechanisms, i.e.
mechanisms related to the selection of candidates that share the same preferences with
the broader party, and ex post mechanisms, i.e. those related to the monitoring and sanc-
tioning of candidates' and MPs' behavior. Recent research has focused more heavily on
parties' ex post mechanisms, by looking into when and how parties punish renegades at
the time of re-nomination (Schröder and Manow 2016) or how eﬀective disciplining is in
keeping the party united (e.g. Kam 2009). In this paper, I show empirically that ex ante
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screening mechanisms, too, are crucial in promoting party unity by way of producing a
more loyal party personnel (see Müller 2000). The next paragraphs lay out my theoretical
reasoning and develops my main hypothesis.
Adverse Selection in Candidate Recruitment
Before general elections, parties face the consequential task of selecting their candidates.
Candidate selection can be deﬁned as
the predominantly extralegal process by which a political party decides which
of the persons legally eligible to hold an elective public oﬃce will be desig-
nated on the ballot and in election communications as its recommended and
supported candidate or list of candidates Ranney 1981, p. 75
This selection is crucial in many respects. It not only determines the face of the party
and how it is perceived by the electorate, but also the demographic, socio-economic and
ideological make-up of the party in parliament after the election. During the selection,
however, parties are confronted with diﬀerent types of candidates. Some candidates, here-
after referred to as opportunists, are motivated mainly by oﬃce while others, loyalists, are
motivated by policy. Naturally, parties favor loyalists over opportunist candidates as the
former constitutes the party's main personnel in parliament (see Galasso and Nannicini
2011).
The main dilemma for parties, though, remains. Most of the time parties cannot readily
observe how committed candidacy-seekers are and cannot therefore observe a candidate's
potential for undermining the party's cohesiveness at times. One way to solve this problem
of adverse selection is to employ screening mechanisms, that make it more diﬃcult for
opportunist aspirants to persist (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Lupia 2003). This screen-
ing can come in the form of Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC), that is, requirements
set forth in a party's constitution abjudicating whether a candidate is formally eligibile
to run or not. This not only ensures avoiding opportunist would-be candidates through
deterrence but also creates a structure of selective incentives and rewards for loyalist and
long-time activists (Hazan and Rahat 2010, p.21).
First and foremost, by employing tougher CEC parties can raise the cost of seeking can-
didacy for all types of candidates. These costs may accrue from the time and money to be
invested but also from indispensable long-term networking eﬀorts. The Belgian Socialist
Party of the 1970s epitomizes the potentially high costs associated with the ambition for
candidacy; aspirants were required to have joined the party, the Socialist trade union and
health insurance at least ﬁve years before seeking candidacy. Moreover, they were also
asked to have joined the Socialist cooperate with minimum annual purchases and to have
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subscribed to the party's newspaper. Even their spouses and children were expected to
join the respective organizations of the party and were not allowed to attend Catholic
schools (see De Winter 1988).
Strict requirements like these, although not always completely enforceable, serve two
purposes that beneﬁt party unity. First, highly demanding requirements, such as certain
period of prior party membership, are likely to deter opportunists who shun the eﬀort to be
invested for several months or years in the service of the party. Truly opportunist aspirants
are rather attracted to political outlets that are less restrictive and in which nominations
are comparably easier to obtain. However, in the case an opportunist would-be candidate
has joined a party with strict CEC, nonetheless, they are forced to comply with the
party's formal rules to be considered for nominations. This often entails the socialization
into prevailing party norms and values with the likely result that their preferences have
converged with that of the party at the time they have obtained eligibility. Still, in most
instances it is the ideological orientation of many would-be candidates that make them
join parties in the ﬁrst place. As the studies in van Haute and Gauja (2015) and by
Young and Cross (2002) show, the major factor driving party membership is ideological
conviction and not career advancement.
Secondly, strict requirements create an incentive structure of rewards for those that have
already joined the party. Here, ambition for oﬃce can only unfold after years of ser-
vice to the party, entailing processes of socialization into and internalization of common
norms and values. The longer the time spent in a certain group, new entrants may be
socialized into the groups values and norms through compliance and/or aﬃliative ties.
While ambitious new members have to play by the rules to be considered for nomina-
tions in parties that demand such strict CEC (compliance), an increase in psychological
attachment to the party and contact with co-partisan nudges new members to re-evaluate
their own attidues and behavior in light of what they deem essential to belong (aﬃlia-
tive ties) (Dodson 1990). Parties that demand CEC that entail long-term membership or
networking within the party are likely to impose these socializational processes on future
candidates. And those aspirants for candidacy that formally fulﬁll the eligibility criteria
send a strong signal to the selectorate. Moreover, the processes of socialization that many
screening mechanisms try to encourage through their stipulations entail not necessarily a
homogenization of policy preferences, but much more likely the internalization of party
unity as a norm in and for itself, as suggested by survey data reported by Crowe (1983,
1986).
Granted, electoral considerations may weaken a party's preference for loyalists and instead
urge them to select less loyal but electorally more attractive candidates. Some parties
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that have demanding formal screening mechanisms, indeed, allow for waivers for certain
candidates that would otherwise not be eligible, given the approval of some higher ranking
party committee. Candidates that receive these kind of waivers, however, are very likely
to be in good standing with the respective party branch in charge and have proven their
value to the party or they would not be under consideration in the ﬁrst place. That is,
even when looking for electorally more attractive candidates party loyalty is likely to play
a big role in the selection. These stipulations leave untouched the formal criteria that
still unfold their eﬀects on the majority of candidates. Moreover, as these sorts of waivers
are mainly relevant for single-seat electoral districts, the large number of safe seats (see
Matland and Studlar 2004) suggests that most opportunist candidates are, ﬁrst of all,
an exception  as they are not needed in safe districts  and secondly, are likely to run
in marginal seats that not all of them may win. Eventually, their number in any given
electoral cycle should be small and not taint the theoretical logic or empirical test of the
hypothesized relationship between CEC and candidate respective party behavior.
Thus, demanding strict CEC aﬀect party unity and candidate loyalty through two chan-
nels: (1) deterrence of opportunists, that is amplifying ideological sorting into political
parties (e.g. Willumsen 2017), and (2) selection of candidates that have been socialized
into prevailing party norms and values (see Müller 2000). The main hypothesis of this pa-
per is that parties employing tougher screening mechanisms, i.e. more demanding CEC,
show higher levels of party unity. In the empirical analysis I will ﬁrst explore the unifying
eﬀects of diﬀerent types of screening mechanisms at the party level, and secondly, how dif-
ferent types of CEC aﬀect the expressed loyalty of candidates toward their party's policy
platform. Using two slightly diﬀerent analyses at the individual level of the candidate, I
explore whether CEC have rather a deterrence eﬀect on potentially unloyal party members
to-be or a socialization eﬀect on ambitious members that have joined the party.
Research Design
Data
The data used to empirically assess my hypothesis on party unity stem from several
sources. Data on parties' candidacy eligibility criteria comes from the Political Party
Database (PPDB) (Poguntke et al. 2016).8 Based on recent oﬃcial party statutes and
constitutions, parties' formal eligibility criteria for candidates are coded in a binary fashion
for the following requirements: party membership, union membership, religious aﬃliation,
pledge of loyalty, collection of signatures, and monetary deposits. The minimum length
8Online: http://www.politicalpartydb.org/
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Figure 2.1: Eligibility Criteria in the Norwegian Labour Party, 1961-2011
DNA, founded in 1887
1961 1967 1971 1973 1983 1989 1992 1996 2002 2011
Membership
Minimum Length 3 months 1 months
of party membership prior to candidacy is measured in months. These variables form my
independent variables for the analyses below.
As CSM in many countries are subject only to the discretion of the party leadership or a
qualiﬁed majority of party members at party conventions, CSM including CEC are com-
parably easy to reform. In order to explore changes over time I have in addition to the
PPDB data collected houndreds of historical party statutes for mainly social democratic
parties from Australia, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.9 Generally, we see a decline in such meritocratic
requirements as minimum periods of party membership in these social democratic par-
ties, as exempliﬁed by the Norwegian Labour Party presented in Figure 2.1. However, in
many of these parties we see that only in the 1970s have they in fact instituted formal
requirements. The decline over time can possibly be attributed partly to the dwindling
away of traditional party milieus in the electorate in the wake of increasing individualism
and declining unionized work as well as a decline in the importance of comparable orga-
nizations adjacent to the political realm (e.g., van Biezen and Poguntke 2014; Dalton and
Wattenberg 2002).
I use two dependent variables that operate at diﬀerent analytical levels. The ﬁrst applies
to the party level and measures the party's unity in roll-call votes. I have collected data
on roll-call votes for 16 countries from national sources. Where possible, I have done
so for two legislative cycles in order to get variation on potential confounders such as
9The focus on social democratic parties is for the most part a function of data availability. The
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, a think-tank linked to the German social democrats, has archived a substan-
tial number of (historical) party statutes from mainly social democratic parties from many advanced
democracies. For no other party family could I retrieve a comparable amount of party statutes. Other
sources besides the parties themselves include the Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, the Rijksuniver-
siteit Groningen, and the Norwegian Labour Movement Archives and Library.
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government status and party size (see Sieberer 2006).10 Voting unity is measured by the
Agreement Index (AI) as proposed by Hix, Noury, and Roland (2005),11 by party and
legislative cycle.
As roll-call votes in many countries suﬀer from high selection bias (Hug 2009) and are
subject to party discipline instilled through other ways than mere preference homogeneity
(Kam 2009), I complete this measure by a second dependent variables from the Compara-
tive Candidate Survey (CCS) that applies at the individual level.12 Candidates were asked
anonymously whether MPs should follow their own opinion or their party position in case
of conﬂict. I recoded their answers in a way that loyal answer behavior equals 1 and 0
otherwise.
By employing these two dependent variables I can assess the importance of parties' CEC
for such consequential actions as roll-call votes in parliament, but can also probe their
impact on candidates' reverence for their party's position individually, and thus establish
a plausible link at the micro-level between CEC and voting unity.
As neither parties' CEC nor parties' voting behavior and candidates' attitudes unfold in an
institutional vacuum, I control for several institutional confounders in my analyses. Apart
from the government status and party size as mentioned already above, I also control for
the centralization of the selectorate dimension in candidate selection (Hazan and Rahat
2010), in order to rule out possibly spurious relations between CEC and my dependent
variables. The data for this variable comes from the Democracy and Accountability Linkage
Project (DALP).13 The variable's values range from 1 to 4 in real numbers capturing the
level at which selection takes place. A 1 indicates national party leaders as deciding upon
selection and a 4 indicates local actors to be in control. Values inbetween indicate regional
levels to be in charge (2) or that selection is an outcome of bargaining between diﬀerent
levels (3). An additional control at the party level is the party's age, measured as the
10These countries and periods are: Austria (2006-2008, 2008-2013), Australia (2010-2013, 2013-2016),
Belgium (2007-2010, 2010-2014), Canada (2008-2011, 2011-2015), Denmark (2007-2011, 2011-2015),
Germany (2009-2013, 2013-2017), Hungary (2006-2010, 2010-2014), Ireland (2007-2011, 2011-2016), Is-
rael (2006-2009, 2009-2013), Italy (2006-2008, 2008-2013), Netherlands (2006-2010, 2010-2012), Norway
(2009-2013, 2013-2017), Spain (2011-2015), Sweden (2006-2010, 2010-2014), United Kingdom (2005-
2010, 2010-2015). Data for the Netherlands comes from the Dutch Parliamentary Behaviour Dataset
(Louwerse, Otjes, and Vonno 2017), and data on the United Kingdom from the The Public Whip,
http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/.
11In contrast to the widely used RICE Score of Cohesion, the Agreement Index allows to take into
account not only Yea and Nay votes, but also the number abstentions:
Agreement Indexi =
max{Yi,Ni,Ai}− 12 [(Yi+Ni+Ai)−max{Yi,Ni,Ai}]
(Yi+Ni+Ai)
where Y denotes the number of yea, N the number of nay and A the number of abstentions for the ith
vote.
12Online: http://www.comparativecandidates.org/
13Online: https://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/data/
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years between its foundation and the ﬁrst year of the legislative cycle. I expect that older
and more institutionalized parties tend to have higher CEC than newer parties.
A second important control variable are the electoral circumstances of candidates and
MPs. To measure the degree of centrifugal pressures that emanate from the electoral
system and to which candidates and MPs are exposed to, I control for the incentive
of cultivating a personal vote of an electoral system. Data for this variable comes from
Johnson andWallack (2012) who coded countries' electoral systems in accordance to Carey
and Shugart's (1995) classiﬁcation. Here, the maximum value of 10 indicates an electoral
system that incentivizes the cultivation of the personal vote the strongest. Secondly, and
where possible, I control for the perceived electoral security of candidates in the individual
level analyses. In the CCS dataset, candidates where asked how likely they think their
election is. I regrouped the answer categories of I thought I could hardly lose and I
thought I could not lose into Thought to win and the categories of I thought I could
hardly win and I thought I could not win into Thought to lose. I thought it was an
open race will be the reference category. Descriptive statistics for my two analyses can
be found in Tables 2.5 to 2.7 in the Appendix.
Candidacy Eligibility Criteria
How do CEC distribute across diﬀerent types of parties? Are there systematic diﬀerences
in what certain types of parties demand from their candidates? Hazan and Rahat (2010)
speculate that catch-all parties might be more lenient in their requirements due to elec-
toral considerations while more ideological parties put more emphasize on whom they
recruit and run as candidate. Additionally, Gallagher (1988) sees a diﬀerence in formal
requirements between left-wing and right-wing parties, with the former one being more
demanding. Table 2.1 presents a cross-sectional snapshot of the share of parties in the
Political Party Database that have instituted a given criterion, grouped by their party
family aﬃliation.
Table 2.1: Party Families and Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (%)
Communist/ Green/ Social Liberal Agrarian Christian Conservative Right- Special
Socialist Ecologist Democracy Democracy Wing Issue
Membership 42.86 33.33 60 52.94 33.33 58.33 64.71 54.55 0
Length of Membership (months) ∅ 1.71 0 3.13 3.10 6 3 5.67 2.3 0
Union Membership 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0
Religious Aﬃliation 0 0 0 5.88 0 25 0 9.09 0
Pledge of Loyalty 14.29 11.11 35 17.65 0 50 17.65 36.36 0
Signatures 14.29 22.22 30 23.53 33.33 8.33 23.53 18.18 0
Monetary Deposit 0 0 5 5.88 0 8.33 29.41 9.09 0
N 7 9 20 17 3 12 17 11 3
Source: Political Party Database, Poguntke et al. (2016)
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In contrast to Gallagher and to Hazan and Rahat, it is not the more ideological parties
and not rather left-wing parties that demand the fulﬁllment of formal CEC. It seems
that parties that follow one of the traditional ideologies of the 19th century, that is
Social Democracy, Liberalism and Christian Democracy as well as Conservatism, are
the ones with higher numbers of formal candidacy requirements. Ecological and Green
parties, as well as Agrarian ones tend to be more lenient in terms of formal requirements.
However, CEC do not provide any information on possible informal criteria and screening
mechanisms. In case of Green parties, though, this might possibly relate to these parties'
self-image of openness and intra-party democracy.
Data Analysis
Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Party Voting Unity
To what extent do CEC in fact have an impact on parties' behavior? Table 2.2 presents
results from fractional logit models explaining voting unity in parliament. All models have
been estimated with country and party-family ﬁxed-eﬀects and coeﬃcients are shown with
standard errors clustered by country and party. Moreover, controls for a party's age, its
size, its government status and its degree of centralization in its selectorate are included.
Country ﬁxed-eﬀects eﬀectively control for inﬂuences emanating from the electoral sys-
tem. The main independent variables, i.e. the various types of CEC, are once included
individually and once collectively.
In the models with individual CEC predictors three speciﬁcations and their CEC stand
out: (1) Parties requiring membership from their candidates tend to have higher agreement
scores; (2) in contrast to this, parties asking only for a monetary deposit of its candidates,
and (3) those parties that do not institute any sort of formal CEC appear to be less
uniﬁed.
However, as parties may institute multiple criteria at the same time model speciﬁcations
including all predictors are shown as well. In these more fully speciﬁed models, formal
criteria such as party membership, and especially a minimum length of membership or
the collection of signatures from other party members in support of one's candidacy
are all (though in parts only marginally) statistically associated with higher unity in
parliamentary voting.
Interestingly, these three types of CEC found in favor of higher unity require candidates
to immerse themselves deeply with the party through oﬃcial (long-term) membership
and/or the building of support networks within the party. This corresponds nicely with
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the notion that it is the aﬃliative ties and the social identity of a party member respective
candidate and MP that comes with oﬃcially belonging to a certain group that informs
their political behavior. Or, from the party's perspective, instituting these kind of criteria
ensures the selection of those members that have engaged with the party and its members
more seriously and who thus have signalled their committment.
Figure 2.2 shows average marginal eﬀects for all types of CEC. The quantities shown are
the expected increases on the agreement index ranging from 0 to 100. The AMEs of no
formal CEC are obtained from model (8) in Table 2.2, the others are obtained either from
model (10) or (11). Although the eﬀects appear to be rather miniscule, the average of the
agreement index across all parties in this sample is an extremely high 98,7. Against this
backdrop, the eﬀect of a 0,512 increase when demanding oﬃcal party membership pushes
the expected unity score to 99,2  almost perfect unity. In the same vein, the installment
of monetary deposits for candidacies reduces unity to below 98, entailing a greater number
of votes that see defections.
Table 2.2: CEC and party voting unity. Fractional Logit Estimation
Agreement Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Candidacy Eligibility Criteria
Party Membership 0.487∗∗ 0.379 0.408∗
(0.199) (0.239) (0.227)
Min. Length of Membership 0.016 0.021∗ 0.025∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Pledge 0.085 0.040 0.081 0.035
(0.169) (0.232) (0.248) (0.214)
Signatures 0.168 0.479∗ 0.292∗ 0.406
(0.415) (0.277) (0.173) (0.324)
Union Membership 0.347 0.086 0.177 0.101
(0.286) (0.402) (0.339) (0.321)
Monetary Deposit −0.726∗∗ −0.544 −0.531 −0.696∗∗
(0.349) (0.372) (0.365) (0.351)
Religious Aﬃliation −0.207 −0.043 0.005 −0.333
(0.192) (0.415) (0.394) (0.212)
No formal CEC −0.402∗∗
(0.177)
Party Level Controls
Party Age −0.006∗∗ −0.004∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.004∗ −0.002 −0.005∗∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.003 −0.003 −0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Party Size 0.004∗∗ 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.003∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Government Status 0.262 0.334 0.320 0.336 0.340 0.373∗ 0.320 0.277 0.372∗ 0.332∗ 0.420∗∗
(0.210) (0.231) (0.235) (0.232) (0.230) (0.201) (0.238) (0.215) (0.193) (0.178) (0.200)
Selectorate −0.056 −0.108 −0.138 −0.116 −0.180 −0.142 −0.157 −0.067 0.132 0.012 0.057
(0.345) (0.422) (0.425) (0.452) (0.426) (0.389) (0.416) (0.371) (0.427) (0.390) (0.516)
Constant 24.485∗∗∗ 23.860∗∗∗ 24.242∗∗∗ 24.168∗∗∗ 23.697∗∗∗ 24.700∗∗∗ 24.293∗∗∗ 24.919∗∗∗ 24.303∗∗∗ 24.522∗∗∗ 24.192∗∗∗
(1.675) (1.957) (1.904) (1.882) (1.605) (1.866) (1.897) (1.980) (1.778) (1.779) (1.903)
Country Fixed-Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Party Family Fixed-Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Countries 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Number of Parties 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89 89
Residual Deviance 0.677 0.712 0.72 0.719 0.718 0.676 0.72 0.696 0.632 0.645 0.655
Observations 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Government status, previously found to be consequential (e.g. Sieberer 2006), appears to
have eﬀects on unity only in some speciﬁcations. The ﬁndings for the selectorate dimension
are at odds with theoretical expectations and previous empirical research  though, the
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Figure 2.2: Average Marginal Eﬀects on Voting Unity by CEC
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Solid lines and whiskers present 90% conﬁdence intervals, dashed ones present 95% conﬁ-
dence intervals. Obtained from 1000 simulated random-draws from the variance-covariance
matrix. Based on models (8), (10) and (11) from Table 2.2. AME of a unit-change ex-
cept for length of membership for which AME is calculated for a change of one standard
deviation.
overall direction of its eﬀect is in line with expectations (e.g. Shomer 2017, 2016). Party
age exhibits a negative and party size a positive eﬀect on voting unity. The latter ﬁnding
is arguably somewhat counterintuitive, as the greater the number of MPs the greater the
risk of particularistic incentives to materialize.
To sum up, this explorative analysis of roll-call votes led to some interesting tentative
ﬁndings that support the expectation that screening mechanisms and CEC that encourage
the development of a social identity as a party member and also aﬃliative ties to other
party members produce a more loyal pool of candidates to-be. However, while candidates
of these parties have internalized party norms and very likely share many policy positions
in the ﬁrst place (see Crowe 1983, 1986), parties that merely ask for a monetary deposit or
that do not install any sort of formal eligibility criteria at all are found to be less uniﬁed
 presumably through the selection of candidates that lack in reverence for the party's
policies and image and in the internalization of prevailing party norms.
Although these ﬁndings speak to the importance of formal CEC in molding party behavior,
one caveat to this analysis is the uniform coding of CEC that does not take into account
possible changes in CEC over time. It could very well be that current MPs have joined
their party under diﬀerent CEC decades before. Nonetheless, as Figure 2.1 epitomizes,
most parties have seen a move towards less strict requirements over a time period most
relevant for my sample. This implies that parties that are strict today are likely to have
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been even stricter in previous periods, suggesting an underestimation of the predictors'
eﬀects.
Ultimately, analyses relying on roll-call votes to gauge preference homogeneity or loyalty
towards the party usually suﬀer from several shortcomings, such as a biased collection of
actually recorded votes and the fact that most parties instill voting unity through carrot-
and-stick discipline. Keeping this in mind, the next section will recover corresponding
eﬀects of these types of CEC at the individual level bar the uniform coding of CEC
and placed in a setting in which candidates' behavior is less distorted by expectations of
rewards or punishments by party whips when anonymously speaking their mind.
Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Candidate Loyalty
While the previous analysis gauges the inﬂuence of CEC on unity and loyalty at the party
level, this section examines the eﬀect of diﬀerent types of CEC at the individual level
using data from candidate surveys in order to establish a plausible link between CEC and
candidates' loyalty. Candidates were asked the question: An MP in a conﬂict between own
opinion and the party position should follow?. The answer options are own opinion and
party's position. I recoded this variable in a way that a 1 indicates following one's own
opinion and 0 following the party line. The ﬁrst analysis examines whether and to what
extent eligibility criteria in place at the time the now-observed candidates have joined the
party exert any impact on these candidates' expressed loyalty. This analysis, thus, tests
whether CEC serve as a useful deterrence on opportunists and keeping them from joining
the party. In other words, do demanding CEC amplify ideological sorting into political
parties?
Candidacy Eligibility Criteria as Deterrence
Table 2.3 reports logit estimates of the inﬂuence of CEC on candidates' loyalty to the
party platform. The sample is restricted to social democratic parties from 10 countries
for which I could establish their CEC over a longer period of time.14 An overview of these
parties CEC are presented in Table 2.8 in the Appendix. All models are estimated with
party ﬁxed-eﬀects and standard errors clustered by party.
14These parties are the Australian Labour Party, the Socialist Party  Diﬀerent and the Parti Socialist
of Belgium, the Social Democratic Party of Denmark, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the Irish
Labour Party, the Partij van de Arbeid of the Netherlands, the New Zealand Labour Party, the Norwegian
Labour Party, the Socialist Party of Portugal and the Labour Party of the United Kingdom. Data sources
next to my own collection eﬀorts include the PPDB, contributions in Gallagher and Marsh (1988) and
by Galligan (2003).
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Figure 2.3: Average Marginal Eﬀects on Candidate Loyalty by CEC
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Solid lines and whiskers present 90% conﬁdence intervals, dashed ones present 95% conﬁ-
dence intervals. Obtained from 1000 simulated random-draws from the variance-covariance
matrix. Based on models (3) and (4) from Table 2.3. AME of a unit-change respective
one standard deviation change for minimum length of membership.
Through the focus on one single party family and the inclusion of party ﬁxed-eﬀects,
I compare candidates within the same parties and coeﬃcients present eﬀects aggregated
over parties of this party family. Furthermore, this allows me to estimate the eﬀect of CEC
on candidates' loyality while controlling for parties' organizational and ideological make-
up. To further account for potential cohort eﬀects, I control at the individual level for
the length of party membership. Additionally, I include an indicator for having ever been
employed by the party.15 These two variables account for heterogeneity among candidates
in terms of committment to the party. Finally, two variables capturing electoral incentives,
such as the electoral system's incentives to cultivate a personal vote and the candidate's
perceived electoral security are included. As the second variable is based on a survey
question not asked in all countries, observations from the New Zealand Labor Party drop
out of model (5). Given the low variation over time for most CEC, I have to focus on
a comparison of diﬀerences in the demanded minimum length of party membership, the
signing of a pledge of loyalty and no formal CEC.
Among the variables capturing the eﬀects of eligibility criteria, only the minimum length
of membership yields a signiﬁcant eﬀect with the expected direction of the eﬀect  even
when controlling for the electoral circumstances of the individual candidates. Candidates
that have joined their party while it demanded a longer minimum period of membership
15The inclusion of the employment variable results in the drop-out of the Irish data, as the item was
not asked in the Irish wave of the survey. Running the models with the Irish data leaving out this variable
does not change the ﬁndings substantially.
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Table 2.3: CEC at time of joining the party and candidate loyalty. Logit Estimation.
Party Position Over Own Opinion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Candidacy Eligibility Criteria
Minimum Length of Membership 0.022∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Pledge 0.294 0.141 0.280
(0.256) (0.212) (0.175)
No formal CEC 0.195
(0.901)
Individual Level Controls
Ever Employed by Party 0.232 0.236 0.233 0.234 0.137
(0.256) (0.255) (0.250) (0.258) (0.209)
Time Party Member (Years) 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.010 0.019∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Electoral Security  Reference category: I thought it was an open race
Thought to Win 0.012
(0.240)
Thought to Lose 0.037
(0.369)
System Level Controls
Incentive for Personal Vote −0.401∗∗∗ −0.133 −0.258∗∗∗ −0.326∗∗∗ −0.726∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.117) (0.062) (0.112) (0.099)
Constant 3.588∗∗∗ 1.430 2.744∗∗∗ 2.873∗∗∗ 5.835∗∗∗
(0.531) (1.168) (0.468) (1.027) (0.687)
Party Fixed-Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Parties 10 10 10 10 9
Observations 639 639 639 639 555
Log Likelihood −358.490 −359.121 −359.373 −358.429 −306.223
Akaike Inf. Crit. 742.980 744.242 744.746 744.858 642.445
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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express greater loyalty than candidates of parties demanding a shorter or no ﬁxed periods
of membership at the time of joining. Hence, this result speaks to the possible sorting
and deterrent eﬀects CEC may unfold upon potential new party members. Figure 2.3
presents average marginal eﬀects of all three variables of interest. The average marginal
eﬀect of a one standard deviation change, i.e. about 6 months, in the minimum length of
membership required before a candidacy can formally be obtained results in a 3.2%-point
decrease in following one's own opinion.
For the other two CEC variables variation is rather low, which very likely explains the
presented insigniﬁcant eﬀects. In fact, only two parties in the sample changed their CEC
as fundamentally as moving from no formal CEC to requiring membership.
Candidacy Eligibility Criteria as Socialization
In this ﬁnal analysis, I examine the eﬀects of CEC in place at the time of nomination.
In this cross-sectional analysis I remove candidates that have competed in the election
prior to the one in the survey. In this way I minimize the risk that previous candidates
and especially incumbents are re-selected automatically. That is, I look at new candidates
and the eﬀect of CEC in place at the time of their nomination on their expressed loyalty
toward the party. However, due to this pruning of the data I am left with only 37 parties
from six countries.
As in previous analyses, I control for a set of potential confounders at the individual, party
and country level. Besides country and party family ﬁxed-eﬀects, I control for the length
of membership of individual candidates and whether they have ever been employed by
the party. At the party level, I control for the centralization of the selectorate. Electoral
incentives are captured by the candidate's perceived electoral security, which again causes
a drop in observations and are thus only included in model (9). Moverover, through the
inclusion of country ﬁxed-eﬀects incentives originating from the electoral system are taken
out of the equation.
Table 2.4 presents results from logit estimation with standard errors clustered by party.
Corresponding to the ﬁndings from my other two analyses, it is again the minimum
length of membership and the collection of signatures that exhibit statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects in the expected direction. Candidates, nominated for the ﬁrst time, are less likely to
follow their own opinion in a conﬂict with their party's position and instead express greater
loyalty to the party's policy platform, if their party demands a period of party membership
and/or a collection of signatures before they become eligible for a candidacy.
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Table 2.4: CEC at time of nomination and candidate loyalty. Logit Estimation.
Party Position over Own Opinion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Candidacy Eligibility Criteria
Membership 0.193 0.020 0.253
(0.262) (0.214) (0.294)
Minimum Length of Membership 0.081∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)
Signatures 0.232 0.524∗ 0.302 0.520∗∗ 0.571∗∗
(0.255) (0.270) (0.304) (0.251) (0.251)
Pledge −0.027 −0.196 0.051 −0.203 −0.194
(0.271) (0.280) (0.248) (0.282) (0.271)
No formal CEC −0.067
(0.243)
Individual Level Controls
Ever Employed by Party 0.241 0.223 0.220 0.228 0.228 0.217 0.234 0.216 0.184
(0.193) (0.193) (0.190) (0.193) (0.191) (0.195) (0.193) (0.193) (0.202)
Time Party Member (Years) 0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.015∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Electoral Security  Reference category: I thought it was an open race
Thought to Win 0.082
(0.260)
Thought to Lose 0.219
(0.168)
Party Level Controls
Selectorate 0.338 0.329 0.339 0.254 0.303 0.486 0.477 0.476∗ 0.402
(0.263) (0.211) (0.260) (0.212) (0.234) (0.306) (0.323) (0.248) (0.237)
Constant −0.677 −1.794∗ −0.503 −0.167 −0.316 −2.560∗∗ −1.281 −2.512∗∗∗ −2.449∗∗∗
(1.251) (1.000) (0.983) (1.026) (1.054) (1.265) (1.436) (0.930) (0.849)
Country Fixed-Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Party Family Fixed-Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Countries 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5
Number of Parties 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 29
Observations 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,177
Log Likelihood −788.393 −783.817 −788.480 −788.778 −788.745 −781.991 −787.891 −781.994 −756.659
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,608.786 1,599.634 1,608.960 1,609.555 1,609.489 1,601.982 1,611.782 1,599.989 1,551.318
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Figure 2.4: Average Marginal Eﬀects on Candidate Loyalty by CEC
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Solid lines and whiskers present 90% conﬁdence intervals, dashed ones present 95% conﬁ-
dence intervals. Obtained from 1000 simulated random-draws from the variance-covariance
matrix. Based on models (5), (7) and (8) from Table 2.4. AME of a unit-change respective
one standard deviation change for minimum length of membership.
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The results from Table 2.4 again are in line with my expectation: parties instituting
screening mechanisms can expected their pool of candidates to be more loyal. Figure 2.4
shows average marginal eﬀects of each type of CEC at the time of nomination of ﬁrst-
time candidates' expressed loyalty. A standard deviation change in the minimum length of
membership reduces the probability of choosing one's own opinion over the party position
by roughly 11%. Demanding the collection of signatures, too, reduces the likelihood of
going against the party by roughly 10%. These results at the individual level complement
the results from the ﬁrst analysis and underscore the importance of candidacy eligiblity
criteria. The next section sums up the results, mentions some caveats of this analysis and
links the ﬁndings to the bigger picture of the current status of the literature.
Conclusion
Candidacy eligibility criteria are highly consequential party rules that aﬀect what type
of candidate voters face in the voting booth. However, its consequences for party unity
among others are underresearched. In contrast, the other dimensions of candidate selection
as conceptualized by Hazan and Rahat (2010), namely the dimensions of the selectorate
and of the centralization, have been receiving more and more attention in the last two
decades. To remedy this imbalance, this paper has argued and empirically tested that
CEC can serve as a countermeasure to adverse selection in candidate recruitment and en-
sures the selection of candidates that are loyal to the party once elected. Especially those
candidacy criteria that require and incentivize candidates to seriously immerse themselves
with the party and its members, turn out to be associated with higher party unity and
candidate loyalty. The underlying factors contributing to this behavior are thought to
be the psychological attachment and a social identity that evolve in the (enforced) so-
cialization process and shape the attitudes and behavior of candidates and Members of
Parliament.
Even though these ﬁndings signiﬁcantly advance our understanding of how candidacy
eligibility criteria inﬂuence candidate and party behavior, they remain subject to some
limitations. First, the analysis of parliamentary voting is restricted to a cross-sectional
comparison of whipped votes. Secondly, parties' decisions to adopt, change or scrap el-
igibility criteria alltogehter might be endogenous to strategic considerations in response
to electoral incentives or intra-party struggles. I have presented a longitudinal analysis
to partially address both of these issues. However, low variation and lack of informa-
tion on parties' CEC over a longer time span preclude a more thorough investigation at
this point. A possible avenue for addressing this problem is a systematic data collection
eﬀort going back in time or exploiting within-party variation in, for instance, federal sys-
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tems. Moreover, future research should also engage in disclosing the impact and methods
of informal screening mechanisms of candidates, in order to add further scrutiny of the
important topic of candidate selection  especially in light of gender imbalances among
candidates.
In summary, the ﬁndings of this study suggest a new angle through which party unity
and candidate selection can be looked at and calls for more attention to eligibility criteria
in the study of party and political elite behavior in general. Studies on party unity or
representation, for instance, stand to gain by taking into account the type of personnel
constituting the party, or any social group for that matter, and its screening mechanisms
for admission. For the study of candidate selection, eligibility criteria should be studied
for its own sake, but also in light of possible conditional eﬀects with other dimensions of
candidate selection and possible conditional consequences for the nomination of members
of minority groups.
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Appendix
Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics for Voting Unity Analysis
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Agreement Score 163 0.988 0.014 0.935 0.994 1.000
CEC None 163 0.331 0.472 0 0 1
CEC Membership 163 0.589 0.494 0 1 1
CEC Incentive-based 163 0.454 0.499 0 0 1
CEC Length of Membership 163 2.850 5.814 0 0 36
Party's Age 163 51.945 42.553 0 36 176
Party Size 163 17.341 13.723 1 11.5 59
Government Status 163 0.446 0.490 0 0 1
Selectorate 163 2.664 0.759 1.000 2.684 4.000
Incentive for Personal Vote 163 4.595 3.223 1 3 10
Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics for Loyalty Analysis I
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Own Opinion over Party Position 639 0.490 0.500 0 0 1
Ever Employed by Party 639 0.121 0.326 0 0 1
Time Party Member (Years) 639 18.676 11.545 0 18 48
Thought to Win 555 0.232 0.423 0 0 1
Thought to Lose 555 0.573 0.495 0 1 1
I thought it was an open race 555 0.134 0.341 0 0 1
No formal CEC 639 0.119 0.324 0 0 1
Pledge 639 0.362 0.481 0 0 1
Minimum Length of Membership 639 5.252 8.458 0 0 24
Incentive for Personal Vote 639 6.646 3.858 1 10 10
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Table 2.7: Descriptive Statistics for Loyalty Analysis II
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Own Opinion over Party Position 1.220 0.506 0.500 0 1 1
Ever Employed by Party 1.220 0.113 0.317 0 0 1
Time Party Member (Years) 1.220 12.625 10.775 0 9 53
Thought to Win 1,177 0.105 0.306 0 0 1
Thought to Lose 1,177 0.762 0.426 0 1 1
I thought it was an open race 1,177 0.133 0.340 0 0 1
Membership 1.220 0.627 0.484 0 1 1
Minimum Length of Membership 1.220 4.286 5.406 0 0 12
Signatures 1.220 0.189 0.392 0 0 1
Pledge 1.220 0.475 0.5 0 0 1
No formal CEC 1.220 0.249 0.433 0 0 1
Selectorate 1.220 2.674 0.754 1.4 2.833 4
Table 2.8: Overview of Parties' CEC from Loyalty Analysis
Country Party Time Coverage
Candidacy Eligibility Criteria
Membership Length of Membership Pledge None
Australia ALP 19832007 Yes 12-24 months Yes No
Belgium
PS 19782006 Yes  Yes (1997) No
SPa 20022010 No  Yes No
Denmark Sd 20082009 Yes 12 months No No
Germany SPD 19622008 Yes (1971)  No Yes (1971)
Ireland Lab 19742007 Yes 6-12 months No No
Netherlands PvdA 19722006 Yes 0-2 months Yes No
New Zealand LP 19692011 Yes 12-24 months No No
Norway DNA 19672007 Yes 1-3 months No No
Portugal PS 19742011 No  No Yes
United Kingdom Lab 19622010 Yes 12-24 months No No
Notes: Data of empty cells interpolated when information before and after available. Data on ALP partly
interpolated from regional party branches.
57
Chapter 3
Party Membership, Pre-Parliamentary Socialization
and Party Cohesion
Party membership seems to lose relevance for political careers in most estab-
lished democracies. Yet, what are the implications of long-term party member-
ship for party cohesion? In this paper, I argue that pre-parliamentary party
membership is crucial. Using data on the party membership background of ca.
2,000 MPs of the German Bundestag from 1953 to 2013, I show that MPs
that have joined their party at a younger age and that have been a member
for a longer time before their candidacy, are less likely to disagree with the
majority of their party on free votes. By examining free votes on which disci-
pline is lifted, alternative sources generating unity are controlled for by design.
Results are in line with expectations generated from social identity theory and
underscore the importance of party membership for party cohesion. The pa-
per concludes with a discussion of the ﬁndings' implications in light of recent
developments in parties' candidate recruitment.
Introduction
Political dealignment is one of the most central and consequential trends in politics of the
last few decades. We see the erosion of partisan identiﬁcation (e.g. Dalton and Wattenberg
2002), a decline in membership-based politics (e.g. van Biezen and Poguntke 2014), and in
an increasing number of countries the entry of political outsiders to the highest political
oﬃces, including such businessmen as Donald J. Trump in the United States, Emmanuel
Macron in France, or Andrej Babi² in the Czech Republic. These trends, combined with
additional local factors, have led parties in Japan (e.g. Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014; Smith
and Tsutsumi 2014), France (e.g. Par et al. 2017; The Economist 2017), Austria (e.g.
Austria Presse Agentur 2017), and Germany (e.g. Ripperger 2016), to nominate candidates
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without prior party membership or political experience. Membership in political parties,
it appears, is losing in importance for political careers (see also Bailer et al. 2013).
What role, however, does party membership and especially long-term party membership
play for (converging) political preferences and behavior of Members of Parliament (MPs),
and eventually party cohesion in parliament? This chapter explores in particular the role
of pre-parliamentary party membership and the eﬀects of socialization processes it en-
tails on the voting behavior of MPs of the German Bundestag. Kam (2009), for example,
shows that the share of freshmen arriving in parliament is not related to the frequency of
defections. Similarly, Crowe (1986) argues that there is no diﬀerence between parliamen-
tary newcomers and veterans in the United Kingdom when assessing the most important
factors underlying party loyalty: agreement and duty. These two ﬁndings suggest that loy-
alty inducing socialization processes are likely to take place before entering parliament and
highlight the importance of party membership. At the same time, now, however we observe
trends that indicate a decline in the importance of party membership for political careers
that lead to Parliament. Thus, addressing questions on the role of pre-parliamentary party
membership and its socialization eﬀects on behavior in parliament warrants to produce
insights for and predictions for party cohesion and about future workings of legislative
institutions.
In general, two major approaches exist that dominate the literature in explaining why
MPs vote with or against the majority of their party; a rational choice approach and a
sociological one. The rational choice approach, currently the more dominant one of the
two, assumes that individual legislators vote after pondering the potential sanctions and
rewards of their actions (e.g., Kam 2009). In contrast to this assertion stands the socio-
logical approach. This approach itself can be further subclassiﬁed into a strand explaining
unity by social cohesion, i.e. the preference homogeneity of MPs as a function of similiar
socialization processes due to shared socio-economic and demographic backgrounds (e.g.,
Saalfeld 1995), a strand arguing that party unity is the result of preference alignment of
party members due to sorting processes of citizens with similar ideological proclivities into
parties (e.g., Krehbiel 1993; Willumsen 2017), and a strand asserting that unity is a prod-
uct of shared values and norms (e.g. Crowe 1983). These three mechanisms, while taking
eﬀect at diﬀerent temporal sequences, are but just the product of one overarching process:
the process of socialization (see Searing 1969). However, the process of socialization can
have many faces.
Most empirical investigations of the sociological strand hail from the 1960s and subsequent
decades. Some of the studies focus on the political socialization in the family during a
legislator's childhood (e.g., Prewitt, Eulau, and Zisk 1966; Clarke and Price 1977; more
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recently see also Fox and Lawless 2005) or the impact of political events during the
adolescence (Herzog 1975; Gruber 2009), others have explored the socialization processes
that take place once MPs have arrived in the legislature (e.g., Price and Bell 1970; Garand
1988). Again others have looked at the socializational role played by political parties (e.g.,
Kornberg 1966; Clarke and Price 1977; Dodson 1990; Saalfeld 1995; Patzelt 1999). Out of
these, only one though has empirically linked socialization within the party, measured by
holding party oﬃce, with voting behavior in parliament (see Saalfeld 1995). This bivariate
analysis, however, falls short in several aspects, such as ignoring subtle diﬀerences in MPs
party history (when did they join, have they been a member of another party, etc.), a
lack of relevant control variables, and by attempting to examine the role of previous party
oﬃce on loyal voting behavior on whipped and not unwhipped votes.
The behavioral consequences of a lack of party membership has been investigated too. A
methodologically innovative recent study by Bailer et al. (2013) explores diﬀerent types
of political careers that lead to the German Bundestag using sequence analysis. They
ﬁnd that political career-changers, so-called Seiteneinsteiger that lack long-term party
activism, tend to be less successful in obtaining party or parliamentary oﬃces, gather less
in committees related to district interests, and tend to defect less often from the party
line. A low number of these Seiteneinsteiger, however, precludes any conclusive inference.
For the Japanese case, Smith and Tsutsumi (2014) report that candidates nominated in
the wake of public calls for applications mostly lack prior party membership and political
experience and that these candidates exhibit political attitudes more moderate when
compared to their copartisans selected through more traditional channels.
In this study I take advantage of so-called free votes, i.e. unwhipped roll-call votes, in
the German Bundestag from 1953-2013 to gauge the eﬀect of pre-parliamentary party
membership and its socializational eﬀects on the (dis-) uniform voting behavior of MPs.
Examining the eﬀect of these socialization processes using four diﬀerent indicators, I ﬁnd
that by and large lengthy party membership results in less voting dissent as predicted by
social identity theory.
Theory
Social Identity Theory & Party Membership
The extant empirical literature on party unity rarely relies on psychological explanations,
despite its apparent applicability. In an unusual investigation, Russel (2014) examines
the reason for the unexpected high level of party unity in the British House of Lords,
despite its system of appointments and the lack of credible threats from the party whips.
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Yet, Russel ﬁnds empirical support for arguments in favor of social identity theory. Loyal
voting behavior of the members of the House of Lords is strongly informed by feelings of
loyalty, belonging and a fear of disrupting the unity of their group.
According to social identity theory, individuals that join a social group develop a social
identity that helps the individuals to deﬁne who they are, where they belong and how
they should act. Thus, group membership per se is thought to aﬀect members through
identiﬁcation with the group, entailing internalization and adherence to group values and
norms and resulting in homogeneity in attitudes and behavior (Turner 1991; Ashforth and
Mael 1989).
New members of groups are often put in a position of uncertainty about their roles and
status, inducing them to learn the role expectations and behavioral norms of the group.
This process of social identiﬁcation takes place in interactions with other group members,
helping the new entrant to resolve his behavioral ambiguity. In fact, new entrants typically
adopt the characteristics perceived by them as stereotypical of the group. Moreover, as
the group's identity, goals and values deviate from the societal mainstream, the more
dramatic is the need for group identiﬁcation and thus adoptation of norms and values by
the new entrant (Ashforth and Mael 1989).
As a member of a group now, the entrant's behavior becomes more and more oriented
to signiﬁcant others, i.e. other group members, from which they yearn to receive ingroup
respect and social approval (e.g., Rise, Sheeran, and Hukkelberg 2010; Pagliaro, Ellemers,
and Barreto 2011). Not before long, membership in the group and the group's values
become part of the entrats (social) identity (e.g. Bettencourt and Hume 1999) and mem-
bership in itself becomes a predictor of intention, motivation and action (see Fielding,
McDonald, and Louis 2008; Bagozzi and Lee 2002).
In the political realm, survey studies have shown that members of the same party in
parliament indeed exhibit highly congruent policy attitudes (Willumsen 2017), congruent
expectations about behavioral norms (Crowe 1983) and that party leaders rely on long-
running processes of socialization to maintain party unity in ﬂoor votes (e.g. Kam 2009).
In other words, the self-categorization as a member of party A generates the expectation
of this member voting with the majority of party A (see Turner 1987). Another straight-
forward expectation derived from this is that with greater exposure to the group's values
and norms, or the party's for that matter, party members should vote in line with the
majority of their party in parliament more often. To put it diﬀerently, the longer a MP has
been a member of the party the more she has internalized the party's norms and values
(see Dodson 1990)  implying as an observational correlate that longer party membership
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should be associated with a voting pattern more in line with that of the majority of the
party (length of membership hypothesis).
Hypothesis 1: The longer the MPs party membership, the more likely it is that
their vote choice is congruent with that of the majority of the party.
Related to the length of exposure of the group's values, one could imagine an eﬀect of
the age of entering a group, i.e. joining a party. The younger new entrants or party
members are, the more malleable their identities and thus the more pronounced processes
of socialization and internalization of group values and norms. Accordingly, I expect to
see that Members of Parliament who have joined their party at a younger age are more
likely to vote in line with the majority of their party (formative years hypothesis).
Hypothesis 2: The younger the age at which MPs have joined their party, the
more likely it is that their vote choice is congruent with that of the majority of the
party.
Party membership can diﬀer in quality and intensity and while the length of membership
in a party may tell us something about the time span of the self-categorization into a
political group, it does not tell us much about the quality of attachment or activism
within the group. Holding an oﬃce within the party, therefore, may tell apart passive
and active party membership. It also signals the ambition for responsibility for the group
and entails the internalization of the duty to or norm of unity on the demanding end. I
therefore expect that MPs that have held a party oﬃce before becoming a candidate or a
Member of Parliament express higher demand for unity on their own part by voting more
in line with the majority of their party (party oﬃce hypothesis).
Hypothesis 3: The vote choice of MPs that have held a party oﬃce before entering
parliament is more likely to be congruent with that of the majority of the party.
Expectations on the voting behavior of MPs that have previously been a member of a
diﬀerent party are more complex. Social inﬂuence via group membership operates through
three modes; compliance, internalization and identiﬁcation (Bagozzi and Lee 2002). Cur-
rent party members that have been a member in another party undergo these processes
two or even more times  presumably not completely though, as otherwise leaving the
group would cause too much cognitive dissonance in relation to one's social identity. To
be accepted into the party, the former member of an oppositional group has to comply
by the rules in order to objectively belong lest not being ostracized formally or socially.
However, their true political preference might diverge from the oﬃcial party line of their
new political homes, otherwise they would not have been members of other parties unless
a complete change of political attitudes took place. Thus, I expect that MPs with a party
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switching history tend to not vote with the majority of their new party member colleagues
on free votes (switcher preference hypothesis).
Hypothesis 4: MPs that have been a member of a diﬀerent party before are more
likely to diverge from the vote choice of the majority of their current party.
Research Design and Data
To test my hypotheses on the role of party socialization and party membership on unity
I will explore as an observational implication of aligned preferences and internalization of
party's norms the voting behavior of German Members of Parliament on so-called free
votes, i.e. unwhipped roll-call votes on which party discipline has been lifted. In doing
so, I minimize the likelihood that observed (uniform) voting behavior can be explained
by other unity inducing factors, such as sanctions or rewards (see e.g. Kam 2009). For
the period from 1949-2013, 112 votes on which party discipline has been lifted could be
identiﬁed (see Ohmura 2014). Data on actual voting behavior and MP characteristics
come from Bergmann et al. (2016). The unit of analysis will be the MPs' decisions on
each of these 112 free votes. The dependent variable, i.e. the vote choice, can take one
of ﬁve categories: voting with the majority of the party, voting against the majority of
the party, abstaining from voting, missing unexcused from voting and being excused from
voting (e.g, traveling, on leave, sick, etc.).
As no free votes have been identiﬁed in the 1st, 3rd, and 9th legislative terms in post-
war Germany, my sample consists of all MPs elected for the ﬁrst time to the Bundestag
in the other legislative terms with free votes until the 17th Bundestag. By only looking
at legislative freshmen I am disentangling socialization processes that may take place
within the legislature (e.g. Price and Bell 1970; Garand 1988) from pre-parliamentary
socialization processes. Using multiple sources,16 I could code for 89% (n = 2065) of
these freshman MPs the age at which they have joined for the ﬁrst time the party for
16These include several editions of Kürschners Volkshandbuch for the diﬀerent legislative cycles, the
newspaper Das Parlament, biographies on websites of the Bundestag and state legislatures, Munzinger's
Archive, archives of the Bundesländer, personal websites, and websites of the party-aﬃliated foundations
(The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, the Friedrich-
Naumann-Stiftung, the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, and the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung).
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which they have been elected,17 the length of their membership in years in this party before
standing as candidate and being elected to the Bundestag for the ﬁrst time. Moreover, I
have also coded whether MPs have been a member of a diﬀerent party and if so, for how
long if data was available. In addition, I have coded whether MPs have held any party
oﬃce before their ﬁrst candidacy and ﬁrst election, respectively.18
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Age Joining the Party
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Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of the ages at which ﬁrst-time MPs in my sample have
joined their party for the ﬁrst time. Most MPs have joined their respective party during
their 20s. A clear outlier here are MPs of PDS/Linke, a product of their coding (see
Footnote 17). The higher average for Bündnis90/Grüne might be related to their late
founding date. While the other four parties  i.e., CDU, CSU, FDP and SPD  have
been (re-) established at the end of the 1940s, B90/GR have only been established in
1979/1980.
17 Where relevant and when coding the year of joining the party I treat predecessor parties as organiza-
tional forerunners of the later parliamentary parties. This means that for members of Bündnis90/Grünen
I code the year of joining the party as the year they have joined for instance the Alternative Liste
(AL) or Demokratischer Aufbruch which later merged into or became the Bündnis90/Grünen (other in-
clude Demokratie Jetzt and Neues Forum). For the FDP this includes the Liberal-Demokratischen Partei
(LDP) and the Demokratische Volkspartei (DVP) in Baden-Württemberg, for the CDU the Christliche
Volkspartei des Saarlandes (CVP) and the Badische Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei (BCSV). Membership
in the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus does not start when joining the Sozialistische Einheitspartei
(SED) of the German Democratic Republic for a lack of systematic data on earlier membership.
18Granted, as many sources depend on self-declared biographies, especially in Kürschners Volkshand-
buch, it could be that MPs were coded as not having held any party oﬃce even though they in fact did.
However, any potential bias due to misreporting and mismeasurement are expected to run counter to the
expected direct of its eﬀect on parliamentary voting behavior.
64
Chapter 3 Party Membership, Pre-Parliamentary Socialization and Party Cohesion
Although most votes in the German Bundestag are decided upon by vote plurality in
contrast to a qualiﬁed majority, which leaves abstaining from voting inconsequential for
the vote outcome, abstentions in and for themselves are generally seen as a breach of
party unity, if not the oﬃcial party line on a given vote (see Crowe 1983). Table 3.1 shows
separately for each party how vote choices on the 112 free votes correlate empirically
with each other.19 Not surprisingly, the number of votes cast against the majority and
the number of votes cast in line with the majority correlate negatively. Abstentions,
interestingly, correlate negatively with the number of votes for the majority line but
only for the CSU and PDS/Linke. They are correlated positively with the number of
votes against the majority for the CDU, implying the same conjunction that abstentions
are another channel of voicing disagreement. For most parties missing unexcused from
a roll-call vote is strongly negatively correlated with the number of votes in line with
the majority choice, with the exception of the PDS/Linke. A similar but less signiﬁcant
pattern exist for excused absentism. These correlations suggest that disunity may express
itself through more channels than outright voting against the majority of the party. Being
absent from the vote, be it excused or not, can mean imply the avoidance of taking a
stance on an issue controversial in the eye of co-partisans or constituents and that as a
form of disagreement is more evasive and softer than pure abstentions (e.g., Kam 2001).
These tendencies apparent in these correlations are even more pronounced and emphasized
when looking at whipped votes (see Table 3.3 in the Appendix).
Table 3.1: Correlation between Vote Choices, by Party
++++++++With Majority Against Majority Party Unity
Party Against Abstention Missing Excused With Abstention Missing Excused Free Votes Regular Votes
CDU −0.588∗∗ −0.074 −0.481∗∗ −0.421∗∗ −0.588∗∗ +0.277∗∗ +0.028 −0.008 0.836 (0.224) 0.970 (0.094)
CSU −0.770∗∗ −0.372∗∗ −0.505∗∗ −0.469∗∗ −0.770∗∗ +0.368∗∗ −0.044 −0.035 0.875 (0.208) 0.974 (0.085)
SPD −0.566∗∗ −0.028 −0.132 −0.076 −0.566∗∗ −0.009 −0.072 −0.084 0.85 (0.215) 0.973 (0.080)
FDP −0.282∗∗ +0.020 −0.335∗∗ −0.164 −0.282∗∗ +0.082 +0.094 +0.087 0.841 (0.208) 0.950 (0.116)
B90/Gr −0.005 +0.074 −0.273∗∗ +0.155 −0.005 −0.059 −0.121 −0.099 0.799 (0.221) 0.951 (0.132)
PDS/Linke −0.211 −0.219∗ +0.610∗∗ +0.632∗∗ −0.211 −0.050 −0.093 +0.152 0.841 (0.230) 0.961 (0.129)
Note: Correlations based on all free votes; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
Party unity scores (and standard deviations) on all free and all regular votes between 1949-2013, respectively.
The last two columns of Table 3.1 show the average party unity scores over all roll-call
votes between 1949 and 2013 but distinguished by free and regular votes. Here, party unity
is measured by the agreement index as proposed by Hix, Noury, and Roland (2005), taking
into account the dispersion of the number of yes, nay and abstentions. If all MPs of a given
party vote the same way the value is 1, if however the caucus is split equally into two or
three voting blocs the value becomes 0. Not surprisingly, parties are more uniﬁed in regular
votes on which party discipline is ensured by the party whips. Looking at free votes, now,
19These parties are the six main parliamentary parties of the post-war period: The socialdemocratic
party (SPD), the two christiandemocratic parties (the CDU and its Bavarian sister party CSU), the
liberal party (FDP), the green party (B90/Gr) and the socialist party (PDS/Linke).
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we see that parties are still very much united but at a lower average. These numbers, of
course, cover up other ways of preference divergence by ignoring the possibilities of being
excused or missing from the vote. In fact, in 1987 (11th Bundestag) a roll-call vote on
which discipline has been lifted concerning construction plans for construction work at
the German Bundestag (Drs 11/407) saw only one member of the Green party voting in
favor, while 35 were missing unexcused and six MPs were excused  over a controversy
of monumental protection. This voting behavior results in a perfect unity score following
the calculation of the agreement index even though the 35 MPs missing from the vote
presumably had a diﬀerent agenda than the one MP voting in favor of the construction
plans.
One caveat when exploring the socializing role of party membership using free votes,
it could be argued, is the fact that the selection of votes on which in fact discipline
has been lifted is not representative of all votes and mostly applies to votes on issues of
conscience or morality. While it is certainly true that free votes are not representative of all
votes, it does not necessarily invalidate any exploration of the role of party membership
on voting behavior. First of all, Crowe (1983) reports from survey data on MPs from
the United Kingdom that defections and abstentions are seen as heavy transgression
on group norms and that party unity in and for itself is a group's goal and value to
be held up irrespective of the matter of the vote. In addition, Pagliaro, Ellemers, and
Barreto (2011) argue that transgressions of moral norms, such as party unity, in contrast
to competence-based norms by members tend to be seen as more dramatic by other group
members. That is, party unity is a goal that is to be maintained as much as possible
even on free votes and transgressions might equally invoke perhaps more informal social
sanctions when compared to defections or abstentions on regular votes. Thus, compliant
voting behavior of individuals on these votes should be even more informed by preferences
acquired through socialization processes. In other words, voting against the majority of
the party on these votes should have higher in-group repercussions, as divergent decisions
can not be justiﬁed by lack of knowledge, by protesting a motion's or bill's technicalities
and so on. Empirically, most of these free votes fall into the categories of Law, Crime,
and Family Issues (n = 27), Healthcare (n = 21), and Defense (n = 8) from a total of
fourteen diﬀerent categories20. Given the individual level MP × vote-dyadic nature of the
unit of analysis, I can account for the policy area of each vote by including corresponding
ﬁxed-eﬀects (see Ohmura 2014).
20These categories are: (1) Macroeconomics, (2) Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties,
(3) Healthcare, (4) Labor, Employment, and Immigration, (5) Law, Crime and Family Issues, (6) Social
Welfare, (7) Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce, (8) Defense, (9), Foreign Trade, (10) Inter-
national Aﬀairs and Foreign Aid, (11), Government Operations, (12) Reuniﬁcation, (13) Constitutional
Amendment, and (14) Other, Miscellaneous, and Human Interest.
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Another important control variable in this setting are the electoral circumstances of the
individual MPs. Baumann, Debus, and Müller (2013) show how characteristics of the elec-
toral district inﬂuence voting behavior of German MPs on controversial free votes related
to the pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. As these district characteristics, in this case
the religiosity of the constituents, are more likely to ﬁnd their way into MPs' decision
calculus when they feel electorally insecure, I control for MPs re-election probabilities.
MPs that electorally feel more secure may feel they can aﬀord voting their conscience
on controversial votes. Due to Germany's mixed-member electoral system, I estimate two
types of re-election probabilities. The ﬁrst captures the probability of re-election in the
electoral district, the second the probability of being re-elected on the party list under the
assumption that list positions remain unchanged, following the estimation procedure pro-
posed by Stoﬀel (2014). Both probabilities enter as separate variables. These two variables
also account for the type of candidacy, i.e. district versus list candidates and candidates
competing on both tiers. Throughout the time period of my sample, candidates of all
parties are becoming more likely to be dual candidates formally (see Manow 2015). The
re-election probabilities however account for the de facto type of candidacy as most district
candidacies of the smaller parties are futile anyhow.
To account for additional political confounders, I control for holding a party oﬃce (i.e.
the party leader (Parteivorsitzende/r), the caucus leader (Fraktionsvorsitzende/r) and
co-leader (stellvertretende/r Fraktionsvorsitzende/r), the party whips (parlamentarische
Geschäftsführer and the policy-ﬁeld speciﬁc speaker of the caucus (Arbeitskreissprecher/in)),
a legislative oﬃce (i.e. committee chair (Ausschussvorsitzende/r) and co-chair (stellvertre-
tende/r Ausschussvorsitzende/r)) or an executive oﬃce (i.e. cabinet minister (Bundesmin-
ister/in) and junior minister (parlamentarischer Staatssekretär/in)). These three variables
are coded binary where a 1 indicates holding that oﬃce and 0 not holding that oﬃce. Al-
though I only look at parliamentary freshmen it can happen that there are prominent
party ﬁgures among these freshmen that immediately assume a legislative or executive
oﬃce in their ﬁrst legislative term. Other demographic controls variables include the sex
and age of MPs. Especially the latter is important in distilling the eﬀects of length of
party membership or the age at which a given MP has joined the party from potential
eﬀects of (non-) compliance emanating from biological age.
Examining the voting behavior of legislative freshmen on these free votes, while accounting
for potentially confounding vote speciﬁcs as well as for electoral, political and demographic
characteristics of the MPs, allows me to adjudicate on my hypotheses and to draw conclu-
sions on the socializational eﬀects of party membership prior to the legislative mandate.
The next section will present the results of my analyses.
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Analysis
Given the choice nature of the dependent variable I will use multinomial logistic re-
gression models to explain the variation in vote outcomes in free votes. The reference
category for all models is set to voting with the majority of the party, in order to explore
the way how pre-parliamentary socialization or lack thereof manifests itself in diﬀerent
ways of voicing divergent opinions or even avoiding taking a controversial stance in the
ﬁrst place. All models are estimated separately for each party, i.e., Bündnis 90/Die Grü-
nen (B90/Gr), Christian Democratic Union (CDU), Christian Social Union (CSU), Free
Democratic Party of Germany (FDP), Party of Democratic Socialism and its successor
The Left party (PDS/Linke), and the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), and
with ﬁxed-eﬀects controlling for the policy ﬁeld of any given vote and standard errors clus-
tered by MPs. Given the large number of combinations (party × independent variables)
I will present ﬁgures showing the average marginal eﬀects of the independent variable on
the ﬁve vote choices separately for each party. The full regression tables can be found in
the appendix.
Length of Membership before First Candidacy
Figure 3.2 presents average marginal eﬀects (AME) of a one standard deviation change
in the length of party membership prior to MPs ﬁrst candidacy. These AME are obtained
following the procedure suggested by King, Tomz, andWittenberg (2000), based on models
run separately for each of the six parties, with a set of control variables and standard errors
clustered by MPs (see Tables 3.5, 3.9 and 3.13 in the Appendix for the full models). The
ﬁgure shows the AME of the length of party membership on each of the ﬁve vote choices
for each of the six parties.
Overall, we see signiﬁcant results in the expected direction, i.e. a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect
on voting with the party's majority and negative eﬀects on abstaining. For members of
the SPD an increase in the length of membership prior to candidacy by one standard
deviation results in an increased likelihood of voting with the majority of the party. On
the ﬂip side, the same increase is associated with lower probabilities of abstaining for MPs
of the SPD, the CDU and PDS/Linke. The eﬀect on missing from the vote is less obvious.
While for the SPD, lengthy membership may urge MPs to not miss any votes, its eﬀect
for MPs from PDS/Linke is the opposite. Yet, one result is puzzling. Weakly signiﬁcant,
it appears MPs of PDS/Linke are in fact less likely to vote with the majority of their
colleagues. However, apart from this exception, longer party membership appears to be
associated with more uniﬁed voting patterns.
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Figure 3.2: Voting Behavior and Length of Party Membership before First Candidacy
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AMEs obtained from 1000 simulated random draws from the variance-covariance matrix. Black
color indicates signiﬁcance at 95% level. Quantities based on models as found in Tables 3.5, 3.9
and 3.13.
Formative Years
Eﬀects of the age at which the MPs has joined the party follow a clearer pattern, as
shown in Figure 3.3. For three parties  the SPD, the CDU and B90/Grüne  we see less
voting with the majority as the age of joining the party increases. To the same substantive
consequences, we see three partly diﬀerent parties  again the SPD and the CDU, now
with PDS/Linke  whose MPs are also more likely to abstain from voting as the age of
having joined the party increases.
Its impact on missing from votes is mixed. While older entrants of the SPD are more
likely to miss votes, the opposite seems true for MPs of PDS/Linke.
Only for the CSU, again, do we see an unexpected and only slightly statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect in the direction of less abstentions. Nonetheless, we see a tendency that the older
MPs are when joining the party for which they will be elected, the less uniﬁed their voting
behavior tends to be.
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Figure 3.3: Voting Behavior and Age of Joining Party
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AMEs obtained from 1000 simulated random draws from the variance-covariance matrix. Black
color indicates signiﬁcance at 95% level. Quantities based on models as found in Tables 3.4, 3.8
and 3.12.
Holding Party Oﬃce Before First Candidacy
While the previous two measures of pre-parliamentary socialization cannot distinguish
between passive and active party membership, holding a party oﬃce before the ﬁrst can-
didacy can. Holding a party oﬃce not only evinces deeper involvement with the party, its
members and successful compliance with the party's formal and informal rules, it further
implies the internalization of norms of unity for the sake of unity. Figure 3.4 presents the
AME of holding a party oﬃce on MPs' voting behavior. Those MPs that have held party
oﬃce before their ﬁrst candidacy of the three parties right of the centre, i.e. CDU, CSU
and FDP, are more likely to vote with the majority of their party on free votes. On the
ﬂip side, former oﬃce-holders are also less likely to vote against the majority (applies to
MPs of the CDU and FDP) or to abstain (MPs of PDS/Linke).
Previous party oﬃce barely produces are clear picture of predictions for absentism. While
prior oﬃce-holders of the CDU are less likely to be excused from votes, MPs of the SPD
and with lower statistical signiﬁcance MPs of PDS/Linke are more likely to miss free
votes.
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Figure 3.4: Voting Behavior and Party Oﬃce Before Candidacy
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AMEs obtained from 1000 simulated random draws from the variance-covariance matrix. Black
color indicates signiﬁcance at 95% level. Quantities based on models as found in Tables 3.7, 3.11
and 3.15.
Switcher
Average marginal eﬀects relating to the ﬁnal hypothesis on the inﬂuence of previous party
membership in another party are presented in Figure 3.5. The eﬀects are largely in line
with expectations. For MPs of the CDU that switched from another party their likelihood
of voting with the majority decreases. At the same time, their likelihood of voting against
or to abstain grows larger  the latter signiﬁcant only at the 90% level however. Abstention
becomes more likely for MPs of the SPD, the CDU and B90/Grüne. They become less
likely for MPs of the CSU  an unexpected result.
MPs that have switched into the SPD or the CSU tend to miss more free votes. Possibly
a way to avoid upsetting party leadership by disrupting party unity (further).
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Figure 3.5: Voting Behavior and Ever Being Member of Other Party
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AMEs obtained from 1000 simulated random draws from the variance-covariance matrix. Black
color indicates signiﬁcance at 95% level. Quantities based on models as found in Tables 3.6, 3.10
and 3.14.
Discussion
Examining the role of party membership on the voting behavior of MPs in the German
Bundestag suggest that voicing divergent stances on free votes  often but not only related
to matters of conscience  are contingent on the degree of pre-parliamentary socialization
processes and party aﬃliation. Moreover, it appears that disagreement is voiced through
diﬀerent channels of varying degrees of dissent, as the number of MPs missing or being
excused from the vote correlated negatively with the number of votes in line with the
majority (see Table 3.1 and 3.3). Yet, mixed results in this respect at the individual level
of the MPs do not reveal any empirical pattern of how pre-parliamentary socialization
processes might inﬂuence the missing from votes. This, it appears has more idiosyncratic
reasons.
Table 3.2 shows how all four indicators of pre-parliamentary socialization processes within
parties, i.e. the length of membership before candidacy, the age of joining the party,
holding a party oﬃce before ﬁrst candidacy and being a member of another party, by and
large support results, though varying by party, in line with theoretical expectations. The
longer MPs have been party members when assuming their legislative mandates for the
ﬁrst time, the more likely they are to vote in line with the party and less likely to dissent.
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The same patterns hold for the age of joining the party. The older the future MP is when
joining the party, the less likely they are to vote with and more likely to vote against the
majority of the party or abstain. Notable exceptions are the CSU and the FDP. While
for the latter no systematic diﬀerence is supported empirically, contradicting results are
made out for MPs of the CSU.
First-time MPs that have held a party oﬃce before their ﬁrst candidacy show higher
probabilities of voting with the majority of the party compared to non-oﬃce holders.
These MPs are also less likely to abstain or vote against the majority of their party.
These results too diﬀer between parties, with one counterintuitive ﬁnding for the SPD,
whose MPs with prior party oﬃces are in fact less likely to vote with the majority  though
only weakly signiﬁcant. Finally, the last indicator of intra-party socialization processes or
lack thereof, i.e. those MPs that have previously been a member of another party, is
related to expected behavioral patterns too. CDU MPs with this background show lower
likelihood of voting with and greater likelihood of voting against the majority. They also
tend to abstain more often, yet signiﬁcant only at the 90% level. Members of the SPD
and B90/GR are also more likely to abstain, while MPs of the CSU and PDS/Linke defy
expectations and either are less likely to vote against the majority (PDS/Linke) or less
likely to abstain (CSU). Additionally, it appears that these MPs have a tendency to miss
free votes, presumably to avoid making tough decisions that could estrange them from
other group.
These results underscore the importance of intra-party socialization processes for the
development of such group norms as loyalty and a shared duty for unity, as well as for
development of homogeneous (policy) preferences. The overall empirical pattern resonates
perfectly with expectations set by social identity theory: belonging to a group nudges
the individual to re-evaluate its attitudes, norms and values in light of what they deem
relevant and adjust their behavior in line with expectations from signiﬁcant others, i.e.
other members of the group. To be become a candidate, aspirants have to comply with
the party's internal rules in order to be considered for a candidacy in the ﬁrst place.
The younger now the new entry into the party is the more formative will obeying to and
complying with the rules to become a candidate be. The variance of these eﬀects between
the diﬀerent parties may allude to diﬀerences in intra-party organizational structures,
most notably the formal and informal rules governing candidate selection (see e.g. Reiser
2014).
What do these ﬁndings imply for candidate selection? As a number of parties have started
with expanding their supply of candidates by allowing non-members to seek party nom-
inations as for instance is allowed for by the constitution of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in
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Table 3.2: Summary of Results by Party and Predictor
Expectation B90/GR CDU CSU FDP PDS/Linke SPD
Length Membership before 1st Candidacy
With + 0 0 0 0 − ++
Against − 0 0 0 0 0 0
Abstain − −− 0 0 0 −− −−
Excused 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missing − 0 0 0 0 ++ −−
Age of Joining Party
With − −− −− 0 0 0 −−
Against + 0 + 0 0 0 0
Abstain + 0 ++ − 0 ++ +
Excused 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missing + 0 0 0 0 −− ++
Party Oﬃce before Candidacy
With + 0 ++ ++ ++ 0 0
Against − 0 −− 0 −− 0 0
Abstain − 0 0 0 0 −− 0
Excused 0 0 −− 0 0 0 0
Missing − 0 0 −− 0 + ++
Switcher
With − 0 −− 0 0 0 0
Against + 0 ++ 0 0 − 0
Abstain + ++ + −− 0 0 ++
Excused 0 0 + −− 0 0 0
Missing + 0 0 ++ 0 0 ++
Note: −|+ p<0.1; −− |++ p<0.05
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Germany (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1993), placing non-party members on safe list posi-
tions as happened in the Christiandemocratic ÖVP in Austria (Austria Presse Agentur
2017), or by searching for candidates through advertisements in national newspaper as
happened in Japan (Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014). While these developments have diﬀerent
causes  which may range from democratic ideals over selection of technocrats to ﬁlling
the pool of quality candidates  they are surely imperiling these parties' coherence.
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Appendix
Table 3.3: Correlation between Vote Choices in Regular Votes, by Party
++++++++With Majority Against Majority
Party Against Abstention Missing Excused With Abstention Missing Excused
CDU −0.331∗∗ −0.221∗∗ −0.316∗∗ −0.402∗∗ −0.331∗∗ +0.410∗∗ +0.037 +0.159∗∗
CSU −0.404∗∗ −0.285∗∗ −0.419∗∗ −0.356∗∗ −0.404∗∗ +0.200∗∗ −0.014 +0.076∗∗
SPD −0.118∗∗ −0.111∗∗ −0.254∗∗ −0.345∗∗ −0.118∗∗ +0.342∗∗ +0.029 −0.030
FDP −0.106∗∗ −0.112∗∗ −0.262∗∗ −0.211∗∗ −0.106∗∗ +0.330∗∗ +0.014 +0.146∗∗
B90/Gr −0.075∗∗ −0.051 −0.218∗∗ +0.064∗ −0.075∗∗ +0.192∗∗ −0.052 −0.015
PDS/Linke −0.120∗∗ −0.074∗ +0.196∗∗ +0.495∗∗ −0.120∗∗ +0.226∗∗ +0.035 −0.061
Note: All roll-call votes from 1949-2013, without free votes. ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01
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Chapter 4
Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate
Recruitment
Candidate selection methods (CSM) crucially aﬀect the behavior of Members
of Parliament (MPs). Extant research investigates the consequenciality of the
selectorate, but is neglecting the candidacy dimension of CSM. But what are
the behavioral implications of minimal candidacy eligibility criteria (CEC)? I
theorize that parties adopt closed CEC in safe districts to ensure nominating
loyalist candidates, while they use open CEC in contested districts to attract
entrepreneur candidates able to woo decisive swing voters. Using survey and
observational data from Japan, where parties have concurrently been nominat-
ing candidates through open and more closed CEC, I show that entrepreneur
candidates are more responsive to their districts but less active in the leg-
islature, measured by diﬀerent types of activities. These ﬁndings corroborate
my expectations that entrepreneur candidates lack political experience and are
sidelined by their more traditional colleagues. Moreover, the results broaden
our understanding of how CSM aﬀect MPs' behavior.
Introduction
Who can become a candidate for general elections? Recently, it seems that membership
in political parties is losing in importance for political careers. An increasing number
of parties have started expanding their supply of candidates, oftentimes reaching out
to non-aﬃliated citizens. Examples include Sebastian Kurz, Prime Minister of Austria,
who hand-picked political outsiders without party membership for his party-list in 2017
(Austria Presse Agentur 2017). The Social Democrats in neighbouring Germany, too, have
started experimenting with broadening their supply of candidates in a radical way. The
party placed a job advertisement on Facebook to ﬁnd a suitable candidate to run in the
district of Bitburg-Prüm for the general election (Ripperger 2016). In the wake of political
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dealignment, including the erosion of partisan identiﬁcation (e.g., Dalton and Wattenberg
2002), a decline in membership-based politics and dwindling numbers of party members
(e.g., van Biezen and Poguntke 2014), these trends in political recruitment seem only
logical.
Selecting candidates for elections is one of the most important and consequential tasks
political parties carry out. Parties' recruitment schemes determine the demographic, ideo-
logical and geographic make-up of parliament to an enormous degree. The recent changes
in parties' selectorates, i.e. the party's body that decides on nominations, and especially
the trend towards greater inclusion of rank-and-ﬁle members in primary elections for party
leaders and general election candidates (see e.g., Pilet and Cross 2014; Cross and Blais
2012), have been mirrored by medial attention and by academic studies exploring the con-
sequences of these changes for electoral competition (Kenig 2009), representation (Lawless
and Pearson 2008), or party voting unity (Indridason and Kristinsson 2015).
However, inclusive candidate selection methods are not limited to the installment of pri-
mary elections or to other changes in the selectorate. The supply of would-be candidates,
too, varies across parties and appears to open up. Yet, we know only little about the be-
havioral consequences of this variation and when the supply of candidates is opened up to
citizens that lack party membership and prior political experience. What can voters, who
often face a take it or leave option, and parties alike expect from Member of Parliament
(MP) that were, for instance, recruited in the wake of public calls for applications?
Although conventional views suggest that parties recruit candidates from within their own
ranks and aﬃliated networks, not all parties require aspirants to be formal members of
the party in order to seek the party's nomination. In fact, parties often are aware of the
electoral attractiveness of candidates that appear to be an alternative to more established
political ﬁgures. One of the most recent examples is the landslide victory of La République
en marche (REM) in France's legislative election in June 2017. The party was launched
only in April 2016 by Emmanuel Macron, who himself was elected President in May 2017.
Both, the president and his party are perceived as overcoming the traditional party-divide
that has ruled France ever since the beginning of the V. Republic. However, the party's
appeal is equally due to the many fresh faces it presented to the voters. Roughly 19.000
citizens felt encouraged to apply as candidate. More than half of the ﬁnal pick of 525 has
never held any elective oﬃce before (The Economist 2017; Par et al. 2017).
While ﬁelding candidates not tainted by previous establishment politics might generate
votes and eventually a parliamentary majority as in the French case, many of these newly
minted MPs feel ill-prepared for their legislative duties and have started considering quit-
ting altogether (see Samuel 2017). Overwhelmed by the workload and underprepared due
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to a lack of prior experience, ineﬃcient and inactive MPs might serve well as voting cattle
in parliament but risk that policy-making will shift to the executive or extra-parliamentary
party entities and that the opposition fails in holding the cabinet accountable  this lack
of experience is something parties cannot induce through the whip. In the long-run this
trend of selecting inexperienced candidates can even contribute to pre-mature coalition
terminations (de Lange and Art 2011) and could eventually undermine the importance of
legislatures.
What is the reasoning of parties when opening up their supply of candidates? The above
examples already hint at a possible reason. In a nascent era of outsider- and the decline
of membership-based politics (van Biezen and Poguntke 2014), established parties are
put in a tough place to secure majorities. Ever more are parties forced to appeal to an
ever more diversiﬁed electorate. In many cases, this entails that in any given electoral
system major parties face districts with weak and strong support. Below I theorize that
in safe districts parties employ more strict Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC) in order
to sort out loyalist from free-riding candidates. In weak and contested districts, however,
parties are compelled to use less demanding CEC to broaden the supply of would-be
candidates and to attract promising entrepreneur candidates that are able to woo inde-
pendent voters through their personality rather than the party's ideology. I hypothesize
that these entrepreneur candidates, selected through open recruitment, exhibit a greater
personal responsiveness to their district but fall short in playing their part in the leg-
islative arena. Due to a lack of prior exposure to the workings of politics that comes
with long-term party membership and socialization, these MPs are excluded from long-
standing co-partisan networks, are ill-prepared for drafting intricate legislative texts, for
holding government accountable and they might carry ill-ﬁtting expectations of their leg-
islative tasks and duties. This lack in legislative prowess has severe implicatiosn for party
governance in democratic systems.
To address the theoretical implications, I take advantage of the Japanese case. Similar to
the German example, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and its centre-right opponent
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), besides some smaller parties, have been recruiting
candidates through public job postings  known as k	obo  for general elections on a large
scale for the last 20 or so years. The k	obo system as implemented by the DPJ and the LDP
is more or less open to anybody wishing to run for oﬃce and both parties have nominated
a total of 189 k	obo selected candidates in the ﬁve general elections between 2000 to 2012.
Out of these, 133 candidates were elected and entered parliament (Yu, Yu, and Shoji
2014). As Smith, Pekkanen, and Krauss (2013) shows, the overwhelming majority of these
candidates have never held any elective political oﬃce before, neither at the national nor
local level and oftentime became party members only in the process. At the same time,
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though, these parties were also nominating candidates using more traditional ways, which
allows for a sound comparison of candidates with diﬀerent selection backgrounds.
Using data from candidate surveys and data on legislative activity, measured by the num-
ber of written questions tabled and Private Member Bills (PMB) initiated and cospon-
sored, I show that entrepreneur candidates in fact return more often to their districts
while parliament is in session and are less likely to engage with the legislative process
when in government and less likely to hold government accountable when in opposition.
Instead of focusing on rather re-active legislative behavior or those regulated by the lead-
ership of the parliamentary party group, e.g. roll-call votes or ﬂoor speeches, the rather
pro-active behavior of written questions and PMBs allows to compare the innate disposi-
tion, ability and drive of MPs. These ﬁndings support my theoretical expectations about
the legislative non-activity and these MPs' weak standing in the party, questioning these
candidates' value to the party in parliament apart from being voting cattle.
While a growing number of studies is focusing on causes and consequences of the se-
lectorate dimension (Hazan and Rahat 2010), we know relatively little about behavioral
consequences of more open candidacy requirements (a notable exception, Smith and Tsut-
sumi 2014). What can party leaders and voters alike expect from such candidates that
often enter politics through the short-cut of applying for nominations in response to public
calls for applications? This paper oﬀers the ﬁrst empirical investigation of the behavioral
consequences of variations of these requirements. By doing so, I address two major strands
of the literature; my ﬁndings add to the literature on CSM and legislative politics. While
CSM are primarily understood to shape the behavior of candidates and MPs through
the degree of (in-) dependence felt toward the selector (e.g., Carey 2009), I show that
CSM aﬀect the behavior of political actors through a second channel, too, namely the
candidacy dimension, i.e. the kind of personnel that is eligible to seek nomination. The
next section provides a brief overview of the scarce studies on the candidacy dimension
in the literature.
Candidate Selection and Candidate Behavior
The study of CSM is inﬂuenced tremendously by the seminal work of Hazan and Rahat
(2001; 2010), who conceptualized candidate selection mechanisms along four distinct di-
mensions  i.e., the selectorate, the candidacy, the decentralization and the voting system.
While most attention has been paid to the dimension of the selectorate (Kenig 2009; Kenig
et al. 2015; Shomer 2009; Faas 2003; Indridason and Kristinsson 2015) and the degree of
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centralization (Lundell 2004; Langston 2006), the candidacy dimension failed to amass a
similar degree of attention.
Although the country-speciﬁc contributions in Gallagher and Marsh (1988) oﬀer a ﬁrst
overview of some of the personal characteristics a party's selectorate is looking for in a
candidate, no systematic analyses of how candidates recruited under diﬀerent eligibility
criteria are provided. Taking a step back and examining the supply of candidates more
thoroughly, the work by Fox and Lawless (2005; 2010) and Lawless (2012) revolves around
the formation of political ambition prior to any political work or oﬃce and sheds light
on the socio-economics, the character traits and familial socialization that encourages
and fosters the development of these ambitions to seek nomination and run for oﬃce.
However, their studies stop before entering the realm of political parties, their candidacy
requirements and the latter's behavioral consequences.
Yet, while the US with its open primaries and weak gate-keeping capacity of its parties,
seems to be an ideal case to study the eﬀect of low demanding CEC, previous studies have
suggested that despite the de jure openness of the selection process, outsiders barely have
a chance of securing a party's nomination. Most incumbents go either unchallenged or win
against low-quality challengers (e.g., Carson, Engstrom, and Roberts 2007). Even in the
contest for open seats in the wake of an incumbent's retirement or death, mainly high-
quality candidates, i.e. candidates with prior political experience who have held elective
oﬃce at a lower administrative level before, secure the party's nomination (e.g.,Hirano and
Snyder Jr. 2014). Hence, despite the fact that US party primaries are technically among
the most inclusive selectorates, the recruitment of candidates for Congress remains closed
to an inner circle of career politicians.
The only study, so far, that examines the consequences of variation along the candidacy
dimension is the one by Smith and Tsutsumi (2014). Relying on the same empirical exam-
ple which will be used in this article, they show that new candidates recruited under more
open candidacy requirements exhibit more moderate policy attitudes than their counter-
parts recruited through traditional channels. They also show that the open recruitment
scheme attracted more candidates without prior political experience and without local
roots in the district they ran in. However, the study is limited as it only looks at can-
didates and neglects to analyse the parliamentary behavior of those candidates selected
under open recruitment that were elected.
Despite all the mounting research on candidate recruitment and most speciﬁcally the
selectorate, there is virtually no study investigating the behavioral and representational
consequences of variations on what Hazan and Rahat (2010) call the candidacy dimen-
sion (save for Smith and Tsutsumi 2014). The signiﬁcance of the candidacy dimension
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results from its rather easy changeability of eligibility requirements for candidates and
can eliminate a hugh number of otherwise eligible aspirants. It has been noted early on,
that the structure of a recruitment scheme aﬀects the type of candidate coming forward,
and the variation in the same should also lead to variation in the motivation and char-
acteristics of those candidates (Black 1972). When allowing virtually everybody to seek
nomination without any formal ﬁlter, i.e. oﬃcial candidacy requirements, aspirants less
interested in the party's policy position but more so in its electoral sway are likely to
emerge, as I argue below. But what indeed can party leaders and voters expect from can-
didates nominated in the wake of public calls for applications? The next section will lay
out my assumptions on why and when parties institute open recruitment and when they
employ rather demanding CEC, and how this shapes the type of candidate likely to come
forward under each of these selection regimen.
Theory
The selection of candidates is one of the deﬁning functions parties fulﬁll in democratic
systems. By presenting and pre-selecting a number of candidates to the electorate, parties
reduce the voters' choice in terms of personnel tremendously and crucially determine the
ﬁnal composition of parliament. Oftentimes, voters face a take it or leave it option. But
what can parties and voters expect from candidates selected under open recruitment in
terms of behavior and legislative prowess? A candidate that is likely to have no prior
political experience and who potentially is an opportunist trying to seize their chance of
national oﬃce? What are the behavioral repercussions when aspirants for candidacy have
to fulﬁll only a bare minimum of requirements?
CSM have been found to play a crucial role in determining the behavior of members of
parliament. The main channel through which CSM are thought to aﬀect the behavior of
candidates and MPs is the level of (in-) dependence from the party leadership. Contingent
on who is responsible for (re-) selection, candidates and MPs might cozy up to primary
voters or toe the party line in order to please the national party leadership (see Carey
2009). However, in this paper I argue that a second channel exists through which CSM
aﬀect MPs' behavior. This second channel works directly via the personnel that is selected
as candidates and, later on, take seat in parliament. Parties regulate their supply of
candidates through more or less restrictions on candidacy eligibility criteria (CEC). These
requirements are often subject to parties' internal rules and, hence, easily malleable and
capable of eliminating a huge number of otherwise eligible personnel. Thus, parties that
desire to arrive in parliament as a cohesive unit may set demanding criteria to only select
committed candidates. On the other hand, if parties are more interested in attracting
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electorally promising candidates, opening up selections to a more diverse set of candidates
is the way to go (Hazan and Rahat 2010, p.20 f.).
The continuum of candidacy requirements runs from being completely open, with few to
none requirements, to highly closed, with multiple requirements to be fulﬁlled by aspi-
rants. At the open end, parties do not impose any requirements and candidates only have
to abide to the very basic legal requirements of minimum age and citizenship. However,
moving toward more closed candidacy, parties may demand the fulﬁllment of additional
requirements. The most common being party membership. Many parties expect aspirants
to have joined the party a speciﬁed time before a possible nomination is being bestowed.
Further requirements may include pledges of loyalty, monetary deposits, or recommen-
dations from other party members (Hazan and Rahat 2010; Poguntke et al. 2016). As a
result, and contingent on the very opportunity structure created by the CEC, a varying
set of would-be candidates is likely to come forward and seek nomination (Black 1972).
One of the most important factors in the candidates' pondering whether to run, is the
cost of candidacy  to be understood as the monetary costs associated with campaigning
as well as the costs that accrue by fulﬁlling parties' CEC.
Accordingly, the more demanding CEC are, the higher is the cost associated with seeking
candidacy. Costs might be low when joining the party at any time before the election
suﬃces, but grow costlier when would-be candidates have to canvass sitting MPs to collect
signatures or do even more. This requires a great deal of networking and a signiﬁcant
amount of time. Only would-be candidates that are highly committed and who have joined
the party out of intrinsic  i.e. ideological  rather than instrumental reasons are likely
to deem this ordeal worthwhile. In other words, the cost of candidacy associated with the
party's CEC can be neutralized to some degree by the utility would-be candidates derive
from purely being a member and by being in good standing with other party members.
From the party's perspective, costlier CEC create a structure of selective incentives that
helps to sort out free-riding candidates that are only in for the promise of oﬃce (Hazan and
Rahat 2010, p. 21). Although all ﬁnal candidates hope to win election, parties can ensure
through highly demanding criteria that only those would-be candidates come forward that
have proven their commitment to the party  i.e. party loyalists.
So what are the incentives for parties to be more open about candidacies? For one, parties,
not unlike candidates, want to win elections or at least win as many seats as possible, be it
to enter government or just to be in a better position to promote the partyies' platforms.
Following the logic of the model laid out by Galasso and Nannicini (2011), I assume
that parties use diﬀerent variants of candidate selection to target speciﬁc districts, which
diﬀer structurally in their party support. That is, parties face safe, contested and hopeless
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districts. As Galasso and Nannicini (2011) have suggested for the case of Italy, parties
usually select loyalists in safe districts. By doing so, they ensure the election of its core
personnel while simultaneously giving the voters a candidate that is ideologically close to
them. In contested districts, in contrast, parties are more likely to nominate high-valence
candidates that are not necessarily associated with the party but that can woo independent
and swing voters who cast their votes based not on party aﬃliation but on idiosyncratic
evaluations of the candidates' personalities.21 How does this aﬀect the CEC of parties? As
parties usually have no shortage of willing candidates to run in safe districts, employing
more demanding CEC deters those free-riding on the electorally attractive party ticket
and instead ensures the selection of committed loyalist candidate. In contested districts,
however, parties may open up their selection and encourage applications from a broader
and more diverse set of would-be candidates that are able to capture the swing vote.
This holds the promise of selecting the most attractive applicants out of many and, in
addition, to veil these candidates in an aura of a seemingly enhanced open and democratic
selection.
What type of candidate is likely to come forward and seek candidacy when parties em-
ploy more open CEC? Installing more open CEC ﬁrst and foremost has the consequence
of reducing the cost of candidacy for would-be candidates. Instead of costly demands of
membership, parties may merely ask candidates to pledge allegiance to the party's plat-
form. Moreover, the party leadership may even advertise their search for candidates in
newspapers (Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014) or online. As a result, would-be candidates previ-
ously deterred by strict and costly CEC now feel encouraged to seek nomination. I name
those candidates that respond to these casting-selections entrepreneurs as opposed to
loyalists. These entrepreneur candidates take advantage when parties open up their CEC
and, once selected, beneﬁt from the party's campaign machinery and support.
The candidacy of the entrepreneur candidate is the product of special circumstances. Only
through the lowering of selection criteria and the encouragement of non-member to apply
for candidacy are entrepreneur candidates put into the situation of being a candidate.
For most of these candidates, this is a ﬁrst. As they lack the socialization that comes
with long-term party membership, they are unlikely to have undergone the same political
trajectory as loyalist candidates. These include campaign experiences, elective oﬃce at
the local or regional level, and the establishment of a support network within the local
21One could also argue that parties are not actively targeting certain districts but that they are
rather re-active about the selection of candidates. That is, in weak districts parties may lack promising
candidates in the ﬁrst place which triggers the search for more independent and less aﬃliated candidates.
However, this argumentative diﬀerence does not alter the conjunction of weak support in districts and
the nomination of more independent candidates on one hand, and the nomination of party members in
safer districts on the other.
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and national party. All this can put entrepreneur candidates at odds with the ideologically
more zealous rank-and-ﬁle of the party (see e.g. Shoji 2013).
In their bid for re-selection and re-election, entrepreneur candidates are thus well advised
to make friends with the local party chapter. To credibly do so, they either have to produce
some personal link with the district (Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen 2005; Campbell and
Cowley 2014), or at least show good will and engage with local politics and issues.
By spending more time in the constituency, entrepreneur candidates can gather local
knowledge, increase their name recognition, and can more plausibly claim to know what
it's like down here. Moreover, being present in the district may also serve to mend fences
with suspicious local rank-and-ﬁle members, who generally favor policy and ideology over
personal advancement (van Haute and Gauja 2015; Young and Cross 2002), and on whose
support future campaigns hinge.
Hypothesis 1: Candidates selected under more open candidacy requirements are
more likely to be responsive to their district and local party chapter, especially in
their early terms.
As a corollary of the pre-occupation with constituency work and the lack of previous
political experience, entrepreneur candidates once elected into parliament are possibly
in a diﬃcult position to engage in the detail-oriented and intricate legislative process.
Therefore, I expect them to struggle ﬁrst in the legislative arena but to adapt later on
when learning the rules of the game. Moreover, as entrepreneur candidates make their way
into national politics via open recruitment, a short-cut compared to traditional political
career trajectories, more seasoned candidates and MPs might hold grievances against them
and exclude them from their mutual support networks. Over time, however, entrepreneur
candidates may earn their senior's trust and start working together with them. That is,
with increasing time in parliament and exposure to its working mechanisms, entrepreneur
candidates are likely to converge in their behavior with MPs selected under more closed
CEC.
Hypothesis 2: Members of Parliament selected under more open candidacy re-
quirements are less likely to engage in pro-active legislative activity in their early
terms.
In the next section I will elaborate on the background of the open recruitment scheme ad-
ministered by major Japanese parties and why they provide the perfect empirical example
to assess these hypotheses.
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Empirical Strategy and Data
Open Candidate Reruitment in Japan
My hypotheses will be addressed by taking advantage of the unique Japanese case, where
major parties have been ﬁelding two types of candidates concurrently since the early
2000s. The electoral reform of the mid-1990s left its mark on the CSM of the major
Japanese parties. Confronted with a new electoral system using single-seat districts, the
veteran Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) saw a centralization of its CSM (Asano 2006)
and a demand for candidates with universal appeals, transcending the particularistic ones
prevalent under the former SNTV system (e.g. Catalinac 2016). Among the opposition,
the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), a merger of several centre-left and centrist parties,
formed and assumed the role of the main opposition party in the early 2000s. However,
the DPJ's initial ambitions were cut short by a shortage of (quality) candidates and weak
local organizations.
To overcome this shortage, attract promising candidates and compensate for weak local
party organizations,22 the DPJ started to employ nationwide open recruitment  known
as k	obo, literally meaning public advertisement of a position  and was followed in this
by other newly founded parties such as the Japan Restoration Party JRP) or Your Party
(YP). k	obo is designed as a competitive recruitment scheme to attract potential candidates
from the general public irrespective of party membership or political experience. The DPJ,
in fact, invested around 50 to 100 million JPY on ads in newspapers for each round of k	obo
recruitment, which usually were held before elections (Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014). Basically,
aspirants need to fulﬁll merely the conditions spelled out in the Public Oﬃces Election
Law's chapter on passive suﬀrage, i.e. holding the Japanese citizenship and being of at
least 25 years.
In the ﬁrst step, applications are send directly to the national headquarter, where a ﬁrst
screening takes place. Applicants, then, have to undergo interviews with senior party
members before entering negotiations about potential districts to run in, in the second
round. In the ﬁnal step, the headquarter has to mediate between local party chapters and
ﬁnalists designated to a given vacant district, to ensure the former's support. Technically,
k	obo recruitment diﬀered from traditional recruitment only in the ﬁrst step, while all
prospective candidates had to undergo steps two and three as well (Shoji 2013). Hence,
k	obo and non-k	obo candidates barely diﬀer in their selectorate background.
22In case of the DPJ, k	obo nomination across districts is thus not random but oftentimes rather a
function of whether or not high quality candidates exist in the district already. I address potential issues
of confounding of selection background with district characteristics in my analyses.
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Pushed into the defensive, the ever-dominant LDP, too, adopted k	obo recruitment to ﬁll
vacant districts, lest being branded as a rather backwards and closed party in comparison.
Compared to the DPJ, the LDP's open recruitment is handled at the district level and
the actual implementation of k	obo recruitment varies between districts. Some of these are
more open in terms of CEC than others. Among the more strict districts, applicants have
to be members of the party and/or collect signatures (Smith, Pekkanen, and Krauss 2013;
Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014). However, in the LDP, too, does the selectorate dimension barely
diﬀer between the two types of candidates. In general, moreover, the overall majority
of k	obo recruitment is highly open and encourages applications from a broader range of
would-be candidates. Party-ﬁxed eﬀects in the analysis accounts for the diﬀerences in k	obo
implementation.
In the ﬁve elections between 2000 and 2012, while also ﬁelding candidates selected through
traditional channels, the two biggest parties, the DPJ and the LDP, ran a total of 189 k	obo
recruited candidates, out of which 133 were eventually elected to the House of Represen-
tatives (HOR) which holds 480 seats in total (Yu, Yu, and Shoji 2014, appendix). Thus, a
signiﬁcant number of candidates and MPs during this time were in fact selected through
highly open CEC. Underscoring my earlier assumption, Smith and Tsutsumi (2014) show
that k	obo selected candidates, indeed, have less political experience (measured by local
oﬃce and service in the House of Councillors). While this is true for the large majority
of k	obo, there are a few instances, mostly in the LDP, in which hereditary politicians or
previous staﬀer to MPs were selected through k	obo recruitment, though.
In addition, the mixed-member electoral system of Japan makes running in otherwise
contested districts  bivariate relationships indicate that districts with k	obo recruitment
are slightly more competitive  not completely unattractive for (inexperienced) candi-
dates. Most parties usually place all their candidates that compete in the nominal tier
also on the party list  on the same slot! While those candidates that win their districts
are ticked-oﬀ the party list, the remaining district-loser are reordered on the party list
in accordance to their loss margin (their voteshare divided by the district winner's vote-
share). Contingent on the number of PR seats won by the party in a given PR block, these
re-ranked best-losers are elected too through the party list. This safety-net provision
implies that candidates running in insecure districts do not have to win the district per
se to get elected, but only to mobilize enough votes to be among a certain top number of
best losers within their own party.
The Japanese case, thus, presents an ideal case to test my theoretical expectations con-
cerning the eﬀects of more inclusive candidacy requirements. As both types of candidates
were running at the same time for the same parties within the same electoral system, pos-
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sible cultural, periodical or systemic confounders, typical pitfalls in cross-country studies,
as well as the selectorate dimension in candidate selection are controlled for by design.
In the next section I will present the data sources that I use to empirically assess my
hypotheses.
Data
I make use of two main data sources; the pre-election candidate survey jointly administered
by the University of Tokyo and the Asahi Shimbun (henceforth UTAS survey)23 and data
on legislative activity, available on the website of the HOR.24 From the UTAS survey, I
will use the 2012 wave, as only for the 2012 election were incumbent candidates asked
how often they have been returning to their district in the previous legislative term. This
question is used to examine my ﬁrst hypothesis by looking at the frequency of returning as
an observable implication of a greater personal responsiveness to the district. Overall, this
wave, targeting all candidates competing, has an average response rate of 93,4%. Data on
legislative activity consists of the introduction and cosponsoring of Private Member Bills
(PMB) and written questions in the HOR by individual MPs for the 43th to 46th electoral
periods between 2003 and 2014. Members of the HOR may submit bills to parliament,
irrespective of the government's policy agenda. MPs intending to submit PMB need the
support of at least 20 other legislators. Apart from initiating own PMBs, MPs can also
endorse and cosponsor other MPs' PMBs to broaden support. PMBs and written questions
are legislative activities the least controlled by party leadership or the plenary agenda
when compared to speeches or legislative voting. These kind of activites can therefore
be considered pro-active and to measure a MP's legislative activity and capability more
accurately (see also Burden 2007).
The samples for my analyses thus vary according to the hypotheses tested (Table 4.2 in the
Appendix provides descriptive statistics organized by my hypotheses). Whereas the ﬁrst
hypothesis on district responsiveness is tested using the sample of incumbent candidates
in the 2012 election, my hypotheses on legislative activity are assessed by a sample of all
MPs in the four legislative terms between 2003 and 2014,25 as the number of elected k	obo
candidates reached signiﬁcant numbers in these periods. The shares of k	obo among all
MPs for each period are 4,34%, 8,68%, 14,38%, and 26,46%, respectively.
In the following analyses, I employ the coding of Smith and Tsutsumi (2014) and code k	obo
MPs with a 1 if they were selected through open recruitment, i.e. candidates that applied
23See http://www.masaki.j.u-tokyo.ac.jp/utas/utasindex.html.
24See http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/index.nsf/html/index.htm.
25The 43th (2003-2005), 44th (2005-2009), 45th (2009-2012), and 46th (2012-2014).
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and were selected following public calls for nominations, and 0 otherwise. The majority
of control variables are binary in nature, too. I suspect that k	obo will be negatively
associated with either Party Oﬃce, Parliamentary Oﬃce or Executive Oﬃce. However,
since parliamentary activity, too, is likely to be correlated with these three types of oﬃce,
I control for each using a binary indicator. Speciﬁcally, holding Party Oﬃce is coded 1
if a given MP fulﬁlls one of the following functions within the party: leader, vice-leader,
secretary-general, or chairman of one of the party's internal councils, such as the Policy
Research Council (in case of the LDP) or the Election Strategy Council. Parliamentary
Oﬃce is coded 1 for all MPs that chair or are directors of any committee in the HOR and
0 otherwise. Executive Oﬃce is coded one for all cabinet members. Given the frequent
cabinet reshues and common ﬂuctuation in committee chairmanship, 1s are assigned
to these two variables if a given MP held a cabinet post or a committee chairmanship,
respectively, at some point during the legislative term. Government status, too, is assumed
to correlate with certain activities in parliament and with the number of k	obo MPs.
Similary, Seniority is assumed to be associated with legislative activity and negatively with
the freshmen status of many k	obo MPs. It is measured as the number of times elected to
the HOR. Vote Margin indicates the diﬀerence in the voteshares of the district's winner
and the runner-up and shall account for electoral permissiveness of legislative activity.
Additionally, since most candidates take advantage of the dual-candidacy opportunity
in the Japanese mixed-member system, district losers may still be elected to parliament
through the party list. For these so-called zombie MPs the vote margin is calculated as
the distance to the district winner's voteshare and is therefore negative.
Analysis
Returning to the District
In this section I address my ﬁrst hypothesis on candidates' responsiveness to their district
and the local party chapter. Given the limitation of available data to test the interaction
of candidates with their local party chapter and their constituents directly, I rely on
an observable implication of my hypothesis: the frequency of incumbents to return to
their district. As frequent visits signal interest in local matters on part of the MP we
should expect MPs with weak standing in the local party chapters to return more often
in order to strengthen their position in both the electorate and the party. Although all
candidates respective MPs competing in geographic electoral districts are thought to be
policy-responsive to their district, k	obo candidates and MPs are in addition more heavily
induced to be personally responsive on account of their presumable outsider status.
105
Chapter 4 Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate Recruitment
The UTAS survey was conducted shortly before the 2012 general election and targeted all
candidates. With a response rate of 84% among incumbents and after dropping n = 55
MPs that solely competed through the party-list in the previous election and removing
parties that did not employ open recruitment26, I am left with n = 333 observations for
analysis (i.e. 78,4% of incumbent competing in districts in 2009). The survey provided
an ordinal answer scheme with six categories to the question how often MPs return to
their district; never, once a month, two to three times a month, once a week, every other
day and everyday. Given the skewed distribution of the ordinal variable, peaking at once
a week with n = 220, I collapse never, once a month, and two to three times a month
into the new category less than once a week. The two categories of every other day and
everyday were grouped together to form the category more than once a week.
Concerns about misreporting of how often incumbents have returned to their districts
are warranted  especially for those electorally weak. However, I expect that visits to
the districts are aimed not solely to win over voters but moreover to appease potentially
suspicious party members on the ground. Misreporting how often MPs have returned
can in the eyes of local party members, who have greater knowledge of how often their
incumbent actually has returned, paint the misreporting incumbent in an unfavorable
light. Moreover, controlling for vote margin might partially account for the incentive to
misreport. However, I can not rule out misreporting completely and ﬁndings should thus
be consumed with caution.
Table 4.1 presents estimation results based on multinomial logistic models.27 I control for
the distance from the HOR, which is based in Tokyo's 1st district,28 party and executive
oﬃce as well as seniority, the previous vote margin and party ﬁxed-eﬀects. Moreover,
to account for possibly systematic variation in the nomination of k	obo across districts,
I control for the party's district voteshare in the 2005 election as the incumbents of the
2012 wave of the UTAS survey were nominated for and elected in the 2009 election. In
this way, I control for the past electoral performance in the districts  which might have
prompted open recruitment in the ﬁrst place  and minimize spill-over eﬀects on the
selection background.
26This, in combination with party ﬁxed-eﬀects, allows for a comparison of diﬀerent candidate selection
backgrounds within parties.
27Robustness checks using ordered logit models yield the same results and can be found in Table 4.9
in the Appendix.
28Using a shapeﬁle of the 300 single-member districts, I calculate the distance between any given dis-
trict and Tokyo's 1st by taking the distance between the district-polygon's centroids. To avoid distortions
emanating from small islets oﬀ the Eastern coast belonging to Tokyo's 10th district, I manually assigned
a value 10 km based on a calculation using Google maps.
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The eﬀect of the selection background is signiﬁcant in all four model speciﬁcations. In the
ﬁrst two models k	obo selection background is coded as 1 only for those k	obo-selected MPs
in their ﬁrst legislative term  those k	obo-selected MPs in higher terms are coded 0 (Oper-
ationalization A). Models (3) and (4) codes all k	obo-selected MPs as 1 irrespective of the
term they are serving (Operationalization B). As expected are k	obo-selected incumbents
more likely to return to their district. This tendency, however, becomes less likely once
they have reached higher seniority. Figure 4.1 shows average marginal predictions of k	obo
selection background compared to a non-k	obo background for MPs in their ﬁrst (panel a)
and second term (panel b).
Table 4.1: Multinomial Logit Estimation. Returning to District
Operationalization A Operationalization B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
less than more than less than more than less than more than less than more than
once a week once a week once a week once a week once a week once a week once a week once a week
k	obo 0.180 2.078∗∗∗ 0.867 1.699∗∗∗ 0.507 1.049∗∗ −0.090 1.638∗∗∗
(1.123) (0.538) (1.160) (0.564) (0.767) (0.476) (1.327) (0.557)
k	obo × Seniority 0.055 −0.971∗
(0.550) (0.502)
Distance from Diet, in km (log) −0.466∗∗ −1.777∗∗∗ −0.445∗∗ −1.891∗∗∗ −0.413∗ −1.863∗∗∗ −0.427∗ −1.905∗∗∗
(0.215) (0.197) (0.221) (0.211) (0.219) (0.208) (0.227) (0.214)
Party Oﬃce 2.940∗∗ 2.869∗ 2.239∗ 3.773∗∗ 2.254∗ 4.038∗∗ 2.272∗ 3.465∗
(1.151) (1.643) (1.160) (1.852) (1.159) (1.882) (1.160) (1.883)
Executive Oﬃce 1.441∗∗ −1.513∗ 0.572 −0.404 0.561 −0.507 0.546 −0.125
(0.598) (0.900) (0.658) (1.035) (0.657) (1.038) (0.657) (1.087)
Born in Prefecture −1.251∗∗∗ −0.757∗ −1.196∗∗∗ −0.798∗ −1.166∗∗ −0.725∗ −1.193∗∗ −0.793∗
(0.444) (0.423) (0.463) (0.436) (0.465) (0.430) (0.467) (0.439)
Vote Margin 0.053∗∗∗ 0.029∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.032∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.025 0.061∗∗∗ 0.033∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017)
Previous Party Voteshare in District −0.004 −0.067∗∗∗ −0.028 −0.047∗ −0.027 −0.047∗ −0.029 −0.045∗
(0.022) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Seniority 0.347∗∗∗ −0.447∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ −0.495∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ −0.445∗∗
(0.115) (0.175) (0.115) (0.176) (0.115) (0.177)
Constant 0.490 11.019∗∗∗ 0.457 11.398∗∗∗ 0.261 11.427∗∗∗ 0.528 11.386∗∗∗
(1.578) (1.407) (1.588) (1.489) (1.588) (1.479) (1.629) (1.490)
Observations 333 333 333 333
Akaike Inf. Crit. 389.877 372.176 376.822 375.314
Controls
Party Fixed-Eﬀects Yes Yes
Note: Multinomial Logistic regression; once a week as reference category; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Controlling for the party's previous voteshare in the district as well as the incumbents'
vote margins disentangles the eﬀect of selection background ﬁrst from structural char-
acteristics that might have prompted open recruitment in the ﬁrst place and secondly
from other electoral incentives. To sum up and assuming no misreporting, these results
suggest that k	obo selected incumbents tend to return to their district more often, which is
strongest in their ﬁrst legislative term. With increasing seniority k	obo-selected incumbents
tend to converge in their behavior with their colleagues selected through more traditional
channels.
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Figure 4.1: Average Marginal Eﬀects of being k	obo-selected MP on returning to district.
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Graph shows average marginal eﬀects with 95% conﬁdence intervals of falling into re-
spective category conditional on k	obo selection background. Reference category is once a
week. Quantities obtained from model (4) in Table 4.1.
Legislative Activity
For my ﬁnal hypothesis on legislative activity I now turn to observational data, speciﬁcally
three diﬀerent types of legislative activity: the number of written questions tabled and the
number of PMBs a MP has initiated and cosponsored in a given legislative cycle29. The
initiation of PMBs and tabling of written questions are pro-active activities that reﬂect
MPs' initiative and their prowess in the legislative arena to a greater degree than, say,
reactive behavior such as roll-call votes (see Burden 2007). The cosponsoring of PMBs, in
contrast, indicate not pro-active behavior of MPs but rather how well they are connected
and respected within their party.
To isolate the impact of the candidacy background and to control for possible confounding
features I run multivariate analyses and present robustness checks. Given the clear count
nature of my data I employ negative binomial models with period and party ﬁxed-eﬀects
and standard errors clustered by MPs.30 All models are estimated on a subset containing
only parties that have employed k	obo selection (i.e. DPJ, LDP, JRP and YP), to exploit
the within-party variation in selection background. As before, two variants of the k	obo
operationalization are employed. Variant A codes only k	obo in their ﬁrst term as 1, while
operationalization B codes any MP as k	obo if they have been selected through open se-
29Source: http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/index.nsf/html/index.htm.
30To ensure a common length of exposure time as assumed by count models, I have excluded MPs that
dropped out during the term and MPs that entered midway as replacements. Moreover, I have excluded
the two speakers of the House of Representatives, given their special role detached from legislation.
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lection background at some point. Moreover, for each legislative activity there are three
model speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst one is pitching k	obo selected MPs against those selected
through traditional channels. The second speciﬁcation includes an interaction term with
seniority to explore potential learning and socialization eﬀects. The third speciﬁcation,
moreover, introduces an interaction eﬀect with government status, as some types of leg-
islative activities are more relevant to the opposition (e.g., questions) and others more
relevant to government MPs (e.g., PMBs). Finally, robustness checks are presented by
running the same models on all activities again using a binary variable (k	obo-District)
that indicates those districts of a party that at some point saw or will see a k	obo se-
lected candidate in my sample. These models exclude actual k	obo-selected MPs and thus
compares MPs selected through traditional channels which ran in presumably diﬃcult
districts and those that ran in districts with purely traditional ways of selection. In this
way, I disentangle the eﬀects emanating from the selection background from those from
district characteristics. That is, if it is the district that drives the results and not the se-
lection background, we should see signiﬁcant eﬀects in the expected direction. In addition,
a variable capturing the electoral margin is furthermore accounting for diﬃcult districts
and thus district-induced behavioral incentives for legislative activity.
Figure 4.4a presents average marginal eﬀects of k	obo selection background shown as the
diﬀerence in predicted counts for each type of legislative activity (all full models as well as
zero-inﬂated negative binomial robustness tests of the same speciﬁcations are presented
in Table 4.3 to 4.8 respective Table 4.10 to Table 4.12 in the Appendix). Among the pro-
active activities k	obo selected MPs are signiﬁcantly less likely to engage. On average, k	obo
MPs table one written questions less than non-k	obo MPs. Similarly, k	obo MPs are less
likely to initiate PMBs. When running these models again with an indicator for MPs of
districts with a k	obo selection of the same party at some point  presented in Figure 4.4b
 we do not observe any signiﬁcant results. Overall, it appears that behavioral diﬀerences
are mainly due to the selection background and not characteristics of a district which
should aﬀect the behavior of traditionally selected MPs too.
The second model speciﬁcation attempts to capture learning and socialization eﬀects by
introducing an interaction term between selection background and seniority, measured by
the times MPs have been elected to parliament. Figure 4.6a and 4.6b present again average
marginal eﬀects of k	obo selection background shown as diﬀerences in predicted counts
and robustness tests, respectively. The upper panel clearly shows that newcomer with a
k	obo selection background are signiﬁcantly less likely to engage in tableing questions and
initiating PMBs in their ﬁrst two terms when compared to newcomer with a traditional
selection background. Over time, however, these systematic diﬀerences become smaller
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Figure 4.3: Average Marginal Eﬀects. Diﬀerences in Predicted Counts by Activity.
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95%. Signiﬁcant eﬀects are shown in black, insigniﬁcant eﬀects in grey.
and tend to disappear. No systematic diﬀerence can be reported when replacing k	obo
selection background with the k	obo-District variable.
Finally, as not all legislative activities are equally relevant for all parliamentary actors, I
furthermore introduce an interaction eﬀect between k	obo selection background and govern-
ment status in the ﬁnal model speciﬁcation. Written questions, for example, are usually
seen as the opposition's mean to hold government accountable, while PMBs not intro-
duced by government MPs have higher chances of success. Therefore, we would expect
highly active opposition MPs to table many questions and government MPs to attempt
introducing their or supporting a colleague's legislative pet project through the initiation
or cosponsoring of PMBs.
Figure 4.8a presents results for the ﬁnal model speciﬁcation accounting for the behavioral
diﬀerences of government and opposition k	obo selected MPs. When in government, k	obo
selected MPs are less likely to engage with the initiation or the cosponsoring of PMBs.
This implies that k	obo MPs lack the ability to draft and the connections to be asked to
cosponsor PMBs. What does this reclusive behavior imply for the passage of PMBs? Since
many PMBs are submitted by oppositional MPs anyhow, the overall share of PMBs that
pass is rather low, roughly 8% in the whole sample. However, those that did pass were
cosponsored by 6.7 other MPs on average, those that did not by 4.9 MPs. More important,
however, are cosponsors from across the aisle; passing bills, on average, had the support
from 2 MPs from the government side if the initiator was in opposition and vice versa.
In contrast, bills that did not pass had on average 0.15 supporters from the other block.
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Figure 4.5: Average Marginal Eﬀects. Diﬀerences in Predicted Counts by Activity and
Seniority.
l
l
l
−1.998
−0.11
−0.229
l
l
l
−1.547
−0.093
−0.026
l
l
l
−1.183
−0.038
0.185
1st Term 2nd Term 3rd Term
−4 −3 −2 −1 0 −3 −2 −1 0 −2 −1 0
PMBs     
Cosponsored
PMBs     
Initiated   
Written   
Questions 
(a) AME of k	obo
l
l
l
1.302
−0.04
0.099
l
l
l
−0.504
−0.041
0.144
l
l
l
−1.026
−0.038
0.19
1st Term 2nd Term 3rd Term
0 5 10 −2 0 2 4 −2 −1 0 1 2
PMBs     
Cosponsored
PMBs     
Initiated   
Written   
Questions 
(b) AME of k	obo-District
Average marginal eﬀects obtained through simulations of 1000 random draws from
variance-covariance matrix. Solid lines indicate 90% conﬁdence intervals, dashed ones
95%. Signiﬁcant eﬀects are shown in black, insigniﬁcant eﬀects in grey.
111
Chapter 4 Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate Recruitment
Figure 4.7: Average Marginal Eﬀects. Diﬀerences in Predicted Counts by Activity and
Government Status.
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Among PMBs initiated by k	obo, not a single one elicited support from across the aisle.
Support from the own party, too, is lower for PMBs initiated by k	obo colleagues with
3.7 cosponsors on average. It appears, the inactivity of k	obo is not in any sense rectiﬁed
by greater legislative eﬃciency and that they are sidelined by their colleagues recruited
through more traditional channels.
In opposition, k	obo MPs are also systematically less likely to hold government accountable
by asking questions  to a large substantive degree. On average one can expect k	obo MPs
to table roughly 25 questions less than non-k	obo in opposition. No similar pattern in these
activities can be seen for non-k	obo MPs from k	obo-Districts as shown in Figure 4.8b.
In summary, k	obo selected MPs fail where it matters. In government, they are less likely
or even able to grapple with legislation and in opposition they are less likely to hold gov-
ernment accountable. These ﬁndings corroborate my theoretical expectations. Although
PMBs are not as consequential as legislation forwarded by the cabinet, it indicates how
well MPs have mastered the craftmanship of the legislative process, ranging from the for-
mulation of complex issues to eliciting support and favors from colleagues. However, my
ﬁndings show that not all hope is lost as k	obo selected MPs tend to converge over time in
their legislative behavior toward MPs selected through traditional channels.
Given the political inexperience and electoral uncertainty of k	obo, it appears rational
to allocate the limited resources of time and attention not on legislative but rather on
activities that improve the chance of re-(s)election, such as constituency work. In the
concluding section I discuss the normative implications that arise from the consequences
of employing more open candidacy recruitment.
Conclusion
An increasing number of parties in established democracies have started to experiment
with expanding their supply of candidates. Examples include the People's Party in Aus-
tria, the Social Democrats in Germany, and the French La Républic en marche that have
all followed, though in diﬀerent ﬂavors naturally, Japanese parties which have pioneered
in the nomination of candidates using public calls for applications. However, academic
attention did not keep pace with this trend and its repurcussions for legislative behavior
are underresearched.
In this paper I have argued that CSM aﬀect the behavior of candidates and MPs not only
through the selectorate, but also through the candidacy dimension  the broadening of
the supply side of eligible candidates. I have provided empirical evidence that the type
113
Chapter 4 Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate Recruitment
of personnel selected by parties using the same selectorate has crucial implications for
legislative behavior. Speciﬁcally, the usage of open recruitment and the selection of rather
inexperienced candidates has implications on at least two dimensions of behavior: ﬁrst,
the personal responsiveness of candidates to their districts, including constituents and
local party activists, and second, legislative activity.
The ﬁrst behavioral consequence is likely to speak to the weak standing of candidates
and MPs selected under open recruitment in the party. The tendency to return more
often to the district might be induced by the insecurity of the MP over the local party's
support. Anecdotal evidence obtained through interviews with party oﬃcals by Shoji
(2013) support the assumption that candidates and MPs selected under open recruitment
were considered as taking a short-cut to national oﬃce. This could also explain the low
support for legislation introduced by MPs selected under open recruitment in parliament,
as more traditional MPs might hold grievances against them.
In the legislative arena, MPs selected under open recruitment are less active. Often times
lacking prior political experience in local and party politics, these MPs are ill-equipped
to quickly master the craftmanship of drawing own legislation or holding the government
accountable. While government MPs selected under open recruitment are less likely to
advance own legislative initiatives, their oppositional pendants are dramatically less likely
to hold the government accountable by tableing questions.
In analogy to a growing number of studies showing that the seeming democratization
of parties' internal conducts do not necessarily result in outcomes normatively valued 
such as more competition in leadership races (Kenig 2009), higher legislative turnover
(Put, Gouglas, and Maddens 2015), or more balanced gender or minority representation
(Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008),  parties employing open candidate recrutiment, too,
might feel torn. As open recruitment candidates are thought more likely than traditional
ones to win contested districts, parties might welcome them to maximize their seatshare.
On the other hand, however, these candidates respective MPs fall short in fulﬁlling their
legislative roles, as they are less likely  and possibly less able  to participate in the
legislative process. On a larger scale, my ﬁndings resonate with those by de Lange and Art
(2011). Nominating too many inexperience candidates can contribute in undermining a
party's ability perform. Therefore, the tendency to employ open recruitment could harbor
further implications when a growing number of MPs lack the ability to craft legislation or
to hold government accountable. Executives might take on an even bigger role in policy-
making, perhaps sidelining an inexperienced and possibly disinterested and ill-prepared
parliament.
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Cross-nationally, this trend to nominate politically inexperienced outsiders that oftentimes
lack party membership, as has been happening in Japan but also more recently in France
and Germany, underlines the relevance to study its behavioral consequences not only
for legislatures but also for the electorate. Do candidates and MPs selected under open
recruitment compensate their lack of legislative prowess by greater loyalty to the party and
do they mobilize segments of the electorate hitherto abstaining from voting? Are voters
more satisﬁed with democracy if they can vote for candidates that appear untainted by
establishment politics? As the trend of candidate recruitment in established democracies
moves into this general direction, these questions are becoming more relevant.
115
Chapter 4 Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate Recruitment
References
Asano, Masahiko. 2006. Shimin Shakai ni okeru Seido Kaikaku: Senkyo Seido to Kôhosha
Rikur	uto [System Reform at the Level of Civil Society: Electoral System and Candi-
date Recruitment]. Tokyo: Keio University Press.
Austria Presse Agentur. 2017. 100 "Experten" auf der Bundesliste von Sebastian Kurz.
Die Presse online: https://diepresse.com/home/innenpolitik/nationalrat
swahl/5275456/100-Experten-auf-der-Bundesliste-von-Sebastian-Kurz,
accessed: 09.01.2018.
Black, Gordon S. 1972. A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of
Structural Incentives. American Political Science Review 66 (1): 144159.
Burden, Barry C. 2007. Personal Roots of Representation. Princeton University Press.
Campbell, Rosie, and Philip Cowley. 2014. What Voters Want: Reactions to Candidate
Characteristics in a Survey Experiment. Political Studies 62:745765.
Carey, John. 2009. Legislative Voting and Accountability. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Carson, Jamie L., Erik J. Engstrom, and Jason M. Roberts. 2007. Candidate Quality,
the Personal Vote, and the Incumbency Advantage in Congress. American Political
Science Review 101 (2): 289301.
Catalinac, Amy. 2016. From Pork to Policy: The Rise of Programmatic Campaigning in
Japanese Elections. Journal of Politics 78 (1).
Cross, William, and André Blais. 2012. Who Selects the Party Leader? Party Politics
18 (2): 127150.
Dalton, Russel J., and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds. 2002. Parties without Partisans: Po-
litical Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
De Lange, Sarah L., and David Art. 2011. Fortuyn versus Wilders: An Agency-Based
Approach to Radical Right Party Building. West European Politics 34 (6): 1229
1249.
Faas, Thorsten. 2003. To Defect or Not to Defect? National, Institutional and Party
Group Pressures on MEPs and their Consequences for Party Group Cohesion in the
European Parliament. European Journal of Political Research 42:841866.
Fox, Richard L., and Jennifer L. Lawless. 2005. To Run or Not to Run for Oﬃce: Ex-
plaining Nascent Political Ambition. American Journal of Political Science 49 (3):
642659.
. 2010. If Only They'd Ask: Gender, Recruitment, and Political Ambition. Journal
of Politics 72 (2): 310326.
Galasso, Vincenzo, and Tommaso Nannicini. 2011. Competing on Good Politicians.
American Political Science Review 105 (1): 7999.
116
Chapter 4 Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate Recruitment
Gallagher, Michael, and Michael Marsh, eds. 1988. Candidate Selection in Comparative
Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics. SAGE.
Hazan, R. Y., and G. Rahat. 2010. Democracy within Parties: Candidate Selection Meth-
ods and Their Political Consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hirano, Shigeo, and J. M. Snyder Jr. 2014. Primary Elections and the Quality of Elected
Oﬃcials. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 9 (4): 473500.
Indridason, I. H., and Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson. 2015. Primary Consequences: The Ef-
fects of Candidate Selection through Party Primaries in Iceland. Party Politics 21
(4): 565576.
Kenig, Ofer. 2009. Democratization of Party Leader Selection: Do Wider Selectorates
Produce More Competitive Contests? Electoral Studies 28 (2): 240247.
Kenig, Ofer, William Cross, Scott Pruysers, and Gideon Rahat. 2015. Party Primaries:
Towards a Deﬁnition and Typology. Representation 51 (2): 147160.
Langston, Joy. 2006. The Changing Party of the Institutional Revolution. Electoral Com-
petition and Decentralized Candidate Selection. Party Politics 12 (3): 395413.
Lawless, J. L. 2012. Becoming a Candidate. Political Ambition and the Decision to Run
for Oﬃce. Cambridge University Press.
Lawless, Jennifer L., and Kathryn Pearson. 2008. The Primary Reason for Women's
Underrepresentation? Reevaluating the Conventional Wisdom. Journal of Politics
70 (1): 6782.
Lundell, Krister. 2004. Determinants of Candidate Selection. The Degree of Centraliza-
tion in Comparative Perspective. Party Politics 10 (1): 2547.
Par, Maxime F., Mathilde Damgé, Sophie Dupont, Vincent Nouvet, Jérémie Baruch,
Anne-Aël Durand, Maxime Vaudano, et al. 2017. Qui sont les candidats de la
République en marche aux législatives 2017? L'enquête du Monde". Le Monde on-
line: http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/06/06/qui-sont-
les-candidats-de-la-republique-en-marche-l-enquete-du-monde_5139646_
4355770.html, accessed: 16.05.2018.
Pilet, Jean-Benoit, and William P. Cross. 2014. The Selection of Party Leaders in Com-
parative Perspective. In The Selection of Political Party Leaders in Contemporary
Parliamentary Democracies. A Comparative Study, edited by Jean-Benoit Pilet and
William P. Cross, 222239. New York: Routledge.
Poguntke, Thomas, Susan E. Scarrow, Paul D. Webb, Elin H. Allern, Nicholas Aylott,
Ingrid van Biezen, Enrico Calossi, et al. 2016. Party Rules, Party Resources and the
Politics of Parliamentary Democracies: How Parties Organize in the 21st Century.
Party Politics 22 (6): 661678.
Put, Gert-Jan, Athanassios Gouglas, and Bart Maddens. 2015. Candidate Selection,
Intraparty Competition and Incumbency Turnover: Analysis of the Belgian Lower
House Elections. Paper presented at the 73th Annual Conference of the Midwest
Political Science Association in Chicago, April 16-19.
117
Chapter 4 Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate Recruitment
Rahat, G., R. Y. Hazan, and Richard S. Katz. 2008. Democracy and Political Parties. On
the Uneasy Relationship between Participation, Competition and Representation.
Party Politics 14 (6): 663683.
Rahat, Gideon, and Reuven Y. Hazan. 2001. Candidate Selection Methods. An Analytical
Framework. Party Politics 7 (3): 297322.
Ripperger, Anna-Lena. 2016. Jetzt geht es zum Vorstellungsgespräch. Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung online: http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/rheinl
and-pfalz-spd-sucht-per-stellenanzeige-bundestagskandidaten-14444560.
html, accessed 08.01.2017.
Samuel, Henry. 2017. 'A third' of Emmanuel Macron's MPs are 'considering quitting'
due to lack of morale. The Telegraph online: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/2017/12/14/third-emmanuel-macrons-mps-considering-quitting-due-
lack-morale/.
Shoji, Kaori. 2013. When Do Party Leaders Democratize? Analyzing Three Reforms of
Voter Registration and Candidate Selection. PhD diss., Columbia University.
Shomer, Yael. 2009. Candidate Selection Procedures, Seniority, and Vote-Seeking Behav-
ior. Comparative Political Studies 42 (7): 945970.
Shugart, Matthew S., Melody E. Valdini, and Kati Suominen. 2005. Looking for Locals:
Voter Information Demands and Personal Vote-Earning Attributes of Legislators un-
der Proportional Representation. American Journal of Political Science 49 (2): 437
449.
Smith, Daniel M., Robert J. Pekkanen, and Ellis S. Krauss. 2013. Building a Party:
Candidate Recruitment in the Democratic Party of Japan, 1996-2012. In Japan Un-
der the DPJ. The Politics of Transition and Governance, edited by Kenji E. Kushida
and Phillip Y. Lipscy. Stanford, CA: The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Paciﬁc Research
Center.
Smith, Daniel M., and Hidenori Tsutsumi. 2014. Candidate Selection Methods and Policy
Cohesion in Parties: The Impact of Open Recruitment in Japan. Party Politics 22
(3): 339353.
The Economist. 2017. Emmanuel Macron's democratic Revolution. online: https://
www.economist.com/briefing/2017/06/17/emmanuel-macrons-democratic-
revolution, accessed 11.07.2017.
Van Biezen, Ingrid, and Thomas Poguntke. 2014. The Decline of Membership-based
Politics. Party Politics 20 (2): 205216.
Van Haute, Emilie, and Anika Gauja, eds. 2015. Party Members and Activists. Routledge.
Young, Lisa, and William Cross. 2002. Incentives to Membership in Canadian Political
Parties. Political Research Quarterly 55 (3): 547569.
Yu, Ching-Hsin, Eric Chen-Hua Yu, and Kaori Shoji. 2014. Innovations of Candidate
Selection Methods: Polling Primary and Kobo under the New Electoral Rules in
Taiwan and Japan. Japanese Journal of Political Science 15 (4): 635659.
118
Chapter 4 Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate Recruitment
Appendix
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics by Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 Selection Background Mean St. Deviation Min Max N
Incumbents
k	obo     63
non-k	obo     270
Return to District
k	obo once a week*  never every day 63
non-k	obo once a week*  never every day 270
Distance from Parliament, in km
k	obo 5.005 1.339 2.190 6.798 63
non-k	obo 5.355 1.392 0 7.592 270
Party Oﬃce
k	obo 0 0 0 0 0
non-k	obo 0.041 0.198 0 1 11
Executive Oﬃce
k	obo 0.031 0.177 0 1 2
non-k	obo 0.122 0.328 0 1 33
Vote Margin
k	obo 7.442 12.810 −26.68 36.97 63
non-k	obo 10.301 13.854 −26.74 47.52 270
Previous Party Voteshare in District
k	obo 37.215 7.751 16.931 56.968 63
non-k	obo 42.479 12.752 0 73.618 78
Seniority
k	obo 0.556 1.059 0 5 63
non-k	obo 2.693 2.389 0 12 270
Born in Prefecture
k	obo 0.635 0.485 0 1 40
non-k	obo 0.730 0.445 0 1 197
Hypothesis 2
MPs
k	obo     245
non-k	obo     1252
PMBs Initiated
k	obo 0.102 0.455 0 3 14
non-k	obo 0.314 0.953 0 12 207
PMBs Cosponsored
k	obo 0.906 2.085 0 12 80 †
non-k	obo 1.217 2.294 0 25 547 †
Written Questions
k	obo 0.563 2.777 0 32 29 †
non-k	obo 2.044 16.62 0 423 228 †
Seniority
k	obo 0.665 1.325 0 11 245
non-k	obo 3.018 2.785 0 15 1252
Party Oﬃce
k	obo 0.008 0.0902 0 1 2
non-k	obo 0.044 0.205 0 1 55
Parliamentary Oﬃce
k	obo 0.482 0.501 0 1 118
non-k	obo 0.698 0.459 0 1 874
Executive Oﬃce
k	obo 0.016 0.127 0 1 4
non-k	obo 0.113 0.316 0 1 141
Vote Margin
k	obo 5.405 14.038 -36.32 61.29 245
non-k	obo 10.996 16.596 -47.52 90.6 1252
k	obo District
k	obo 1 0 1 1 393
non-k	obo 0 0 0 0 1104
Government MP
k	obo 0.812 0.391 0 1 199
non-k	obo 0.634 0.482 0 1 794
* denotes the mode instead of mean; † number of MPs with PMB/Question/Speeches greater than or equal to 1.
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Table 4.3: Number of Written Questions. Negative Binomial Estimation.
Number of Written Questions
Selection Background, Operationalization B Robustness Check
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Seniority −0.316∗∗∗ −0.316∗∗∗ −0.321∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗∗ −0.324∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Party Oﬃce 0.064 0.066 0.055 0.077 0.086 0.082
(0.425) (0.427) (0.421) (0.440) (0.442) (0.440)
Parliamentary Oﬃce 0.185 0.188 0.162 0.131 0.133 0.129
(0.269) (0.272) (0.268) (0.300) (0.301) (0.300)
Executive Oﬃce −31.624∗∗∗ −31.610∗∗∗ −31.526∗∗∗ −31.617∗∗∗ −31.277∗∗∗ −30.869∗∗∗
(0.438) (0.442) (0.476) (0.477) (0.401) (0.503)
Electoral Margin −0.010 −0.010 −0.011 −0.009 −0.007 −0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Government MP −6.885∗∗∗ −6.894∗∗∗ −7.018∗∗∗ −6.943∗∗∗ −6.983∗∗∗ −6.842∗∗∗
(0.404) (0.421) (0.472) (0.466) (0.464) (0.476)
k	obo −0.814∗∗ −0.769∗ −1.093∗∗∗
(0.360) (0.396) (0.349)
k	obo-District −0.066 0.785 −0.020
(0.526) (0.567) (0.530)
k	obo × Seniority −0.053
(0.160)
k	obo × Government MP 0.686
(0.777)
k	obo-District × Seniority −0.456∗∗∗
(0.130)
k	obo-District × Government MP −28.643∗∗∗
(1.005)
Constant 1.343∗∗∗ 1.341∗∗∗ 1.375∗∗∗ 1.421∗∗∗ 1.384∗∗∗ 1.416∗∗∗
(0.304) (0.306) (0.297) (0.313) (0.324) (0.314)
Observations 1,497 1,497 1,497 1,292 1,292 1,292
Period Fixed-Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Party Fixed-Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Log Likelihood −1,100.782 −1,100.765 −1,100.199 −987.515 −986.799 −987.272
θ 0.197∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.197∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.197∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.188∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.189∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.188∗∗∗ (0.016)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,229.564 2,231.531 2,230.399 2,003.029 2,003.597 2,004.544
Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.4: Number of Written Questions. Negative Binomial Estimation, Operationaliza-
tion A
Number of Written Questions
Operationalization A
(1) (2)
Seniority −0.309∗∗∗ −0.313∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.051)
Party Oﬃce 0.045 0.023
(0.435) (0.436)
Parliamentary Oﬃce 0.177 0.140
(0.274) (0.270)
Executive Oﬃce −31.649∗∗∗ −31.560∗∗∗
(0.440) (0.480)
Vote Margin −0.010 −0.010
(0.008) (0.008)
k	obo −0.664 −1.047∗∗∗
(0.411) (0.374)
Government −6.885∗∗∗ −7.000∗∗∗
(0.415) (0.471)
k	obo × Government 0.773
(0.778)
Intercept 1.324∗∗∗ 1.362∗∗∗
(0.310) (0.300)
Observations 1,497 1,497
Period Fixed-Eﬀects YES YES
Party Fixed-Eﬀects YES YES
Log Likelihood −1,102.091 −1,101.481
θ 0.195∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.196∗∗∗ (0.016)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,232.183 2,232.962
Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.5: Number of PMBs Cosponsored. Negative Binomial Estimation.
Number of PMBs Cosponsored
Selection Background, Operationalization B Robustness Check
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Seniority −0.070∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029)
Party Oﬃce 0.087 0.061 0.073 0.127 0.134 0.108
(0.277) (0.269) (0.262) (0.270) (0.268) (0.266)
Parliamentary Oﬃce 0.636∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ 0.608∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.112) (0.113) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122)
Executive Oﬃce −0.388∗∗ −0.382∗∗ −0.433∗∗ −0.399∗∗ −0.408∗∗ −0.402∗∗
(0.183) (0.183) (0.181) (0.182) (0.181) (0.183)
Vote Margin 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Government MP −1.834∗∗∗ −1.812∗∗∗ −1.708∗∗∗ −1.727∗∗∗ −1.731∗∗∗ −1.700∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.113) (0.114) (0.116) (0.115) (0.120)
k	obo −0.166 −0.344∗∗ 0.312∗
(0.152) (0.154) (0.175)
k	obo-District 0.130 0.002 0.276
(0.142) (0.247) (0.215)
k	obo × Seniority 0.166∗∗∗
(0.047)
k	obo × Government MP −0.928∗∗∗
(0.247)
k	obo-District × Seniority 0.044
(0.065)
k	obo-District × Government MP −0.233
(0.287)
Intercept 0.182 0.215∗ 0.159 0.177 0.197 0.162
(0.122) (0.122) (0.124) (0.127) (0.129) (0.128)
Observations 1,497 1,497 1,497 1,292 1,292 1,292
Period Fixed-Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Party Fixed-Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Log Likelihood −1,898.941 −1,896.887 −1,891.861 −1,710.924 −1,710.519 −1,710.542
θ 0.897∗∗∗ (0.078) 0.905∗∗∗ (0.079) 0.925∗∗∗ (0.081) 0.901∗∗∗ (0.082) 0.902∗∗∗ (0.082) 0.902∗∗∗ (0.082)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,825.882 3,823.774 3,813.721 3,449.848 3,451.038 3,451.083
Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.6: Number of PMBs Cosponsored. Negative Binomial Estimation, Operational-
ization A
Number of PMBs Cosponsored
Operationalization A
(1) (2)
Seniority −0.073∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028)
Party Oﬃce 0.070 0.118
(0.274) (0.273)
Parliamentary Oﬃce 0.614∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.115)
Executive Oﬃce −0.388∗∗ −0.420∗∗
(0.183) (0.181)
Vote Margin 0.004 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
k	obo −0.261 0.236
(0.160) (0.195)
Government −1.821∗∗∗ −1.736∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.114)
k	obo × Government −0.865∗∗∗
(0.292)
Intercept 0.201 0.177
(0.122) (0.124)
Observations 1,497 1,497
Log Likelihood −1,898.171 −1,893.450
θ 0.900∗∗∗ (0.078) 0.919∗∗∗ (0.081)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,824.342 3,816.899
Standard errors clustered by MPs; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.7: Number of PMBs Initiated. Negative Binomial Estimation.
Number of PMBs Initiated
Selection Background, Operationalization B Robustness Check
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Seniority 0.211∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Party Oﬃce −0.160 −0.166 −0.152 −0.178 −0.176 −0.186
(0.330) (0.332) (0.331) (0.332) (0.332) (0.334)
Parliamentary Oﬃce 0.824∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.186) (0.185) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182)
Executive Oﬃce 0.209 0.199 0.157 0.181 0.179 0.177
(0.262) (0.261) (0.259) (0.259) (0.259) (0.261)
Electoral Margin 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Government MP −1.900∗∗∗ −1.853∗∗∗ −1.756∗∗∗ −1.792∗∗∗ −1.792∗∗∗ −1.763∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.185) (0.186) (0.181) (0.181) (0.190)
k	obo −0.548∗∗ −1.249∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.279) (0.353) (0.256)
k	obo-District 0.034 0.006 0.184
(0.212) (0.327) (0.257)
k	obo × Seniority 0.367∗∗∗
(0.084)
k	obo × Government MP −2.494∗∗
(0.976)
k	obo-District × Seniority 0.007
(0.056)
k	obo-District × Government MP −0.253
(0.415)
Constant −1.998∗∗∗ −1.946∗∗∗ −1.994∗∗∗ −1.902∗∗∗ −1.898∗∗∗ −1.914∗∗∗
(0.291) (0.289) (0.293) (0.288) (0.292) (0.295)
Observations 1,497 1,497 1,497 1,292 1,292 1,292
Period Fixed-Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Party Fixed-Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Log Likelihood −806.098 −804.207 −801.540 −790.251 −790.247 −790.112
θ 0.344∗∗∗ (0.047) 0.346∗∗∗ (0.047) 0.355∗∗∗ (0.049) 0.362∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.362∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.363∗∗∗ (0.050)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,640.195 1,638.413 1,633.081 1,608.502 1,610.494 1,610.223
Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.8: Number of PMBs Initiated. Negative Binomial Estimation, Operationalization
A
Number of PMBs Initiated
Operationalization A
(1) (2)
Seniority 0.196∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026)
Party Oﬃce −0.174 −0.158
(0.331) (0.330)
Parliamentary Oﬃce 0.751∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.185)
Executive Oﬃce 0.203 0.188
(0.261) (0.260)
Vote Margin 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
k	obo −1.821∗∗ −1.177
(0.767) (0.762)
Government −1.817∗∗∗ −1.784∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.183)
k	obo × Government −30.947∗∗∗
(0.759)
Intercept −1.903∗∗∗ −1.906∗∗∗
(0.283) (0.283)
Observations 1,497 1,497
Period Fixed-Eﬀects YES YES
Party Fixed-Eﬀects YES YES
Log Likelihood −801.469 −799.819
θ 0.358∗∗∗ (0.049) 0.359∗∗∗ (0.050)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,630.939 1,629.637
Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.9: Robustness Check. Ordinal Logit Estimation.
Returning to District
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Operationalization A Operationalization B
k	obo 0.619∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗ 0.161 0.469∗∗
(0.205) (0.211) (0.180) (0.207)
k	obo × Seniority −0.438∗∗∗
(0.147)
Distance from Diet, in km (log) −0.676∗∗∗ −0.692∗∗∗ −0.686∗∗∗ −0.707∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.060) (0.059) (0.061)
Party Oﬃce −0.572 −0.247 −0.205 −0.322
(0.375) (0.383) (0.383) (0.385)
Executive Oﬃce −0.876∗∗∗ −0.496∗ −0.512∗∗ −0.422
(0.236) (0.256) (0.255) (0.258)
Vote Margin −0.009 −0.009 −0.010∗ −0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Seniority −0.170∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043)
Born in Prefecture 0.040 0.014 0.012 −0.018
(0.147) (0.148) (0.148) (0.150)
Previous Party Voteshare in District −0.014∗ −0.003 −0.003 −0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Cut-oﬀ Thresholds
never|once a month −6.858 −6.914 −6.958 −7.003
once a month| two three times a month −6.579 −6.616 −6.659 −6.703
two three times a month|once a week −5.960 −5.963 −5.999 −6.045
once a week|every other day −3.687 −3.596 −3.644 −3.659
every other day|every day −2.802 −2.697 −2.758 −2.744
Observations 333 333 333 333
Party Fixed-Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Likelihood −317.256 −309.063 −310.769 −306.054
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.10: Number of Written Questions. Zero-inﬂated Negative Binomial Estimation.
Number of Written Questions
Operationalization A Operationalization B
(1) (2) (1) (2) (3)
Zero Component
k	obo −11.485∗∗∗ −11.863∗∗∗ 0.957 −2.453∗∗ −3.839∗∗∗
(1.947) (2.128) (1.029) (0.818) (0.891)
Executive Oﬃce 17.554∗∗∗ 17.554∗∗∗ 28.746∗∗∗ 16.225∗∗∗ 16.224∗∗∗
(2.092) (2.246) (0.996) (0.970) (1.016)
Intercept −16.255∗∗∗ −9.026∗∗∗ −8.732∗∗∗
(0.976) (0.985) (1.009)
Count Component
k	obo −1.192∗∗ −1.318∗∗∗ −0.814∗ −1.093∗∗ −0.768∗
(0.388) (0.392) (0.394) (0.370) (0.453)
k	obo × Government 0.324 0.686
(0.787) (0.773)
k	obo × Seniority −0.053
(0.222)
Seniority −0.233∗∗∗ −0.235∗∗∗ −0.316∗∗∗ −0.321∗∗∗ −0.316∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.071) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Party Oﬃce −0.291 −0.303 0.064 0.055 0.065
(0.474) (0.468) (0.451) (0.447) (0.450)
Parliamentary Oﬃce 0.171 0.153 0.185 0.162 0.188
(0.277) (0.274) (0.277) (0.277) (0.279)
Vote Margin −0.009 −0.009 −0.010 −0.011 −0.010
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Government −6.233∗∗∗ −6.301∗∗∗ −6.885∗∗∗ −7.018∗∗∗ −6.891∗∗∗
(0.416) (0.480) (0.431) (0.494) (0.440)
Intercept 1.676∗∗∗ 1.694∗∗∗ 1.343∗∗∗ 1.375∗∗∗ 1.341∗∗∗
(0.318) (0.318) (0.319) (0.320) (0.320)
Observations 1497 1497 1497 1497 1497
Period Fixed-Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES
Party Fixed-Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES
Log Likelihood −1142.497 −1142.345 −1099.782 −1099.205 −1099.772
Log(θ) −0.970∗∗∗ (0.092) −0.970∗∗∗ (0.092) −1.626∗∗∗ (0.081) −1.624∗∗∗ (0.081) −1.625∗∗∗ (0.081)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2316.993 2318.689 2233.564 2234.409 2235.544
Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Zero component in model (1) & (2) estimated without intercept due to convergence issues
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Table 4.11: Number of PMBs Cosponsored. Zero-inﬂated Negative Binomial Estimation.
Number of PMBs Cosponsored
Operationalization A Operationalization B
(1) (2) (1) (2) (3)
Zero Component
k	obo 11.448∗∗∗ −3.313∗ 12.501∗∗∗ −3.548∗∗ 13.132∗∗∗
(1.540) (1.453) (1.350) (1.168) (1.416)
Executive Oﬃce 20.836∗∗∗ 8.111∗∗∗ 23.883∗∗∗ 7.479∗∗∗ 27.096∗∗∗
(1.335) (1.249) (0.875) (1.557) (0.837)
Intercept −22.703∗∗∗ −9.806∗∗∗ −25.839∗∗∗ −9.168∗∗∗ −29.105∗∗∗
(1.793) (1.090) (1.538) (1.534) (1.585)
Count Component
Seniority −0.080∗∗ −0.084∗∗ −0.076∗∗ −0.082∗∗ −0.084∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030
Party Oﬃce 0.079 0.124 0.091 0.081 0.062
(0.265) (0.263) (0.267) (0.253) (0.259)
Parliamentary Oﬃce 0.623∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.111) (0.109) (0.109) (0.110)
Vote Margin 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
k	obo −0.253∗ 0.226 −0.152 0.305∗ −0.343∗
(0.151) (0.190) (0.139) (0.171) (0.149)
Government −1.849∗∗∗ −1.767∗∗∗ −1.861∗∗∗ −1.742∗∗∗ −1.836∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.112) (0.108) (0.112) (0.108)
k	obo × Government −0.844∗∗ −0.908∗∗∗
(0.280) (0.242)
k	obo × Seniority 0.182∗∗
(0.057)
Intercept 0.213∗ 0.191∗ 0.194∗ 0.173 0.230∗
(0.119) (0.120) (0.118) (0.119) (0.120)
Observations 1497 1497 1497 1497 1497
Period Fixed-Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES
Party Fixed-Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES
Log Likelihood -1898.406 -1894.275 -1898.636 -1892.852 -1896.249
Log(θ) −0.095 (0.088) −0.073 (0.089) −0.098 (0.088) −0.067 (0.089) −0.089 (0.088)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3830.813 3824.550 3831.272 3821.704 3828.498
Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.12: Number of PMBs Initiated. Zero-inﬂated Negative Binomial Estimation.
Number of PMBs Initiated
Operationalization A Operationalization B
(1) (2) (1) (2) (3)
Zero Component
k	obo 2.305 1.760 −8.302 −11.930∗∗∗ −1.908
(1.636) (1.607) (5.270) (1.937) (10.754)
Executive Oﬃce −0.641 −0.599 −0.768 −0.494 −0.721
(1.682) (1.562) (1.251) (0.745) (1.810)
Intercept −0.618 −0.602 −0.464 −0.285 −0.406
(2.343) (2.318) (1.248) (0.943) (1.035)
Count Component
Seniority 0.199∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.033)
Party Oﬃce −0.080 −0.064 −0.051 −0.013 −0.053
(0.457) (0.456) (0.381) (0.365) (0.465)
Parliamentary Oﬃce 0.731∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.196) (0.182) (0.182) (0.207)
Vote Margin 0.011 0.011 0.012∗ 0.011 0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Government −1.774∗∗∗ −1.748∗∗∗ −1.892∗∗∗ −1.724∗∗∗ −1.840∗∗∗
(0.217) (0.216) (0.192) (0.197) (0.323)
k	obo −0.542 −0.179 −0.899∗ −0.485 −1.478∗
(0.751) (0.729) (0.417) (0.420) (0.873)
k	obo × Government −14.149∗∗∗ −2.528∗∗
(0.750) (0.977)
k	obo × Seniority 0.315
(0.577)
Intercept −1.451 −1.447 −1.495∗ −1.415∗∗∗ −1.410
(1.030) (1.031) (0.674) (0.610) (1.035)
Observations 1497 1497 1497 1497 1497
Period Fixed-Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES
Party Fixed-Eﬀects YES YES YES YES YES
Log Likelihood −799.133 −797.655 −803.047 −797.710 −801.264
Log(θ) −0.251 (0.566) −0.236 (0.568) −0.241 (0.568) −0.050 (0.428) −0.186 (0.589)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1632.266 1631.310 1640.093 1631.419 1638.528
Note: Standard errors clustered by MPs; ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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The second round of the French legislative elections on 18th June 2017 only conﬁrmed
what many pundits and pollsters have been predicting: the end of the traditional French
party system revolving around alternating majorities for either the centre-right and its
allies or the centre-left with its allies. Founded only a year before the dramatic poll, the
winner of the contest was La Républic En Marche! (REM). The party's founder and leader,
Emmanuel Macron, a political outsider in his own right31 won the French presidency only
a month earlier. Part of his party's appeal were the many fresh faces it presented the
voter. Roughly half of all candidates of REM were political novices hailing from the civil
society, while the other half migrated from other parties. Dual party membership, in fact,
was and is still allowed.32 The downside of this fairy-tale of democratic rejuvenation comes
in the form of rookie MPs that are not up for the job. Lacking in political expertise and
oftentimes party membership, many of the newly elected MPs were not socialized for their
legislative tasks. So much so, that a substantial number of them have considered quitting
altogether (see Samuel 2017).
The party received around 19.000 applications before the election and had to ﬁll ca.
250 vacant electoral districts with candidates selected through this open recruitment.
The REM's slate of candidates were on average the second youngest and reached a gender
ratio of perfect parity with 232 women to 229 men. Of these candidates only 244, however,
have held political oﬃce before and 255 have previously been a member of another party.33
Hence, lacking the socialization into politics left these newcomers totally unprepared for
and with ill-ﬁtting expectations of their legislative tasks and duties.
31Although he has spent three years as ﬁnance minister in the cabinet of his predecessor François
Hollande, Macron has never stood for an elective oﬃce before.
32See https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/lrem/legislatives-les-candidats-de-
la-republique-en-marche-investis-d-ici-a-jeudi_1906237.html; accessed: 17.12.2018.
33See https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/06/06/qui-sont-les-candidats-
de-la-republique-en-marche-l-enquete-du-monde_5139646_4355770.html; accessed: 17.12.2018
and https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2017/05/24/qui-sont-les-7-882-
candidats-aux-legislatives_5132898_4355770.html; accessed: 17.12.2018.
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Given the recent developments in candidate recruitment, the trend toward more open
recruitment and the decline in importance of party membership for candidacies, it seems
we stand to see more candidates and MPs that enter parliament without political social-
ization through (long-term) party membership and prior political expertise (either within
the party or in local oﬃce). The examples from Japan (chapter 4) and France show that
when parties lack suitable candidates they are not afraid of using open recruitment to ﬁll
vacant districts. The SPD's candidate casting in Rhineland-Palatine is another point in
case. More generally, however, it seems that parties tend to become more open for non-
members as is the case with Sebastian Kurz's party list or career changers (see also Bailer
et al. 2013)  a development foreshaded by parties' organizational trajectories over the
last 100 or so years (see Katz and Mair 1995). But what do all these developments entail
for the working of legislatures, for party unity and the legislative activity of MPs?
This thesis has investigated these questions and has examined how certain party rules for
the selection of candidates and how long-term party membership aﬀects the behavior of
MPs and the unity of parties. Both of these phenomena eventually have implications for
the working of legislatures and governments. Hence, by providing empirical evidence for
the inﬂuence of candidacy eligibility criteria (CEC) and that of long-term party mem-
bership on party, candidate and MP behavior this thesis has made a ﬁrst contribution
to the study of CEC and the importance of a strong party membership background for
legislative behavior.
In terms of theory, this thesis centers on the importance of socialization processes within
parties that are indispensable for both, the internalization of the party's norms and values,
and the preparation for politics in parliament. These processes evolve hand-in-hand with
(active) party membership. Social identity theory suggests that solely belonging to a
group by and in itself leads to the development of a social identity aﬀecting attitudes and
behavior (e.g., Turner 1991; Ashforth and Mael 1989). Spending time with other party
members nudges politicians and future candidates to reevaluate their attitudes in light of
what they deem appropriate to elicit in-group praise and avoid potential social sanctions
or ostracism. Apart from internalizing the party's norms and values on how to behave
(especially in the case of conﬂicting opinions), party membership also exposes its members
to the working of politics in general and helps to regulate expectations about it.
Hence, the most important message of my thesis is that party membership matters. It
matters for candidates' loyalty to the party's platform, for uniform voting behavior of
Members of Parliament, the overall activity in the legislature and for the embeddedness
in co-partisans' networks  in short it matters for the overall and seamless working of party
government. In the background of these ﬁndings loom parties' candidate selection rules,
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most prominently formal candidacy eligibility criteria, which determine who can stand
as candidate. Focusing on this candidacy dimension in candidate selection, I go beyond
the often posed question of who decides in candidate selection. Instead, my thesis sheds
some ﬁrst light on what kind of questions can be answered by a systematic investigation
of parties' eligibility criteria and candidates' party membership background.
What is the underlying mechanism that connects candidacy eligibility criteria with party
membership and party membership with behavior in parliament? The central link between
eligibility criteria and party membership is as straigthforward as is the link between party
membership and legislative behavior: socialization into the party and internalization of its
norms and values. Formal candidacy eligibility criteria that expect would-be candidates
to spend a certain minimum time in the party and that demand other party members to
vouch for a candidate entail (or perhaps enforce) the socialization of the candidacy-seeking
aspirant into the party's milieu and subculture. With time as an (active) member comes
psychological attachment to the party and an increase in the number of aﬃliative ties to
other party disciples. Membership thus entails the development of a social identity that
internalizes norms, such as party unity, for its own sake and in order to receive approval
from relevant others, i.e. party members, necessary to prop up one's own social identity.
This social identity, which of course is a matter of degree, and the values that comes with
it can aﬀect legislative behavior. I have presented several empirical tests of these links
in the preceding three chapter, of which the ﬁrst one has examined the role of formal
eligibility criteria on candidate and MP behavior, the second one the eﬀect of degrees
of party membership socialization on uniform voting behavior in the absence of formal
sanctions and the last chapter the consequences of a lack of strong party membership
background for legislative activity.
In chapter 2, Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Party Unity, I have analyzed the role of
formal candidacy elibility criteria for party unity. Drawing on the principal-agent frame-
work, I argue that by setting stricter eligibility criteria parties can avoid adverse selection
by weeding out non-committed opportunistic candidates and instead select  or rather
reward  candidates that have proven themselves loyal through long-term service in the
party. With the collection of roughly 500 historical and contemporary party constitutions,
which I have combined with parliamentary voting records at the party level and candidate
survey data, I have shown that some types of eligibility criteria are more associated with
greater party unity and greater revealed loyalty of candidates than others. Speciﬁcally, it
is those formal criteria that demand a longer minimum period of party membership prior
to candidacy and those that nudge aspirants to maintan good relations with other party
members. Both of these types of criteria entail processes of socialization into the party of
the candidates. These ﬁndings speak to two arguments made in the literature on party
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unity. For once, it relates to the argument that citizens with similar ideological procliv-
ities sort themselves into parties, as eligibility criteria can amplify this type of behavior
by deterring non-committed opportunistic citizens. Moreover, these ﬁndings underscore
the importance of socialization processes within the party for party unity. Finally, as the
ﬁrst systematic investigation of candidacy eligibility criteria and their eﬀects on behavior,
this ﬁnding adds to our understanding how a dimension of candidate selection methods,
hithertho neglected, shapes behavioral outcomes.
Chapter 3, Party Membership, Pre-Parliamentary Socialization and Party Cohesion, has
investigated the role of long-term party membership on voting behavior of Members of
the German Bundestag. Based on social identity theory, I have generated several hypothe-
ses on how party membership reﬂects socialization processes into the party's norms and
values. Upon entering a political party, new entrants develop over time and in interaction
with other party members a new social identity. This social identity internalizes rules
and norms deemed important by other group members, whose approval the entrant seeks.
Thus, longer running membership consolidates these norms further. Empirically, I have
tested these claims by examining the voting behavior of German MPs on so-called free-
votes, i.e. votes on which party discipline has been lifted or no oﬃcial party position
has been given. Looking at these free-votes allows to more credibly attributed uniform
voting behavior of individual MPs to their converging preferences with the rest of the
party and to their internalization of group norms, such as upholding party unity even in
the face of personal disagreement. Socialization and internalization is measured by four
diﬀerent indicators of the degree of party membership socialization; the age at which the
MP has joined the party, the length of party membership before the ﬁrst candidacy, hold-
ing a party oﬃce before ﬁrst candidacy and whether the MP has ever been a member
of a diﬀerent party. My ﬁndings suggest that socialization into the party tend to result
in less disagreement and more agreement with the majority of the party, that this, how-
ever, varies across parties. This ﬁrst empirical investigation of how gradual measurement
of party membership informs voting behavior contributes to our understanding of how
party membership, a proxy for party-internal socialization processes, inﬂuences legislative
behavior and party unity.
Lastly, chapter 4, Behavioral Consequences of Open Candidate Recruitment, explores the
behavioral consequences of lacking a strong party membership background. This chapter
compares the legislative activity of MPs with strong party membership background with
those that lack this background. Here, I took advantage of the Japanese case, where
major parties have been nominating candidates through open recruitment and through
more traditional ways at the same time. I have theorized that candidates that answer to
parties' public calls for applications are more motivated by oﬃce than by policy and that
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they lack prior political experience. Lacking socialization processes within the party, these
candidates and MPs are ill-suited to master quickly the challenges of legislative work.
Due to their weak standing in the party, I expected them to be more concerned with
constituency work, meant to garner support for future elections, and less involved in the
legislative process. Using survey data and observational data on such activities as written
questions and Private Member Bills (PMB), I have shown that MPs selected through open
recruitment are in fact less likely to ask questions and hold government accountable when
in opposition, and similarly less likely to engage in drafting PMBs when in government.
Moreover, it appears that they are even sidelined by their more traditional colleagues that
do not ask them to cosponsor their own PMBs. Instead, I found that open recruitment
MPs are more likely to return more often to their district while parliament is in session
 an observational implication of higher personal responsiveness to the constituency and
the local party branch (although this ﬁnding should be treated cautious due to potential
misreporting). In conclusion, this chapter suggests that party membership is not only
important for party unity and voting behavior, but also for activity in parliament.
Implications for Research & Candidate Selection
The overarching insight of this thesis is that party membership matters and that it is a
matter of degree. Moreover, I have found that a set of candidate selection rules hitherto
neglected  candidacy eligibility criteria  aﬀect the unity of parties through channels, i.e.
the type of personnel, other than those promoted usually in the literature, i.e. obedient
behavior in light of re-selection incentives. Due to these insights this thesis has several
implications for future research but also for political practioneers.
In the academic realm for instance, the novel approach I took in measuring party member-
ship could prove useful beyond answering the question for which this operationalization
was used in this thesis. While previous studies have predominantly used dichotomous indi-
cators for party membership (e.g., Kam 2001), i.e. {member, ¬member}, I have measured
party membership in a more ﬁne-grained way by counting the years of party membership
prior to a MP's ﬁrst candidacy and, in a second version, the year at which the MP had
joined the party for the ﬁrst time. This operationalization allowed me to measure the
degree of intra-party socialization in a continuous fashion. Future studies may equally
beneﬁt from a more ﬁne-grained measure of party membership when exploring campaign
or legislative behavior of candidates and MPs.
Moreover, party membership in and as itself has only seldomly be used as a prime explana-
tory variable. Here, my ﬁndings speak to the importance of long-term party membership
for congruent and loyal behavior and at the same time to the lack of activity when party
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membership is lacking. Especially in times of dwindling numbers in party aﬃliates, these
ﬁndings may hold further repercussions for the future.
Another implication of my ﬁndings relates to the phenomenon of party unity. Many theo-
retical models in political science, for example, rely on the assumption of parties as unity
actors, one of which is the responsible party government model (Ranney 1962). This model
stipulates that parties are mainly policy-driven and communicate their policy program
during electoral campaigns which, once elected, they enact thanks to their party unity.
Voters may then reward or punish the party's performance comes the next election. But if
parties now, driven by motivations for oﬃce, select candidates and future MPs that lack
in reverence for the party's platform, undermine party unity or in other ways fall short
in delivering intricate legislative and legal texts a responsible party government could be-
come unattainable  as the example of the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn attests to (de Lange
and Art 2011).
For democratic accountability  which of course lurks beneath the responsible party gov-
ernment model  formal candidacy eligibility criteria hold implications as well. Delegation
in democracies is ubiquitous, with voters delegating to parties, which in turn delegate to
candidates and MPs, who again delegate to the cabinet that eventually delegates to min-
isters and bureaucrats (e.g., Müller, Bergman, and Strøm 2003). With more demanding
CEC the delegation chain between the party and its candidates and MPs can be strength-
ened. Setting higher bars for candidates  or agents  the party  or principal  can rule
out candidates whose own interests are too far oﬀ from that of the party and can thus
contain agency loss. Parties beneﬁt as they maintain a uniﬁed policy image and minimize
inﬁghting and voters beneﬁt as parties are more likely to deliver what they have promised.
In the end, satisfaction with democracy increase and, thus, democracy beneﬁts. However,
CEC, too, need to be understood as a continuoum and may have a stronger or weaker
impact on the chain of delegation, depending on the design of these formal eligibility
requirements.
On top of that, my dissertation holds implications for political parties and political practi-
tioneers alike. As the analyses in the preceding chapters have suggested, party membership
matters on multiple dimensions. It aﬀects the preference homogeneity and the degree of
commonly shared norms and values, manifesting itself in uniform voting behavior of the
party's MPs, and the future MPs' procedural and inside knowledge about the workings
of parliament, expressing itself in the degree of legislative activity.
An increasing number of political parties has started to open up their supply of candi-
dates. Oftentimes, candidates without prior party membership are nominated and elected
to parliament. What can parties adopting these recruitment policies expect from their
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candidates and MPs? Although they might electorally be attractive, they harbor serious
risks for the party's unity and legislative output. How can parties successfully combine
candidates of both backgrounds? My research would suggest to not nominate too many
candidates that lack a strong party membership background when credible and eﬀective
means for sanctioning are absent.
Avenues for Future Research
The research I have presented in the preceding chapters underscore the consequentiality
of candidacy eligibility criteria and party membership for various political phenomena
at the individual level of candidates or MPs and the level of the party. It touches upon
several literatures in political science, including the broader literature on political parties,
political sociology and legislative politics. This research holds extensive implications for
future research; not only research on candidate selection, but also on political ambitions,
representation and legislative behavior. The following paragraphs brieﬂy sketch potential
future research agendas that could build on the research I have presented. All of these
research ideas relate to the literature on candidate selection and have implications for
political representation and legislative behavior.
My research on candidacy eligibility criteria suggests that they exert an independent
impact on behavioral outcomes and thereby provide a new angle from which candidate
selection can be studied. My ﬁndings therefore imply that, ﬁrst and foremost, future
research in this ﬁeld should devote more time in collecting, coding and systematizing
candidacy eligibility criteria further. The serious gap in our knowledge about and in
the availability of CEC impedes meaningful further research in this area. In fact, we
know little about the development of CEC over time and how fragmented CEC of the
same party might be in its diﬀerent territorial branches. Yet, parties' candidacy eligibility
criteria can tell us a lot about their preferences for loyal candidates, for rewarding long-
term party members or for non-party outsiders that may bring an electoral bonus to the
table. CEC can tells us about party's preferences for oﬃce (i.e., nominating more party
outsiders) or for policy and representation of their supporters (i.e., nominating more
long-term party members). Consequently, they can tell us about the likely ideological
composition of parliament and perhaps their legislators' ability to compromise on policy
grounds.
Moreover, I argue that future research on candidate selection should take the candidacy
dimension more seriously into account. Studies examining the impact of the selectorate di-
mension in candidate selection on party unity, for instance,  a quite popular topic recently
(e.g., Faas 2003; Hix 2004; Depauw and Martin 2008; Shomer 2016, 2017)  can beneﬁt
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from including candidacy eligibility criteria into their theoretical and statistical models
to more clearly estimate the eﬀects of candidate selection methods on party unity.
What are the consequences of various types of CEC for representation? Do more exclusive
eligibility criteria lead to the selection of candidates that reﬂect the parties' voter to a
larger degree in terms of socio-economic status or other factors relevant to that particular
party's electorate? Are voters facing candidates more similar to themselves happier with
democracy than those voters who have to vote for someone who is socio-economically
far away from them and their prefered party's ideology? In other words, can CEC help
boosts parties' candidates to exhibit greater descriptive representativity of the parties'
core voters?
Future research on CEC should also explore and investigate the interplay of CEC, party's
selectorates and electoral systems. How do they interact? Are they reinforcing each other
or are they used to supplement each other? Have CEC even stronger implications for
non-professionalized parliaments whose legislators are less dependent on a political career
in political parties? To answer these and related questions we need collect more CEC in
a systematic manner.
One genuine potential avenue for future research is to investigate and explore how political
ambitions for candidacies or party oﬃces unfold in response to the incentive structures
generated by parties' candidacy eligibility criteria (see e.g., Schlesinger 1966; Black 1972;
Norris and Lovenduski 1993; Fox and Lawless 2005, 2010; Lawless 2012). Extant research
on political ambition (Schlesinger 1966; Fox and Lawless 2005, 2010; Lawless 2012) focuses
predominantly on the US with its distinct system of candidate selection. But how do
other systems of candidate selection, in particular the candidacy eligibility criteria of
parties in the parlamentarian systems of Europe and Australia and New Zealand aﬀect
the development of political ambitions? Smith (2014), for instance, reports that most
candidates of the Japanese K	omeit	o are usually approached by the party leadership rather
than come forward themselves. But how does political ambition interact with more formal
eligibility rules of parties? How do these formal criteria aﬀect the development of ambitions
for candidacy among party members belonging to minority groups? Are they especially
unlikely to come forward and seek candidacies? And if so, is this due to rather direct or
indirect discrimination (see also Norris and Lovenduski 1993)? How do eligibility criteria
for party oﬃce and party leadership positions (Kenig 2009) aﬀect the political ambition
of, say, women?
Research on formal candidacy eligibility criteria should be complemented in future re-
search by a thorough investigation of formal and informal criteria for the non re-selection,
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i.e. the de facto de-selection, of incumbent MPs. Are formal criteria, such as age limits,
adhered to and do they result in what they were intended to achieve, i.e. a younger party
in parliament? When do selectors make exemptions from such formal criteria? And, more
critically, what are informal criteria for the de-selection of incumbents? At what points
will untenable incumbents be de-selected by the party's selectorate (see also Put, Gouglas,
and Maddens 2015)? Naturally, empirical examinations have to overcome the challenge of
the endogeneous decision of MPs to seek re-selection in light of possible strong challengers
or a party's selectorate unwilling to further support a nomination.
This potential strand of future research stands to gain in explanatory leverage from insti-
tutional changes within parties. Two German parties, the Greens (Bündnis90/Die Grünen)
and the Left party (Die Linke), have adopted in some of their regional branches quotas
for young and rookie candidates. In some German states, the Greens have adopted a new-
comer quota stipulating that one in every three consecutive list positions has to go to a
candidate that has not yet been a member of a professionalized legislative body  that
is, Landtag (regional legislature), Bundestag or European Parliament. Somewhat similar
but more informal, the Left party aims to guarantee two safe slots on the list for candi-
dates under age 35 in some states (Reiser 2014). How will parties deal with the excess
number of incumbents after introducing such rules? Will they have to hope on voluntary
retirement, a rotational system or perhaps a vote? How will party selectors decide among
excess incumbents? Future research in this direction holds insights in how a rejuvenation
of politics in times of political disenchantment with establishment politics is possible.
What do parties value in incumbents? Are less loyal incumbents easier targets, than, say,
policy experts? And, eventually, will these rules in fact result in younger parliamentary
party groups and perhaps in policies geared toward the young (see McClean 2018)?
Moreover, future studies may explore how diﬀerent dimensions in candidate selection
(Hazan and Rahat 2010) interact with and complement each other. Are parties that are
relatively lenient in their eligibility criteria more likely to have instituted a more central
and exclusive selectorate? And likewise, are parties that link nominations to stricter el-
igibility criteria more likely to democratize their selectorate than those that do not? In
addition, do electoral systems need to be taken into account here? One could expect that
electoral systems that employ single-member districts and in which candidate selection
therefore is often organized locally, party leadership may ensure the selection of commit-
ted candidates by setting nationwide strict eligibility criteria, lest local party branches
nominate candidates beneﬁcial only to the local party. Entertaining this thought further,
the leadership of parties using closed lists in systems using proportional representation
can ensure loyalty and committment of their candidates and MPs through clear incen-
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tives for re-selection and may therefore be in a more comfortable position to open up their
recruitment.
Finally, future research may build upon the research on candidacy eligibility criteria by
exploring what party selectors' are looking for in candidates on top of the fulﬁllment
of formal eligibility criteria. This research avenue may beneﬁt tremendously from new
advances in experimental research, as for example by employing the ever more popu-
lar conjoint analysis (e.g., Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014; Horiuchi, Smith,
and Yamamoto 2018). By placing (hypothetical) pairs of candidates with a given set of
attributes before party selectors, future research stands to gain insights into the prefer-
ences of parties for certain personal and political attributes of candidates, whether subtle
biases potentially cement current underrepresentation of minority groups and women,
and whether electoral incentives might condition the preferences of selectors for certain
candidate attributes.
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